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Introduction
The Archaeology of Knowledge by Michel Foucault is a book that 
presents a number of challenges. Most obviously, it introduces a lot of 
new terminology and makes many methodological distinctions, and for 
this reason presents a certain technical diffi culty. However, there are 
other reasons. First and foremost, it addresses a specifi c problem that is 
not really explained in the book itself, concerning how thought in late 
modernity has responded to the impasse that Foucault describes in the 
fi nal chapters of The Order of Things, and which hinges on the fi nitude 
of man. My fi rst aim in this book is to show that The Archaeology of 
Knowledge is a deliberate attempt to accelerate a response that was 
in his view already underway. In addition, Foucault’s text does little 
to make it clear where the most important precedents lie for the con-
ceptual and methodological steps that he takes. For many readers, this 
is made worse by the fact that some of these precedents may be rela-
tively unfamiliar today. Without some appreciation of them, however, 
I believe one’s understanding of what Foucault is doing in this book 
will be incomplete. The precedents lie primarily in the philosophy of 
mathematics, the philosophy of science and the epistemology of the 
fi rst half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the work of 
Gaston Bachelard and Jean Cavaillès. Michel Serres’ early work on the 
history and epistemology of mathematics is also very signifi cant, as are 
other elements of his thinking, such as his readings of atomism and of 
Leibniz.
It is on the basis of this work, I maintain, that Foucault elaborates 
the central ideas of The Archaeology of Knowledge, and in particular 
his attempt to respond to the challenge that he set near the end of The 
Order of Things; namely, to repeat Kant’s critique of pure reason on 
the basis of the mathematical a priori (OT 383, 394). In different ways, 
for Bachelard, Cavaillès and Serres, mathematics is fundamentally 
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   1 29/10/2012   08:47
2 Foucault’s Archaeology
historical in its practice, and even in its formal basis. As a result, the 
conception of the mathematical a priori to which Foucault refers feeds 
directly into an understanding of the historical a priori, which remains 
one of the most contested ideas in Foucault’s work as a whole, and cer-
tainly in The Archaeology of Knowledge. The understanding of history 
that emerges also involves an engagement with the question of time, 
and here again the work of Bachelard, Cavaillès and Serres is crucial. 
In thinking about the question of time in relation to the conditions for 
knowledge and experience, one comes up against Foucault’s concep-
tion of the historical a priori. This has been read as the key element in 
Foucault’s attempt to rethink the transcendental conditions for knowl-
edge and experience without recourse to the category of the subject. 
However, it may be that Foucault goes further still, and that the idea of 
the historical a priori, and the whole apparatus of which it is a part, is 
developed with the intention of avoiding the category of the transcen-
dental as well. Taking such a view, the reading I put forward proposes 
that the mathematical background to archaeology allows Foucault to 
introduce the idea of historical a priori conditions for discourse without 
repeating the distinction between the transcendental and empirical that 
would tie archaeology back into the situation from which it aims to 
break free.
The fi rst part of this book comprises a short series of introductory 
pieces that have two functions. First, they put Foucault’s study in the 
context of his diagnosis of the situation of knowledge and thinking 
at the end of modernity. Second, they outline the themes and ideas in 
the work of Bachelard, Cavaillès and Serres that I think are important 
for understanding Foucault’s text. These pieces are not intended to 
be comprehensive and I encourage anyone interested in the ideas they 
introduce to read further for themselves. The main body of this book 
is then simply a commentary, chapter by chapter, on The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, written with the material and the problematic I have 
described in mind.
While it is my view that a reading based on this material is important 
for an appreciation of what happens in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
I do not claim that the reading presented here is the fi nal word. There 
are too many precedents, problematics and textual connections not 
covered here for that to be the case. In particular, I do not discuss the 
work of Georges Canguilhem or of Louis Althusser, but this is only 
for reasons of simplicity and clarity, and because their connection 
with Foucault is already well documented. Finally, this book focuses 
solely on the account of archaeology presented in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, without reference to other works by Foucault where 
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this idea also appears. Again, this is simply to try to make the reading 
here as clear as possible, and to avoid having to take into account the 
changes that took place in Foucault’s own work over the period in 
question.
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1 .  T O  W H A T  P R O B L E M  D O E S  T H E 
A R C H A E O L O G Y  O F  K N O W L E D G E  R E S P O N D ?
In The Order of Things, Foucault recounts how, in his view, thought in 
modernity has run into something of a dead end. Different branches of 
enquiry are held within a structure which ensures that each alone is nec-
essarily incomplete, or which commits them to tracking an origin that 
moves continually beyond reach. At the heart of this diagnosis of the 
condition of thought in modernity lies the fi gure of man, and in particu-
-lar of the fi nitude of man.1 The Order of Things famously closes with 
the suggestion that man, this pivotal fi gure in the drama of modernity, 
may be a recent invention and one perhaps nearing its end, soon to dis-
appear ‘like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’ (OT 387, 398). 
If The Archaeology of Knowledge is read as a methodological clarifi ca-
tion of how Foucault understood the practice of thinking at the time, 
then, in its simplest form, his challenge is to explain the meaning of this 
disappearance. Yet the fi nal two chapters of The Order of Things leave 
no doubt that Foucault was more than just a dispassionate observer 
of the changes he saw overtaking the fi gure of man in modernity and 
regarded himself as a participant in the transformation of the practice 
of thinking described in those chapters. However, for all the rich detail 
in Foucault’s analysis of what had become of thinking in modernity, 
the description of what lay ahead is sketchy. The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, published three years after The Order of Things, can there-
fore be read not just as a retrospective exercise in methodology covering 
his earlier works, but as an experiment in a form of thought that he saw 
taking shape in the wake of the disappearance of man. As such, it takes 
up some of the ideas merely outlined in the closing pages of The Order 
of Things and works them into a lengthy (though never complete) 
inventory of concepts, problems and approaches in a new practice of 
thinking; one intended to break free from the impasse in which thinking 
had been caught in modernity.
In their early phases, the sciences of biology, economics and philol-
ogy tried to draw the truth of their object of study from its own depths: 
life was to be defi ned from itself, labour was to illuminate the meaning 
and conditions of exchange, profi t and production, and language was 
to yield up the conditions of grammar and discourse (OT 312, 323). 
This left ‘man’ in an ambiguous position. For it is only in terms of his 
body, his works and his language that he can be known, yet the sci-
ences that address them depend in their turn on man as a living being, 
as the one whose labour is exchanged for profi t, and one whose desires 
and thoughts are expressed in language. At the point where the laws 
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of life, production and language seem to exclude man, he reappears at 
their heart; and at the point where man seems most fully determined 
by these laws, he stands as their enigmatic condition. On the one hand, 
the fi gure of man seems to dissolve into the many currents of positive 
knowledge that form him; on the other hand, the ‘objective’ knowledge 
of man calls for a rigorous foundation, which leads to an inquiry into 
man as the fi nite subject who represents, and ultimately back to the 
Kantian problematic of uncovering the transcendental conditions for 
the possibility of experience. In this twofold movement, man is revealed 
as what Foucault calls a transcendental-empirical double, ‘since he is 
a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders 
all knowledge possible’ (OT 318, 329). In practice, empirical sciences, 
such as neurophysiology, history and linguistics, depend on the fi gure 
of man as an object of study. In this sense, they presuppose the exist-
ence of a truth to be discovered. In the case of neuroscience, by learning 
about the functioning of the brain we are learning something not just 
about complex networks enclosed in the skull, but about ourselves in a 
more profound sense. Similarly, in the study of history there is at least 
the trace of an expectation that we will understand human life a little 
better, and not just the events leading up to a war or the transformation 
of a system of government. Yet these sciences must also presuppose that 
discourse involves a commensurate truth, in order that it can effectively 
communicate what it describes. Again, Foucault traces the dilemma 
faced by modern thought, but in slightly different terms: either the 
truth of the object determines the truth of the discourse that describes 
it, leading to positivism, or the truth of the philosophical discourse 
constitutes the truth of the phenomenon, leading to a form of discourse 
that Foucault calls ‘eschatological’ (OT 320, 331). Foucault presents 
the two modes of thought as indissociable: each alone is incomplete 
and calls forth the other, leading to a fl uctuating movement between 
branches of enquiry, while ‘man’, as the fi xed point on which thought 
as a whole might rest, remains out of reach. The attempt to settle the 
fl uctuation by combining eschatology and positivism will only end in 
being both at once, and thereby lapse into a pre-critical naivety (OT 
320, 331).
As Foucault has outlined, the empirical sciences of biology, econom-
ics and language that are intended to establish the truth of what both 
limits and grounds human existence depend on the conditions they are 
supposed to describe. Moreover, their relation to eschatology is secured 
by the fi gure of the fi nitude of man, around which the fl uctuation 
between modes of inquiry occurs. But in fact, the analyses of life, labour 
and language that set out the concrete conditions determining the exist-
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ence of man only trace the contours of a fi rst, and superfi cial, form of 
fi nitude. In ‘the spatiality of the body, the yawning of desire, and the 
time of language’ they meet a more essential fi nitude than that to which 
they are proximally addressed. As Foucault writes, empirical positivi-
ties depend on the fi nitude of man understood not as a limitation but 
as ‘a fundamental fi nitude which rests on nothing but its own existence 
as a fact, and opens upon the positivity of all concrete limitation’ (OT 
315, 326). As Foucault recounts, the determination of this fundamental 
fi nitude calls for an analytic of man’s mode of being.
In response to the bifurcation of both man and knowledge in 
modernity, there have been attempts to fi ll the dimension opened up 
by discovering ‘a discourse whose tension would keep separate the 
empirical and the transcendental, while being directed at both’ (OT 
320, 331). Such a discourse would have to illuminate the ground of 
both the empirical human condition and the capacity of the human for 
knowledge – a complex role Foucault sees as having been performed 
by a particular form of the analytic of fi nitude that he identifi es as ‘the 
analysis of lived experience’ (OT 321, 331–2).2 Lived experience is, he 
continues, ‘both the space in which all empirical contents are given to 
experience and the original form that makes them possible in general 
and designates their primary roots’ (OT 321, 332). In its fi delity to 
the fi nitude of man as a transcendental-empirical double, the analysis 
of lived experience appears to contest positivism and eschatology, to 
suppress the naivety of empirical discourse and ‘restore the forgotten 
dimension of the transcendental’ (OT 321, 332). It can do this only 
in so far as, beneath the division between positivism and eschatol-
ogy, it traces the outline of lived experience as a third alternative, ‘an 
ambiguous stratum, concrete enough for it to be possible to apply to 
it a meticulous and descriptive language, yet suffi ciently removed from 
the positivity of things for it to be possible, from that starting point, to 
escape from that naïveté, to contest it and seek foundations for it’ (OT 
321, 332). In this way, it opens up communication between the body 
and culture, between nature and history, but only ‘on condition that the 
body, and, through it nature, should fi rst be posited in the experience of 
an irreducible spatiality, and that culture, the carrier of history, should 
be experienced fi rst of all in the immediacy of its sedimented signifi ca-
tions’ (OT 321, 332). Although not the sole contributor to such an 
analysis, phenomenology, and Heidegger’s analytic of the existence of 
Dasein in particular, is placed to make a major contribution here, since 
it aims to disclose the fi nite existence of Dasein as it shows itself from 
itself, without assuming a more general ontology, without taking over 
a traditional (metaphysical) conception of man, and without deriving 
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the fi nitude of Dasein from some notion of the absolute. However, in 
Foucault’s view, Heidegger’s phenomenology remains caught up in a 
deeper tendency within modernity.
Where the Cartesian cogito held out the promise of immediate cer-
tainty and transparency, modernity, writes Foucault, discovers only 
an obscure sensation that thought cannot coincide with itself, that it 
‘resides elsewhere than here’ in so far as it is conditioned in ways that 
are diffi cult to fathom. The attempt to close up the gap that separates 
thinking from itself leads it down into the ramifi ed and inert ‘network of 
what does not think’ (OT 324, 335). There, it hopes not to defi ne itself 
against what it is not, but somehow to take hold of the unthought con-
dition of its own being. As Foucault writes, the unthought is contained 
within man as something from which man cannot free himself. It is the 
Other of man, the ‘in itself’ in Hegel, the unconscious in Schopenhauer, 
the implicit and the inactual in Husserl, and alienation in Marx (OT 
327, 338). For Heidegger, having characterised Dasein in terms of the 
fi nitude of its original temporality, the unthought takes the form of 
‘that rent, devoid of chronology and history, from which time issued’ 
(OT 332, 343). In his later writing, it is the event of Ereignis. However 
it is understood, the weakness of phenomenology for Foucault lies in its 
repetition of the division between a founding event and a founded exist-
ence. As he sees it, if phenomenology takes the form of an interrogation 
of man in his relation to the unthought, then it ‘continually resolves 
itself, before our eyes, into a description – empirical despite itself – of 
actual experience, and into an ontology of the unthought that auto-
matically short-circuits the primacy of the “I think”’ (OT 326, 337). 
Foucault’s concern is that, regardless of this fl aw, the analysis of lived 
experience, in the guise of phenomenology, takes upon itself the role of 
a founding discourse that it cannot fulfi l. It enjoys a double privilege, 
in so far as the irreducibility of the dimension of its analysis secures its 
radicality, and the immediacy of experience safeguards its evidential 
basis.3 As a consequence, while the analysis of lived experience succeeds 
in bringing to light the dimension underpinning both positivism and 
eschatology, and while it provides a fresh reading of human existence 
understood more than ever in its own terms, it exerts a conservative 
infl uence on the structure it apparently calls into question. In effect, 
by placing positivism and eschatology on a more secure foundation, 
the analysis of actual experience shores up the structure within which 
those discourses have their place. Foucault recognises that in order for 
thought to shake off this constraint and move freely beyond the division 
between transcendental and empirical forms of inquiry, the irreducibil-
ity of the space of actual experience and the immediacy of its evidence 
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must both be called into question. This amounts to allowing man to 
disappear from the scene. More specifi cally, it means breaking open 
the dimension of existence so that it is no longer a unity, guaranteed 
in advance and anchored in a transcendental ground, or opened by a 
founding event that has always already occurred. This raises two ques-
tions, or groups of questions. First, if the fi gure of man disappears in 
this way, then neurophysiology or history can no longer be regarded as 
perspectives upon a deep and enigmatic existence that underlies them. 
So what are they really about? Second, if the fi gure of the fi nitude of 
man disappears, what then becomes of the structure of knowledge, and 
in particular of its division between positivism and eschatology? Might 
it survive the loss and install itself in a new form?
Is there anything to prevent knowledge falling back into pre-critical 
naivety? In one way or another, for Foucault, the disappearance of man 
removes the requirement for unity that underpins knowledge, without 
thereby undermining knowledge itself, and he welcomes the pluralism 
and multiplicity that comes from this. Moreover, he does not believe 
that the disappearance of man means the triumph of positivism. There 
are conditions underpinning knowledge, and they are historical, not 
transcendental; but their history cannot be levelled down to that of 
empirical events. Foucault’s challenge is to explain what status they do 
have, if they are neither transcendental conditions nor empirical causes. 
He will do this through an engagement with Bachelard, Cavaillès and 
Serres, and the ideas of the mathematical a priori and temporal disper-
sion. However, these descriptions are really little more than names for 
transformations that take place in the organisation of knowledge, and 
which need to be unpacked with care.
2 .  G A S T O N  B A C H E L A R D :  C O N S T R U C T I O N  A N D 
T E M P O R A L  D I S C O N T I N U I T Y
Gaston Bachelard has been an immensely infl uential fi gure in French 
philosophy since his work became well known in the early 1930s. 
His importance for Foucault is quite properly given wide recognition, 
but the focus tends to be on Bachelard’s idea of the epistemological 
break, and other elements of his thought receive less attention than 
they deserve. While the epistemological break is undeniably signifi -
cant, the mathematical basis of Bachelard’s constructivism, the way 
he positions his thought with respect to Kant, his understanding of 
modern physics, especially atomic physics (microphysique), and his 
account of temporal discontinuity, may all be at least as signifi cant, 
if not more so. In addition, and interwoven with many of the themes 
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just  mentioned, Bachelard’s idea of a ‘distributed rationality’ and his 
description of science as ‘a well ordered dispersion’ both set a precedent 
that Foucault’s archaeology was later to follow (PN 12).
For Bachelard, science is not the direct formalisation of experience, 
but the modifi cation of the conditions of existing experience – fi rst, as 
a break away from the everyday, and subsequently as a ‘correction’ 
of the conditions of the reality proposed by science. To open itself to 
the possibility of thinking scientifi cally, the mind has fi rst to shake off 
the grip of everyday experience and the everyday practices that give 
the ideas within it a veneer of naturalness. This is the idea of the epis-
temological break as a condition for scientifi c thought that Bachelard 
introduced in The Formation of the Scientifi c Mind. The idea meets 
with an ambivalent response from Foucault: he accepts the need for 
thinking to pierce the surface of what appears natural, and therefore 
universal and beyond the possibility of transformation, but on the other 
hand his interest in the operation of power in and through scientifi c 
discourses meant that he was less of an outright advocate for science 
than Bachelard had been, and less judgemental about the shortcomings 
of everyday forms of thought and experience. Ironically, Foucault’s 
appropriation of modes of thought taken from the mathematical sci-
ences will be put to use later in a critical discourse that challenges the 
effects of science. Moreover, for Bachelard, the epistemological break is 
a relatively sharp division, whereas for Foucault the transition is a his-
torical process that is most likely to be gradual, and which may depend 
on several different transitions taking place and falling into a pattern 
together before the break occurs. In short, what Bachelard describes as 
a clear-cut break is for Foucault a more complex process.4
Beneath the idea of the epistemological break lies the broader and 
more fundamental issue of Bachelard’s constructivism, and therefore 
of his opposition to empiricism. Bachelard understood that modern 
science is driven by mathematics, and that mathematics is a language 
apart that is not a formalisation of our everyday experience. This means 
that it would be a mistake for mathematical science to look for a foun-
dation for its judgements in intuition, since this would only tie it back 
to the world of sensibility, instead of allowing mathematics to devise 
new kinds of objects, concepts, and forms of judgement that have 
not been abstracted from experience.5 Sensible intuition as we know 
it is only a narrow form of what intuition can be. This is illustrated 
by the development of non-Euclidean geometries, which began as an 
experiment in pure mathematics, with no expectation that it would 
have an application to the ‘real’ world. Yet many years after Gauss, 
Bolyai, Lobachevsky and Riemann tried setting aside Euclid’s fi fth 
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postulate, the strange geometries they produced proved crucial for the 
general theory of relativity.6 In this example, mathematics constructed 
a description of a reality that did not exist, and which could only exist 
subsequently because of the freedom of mathematics from the world 
as it is experienced. This is to say that mathematics constructed the 
conditions of an experience that did not exist before. Another example 
is the physics of sub-atomic particles that also sprang into life in the 
early twentieth century. While their relations are treated as real and 
can be rigorously described, the particles themselves are ‘represented 
by metaphors’ and do not share the basic properties associated with 
objects of experience (NM 74). This is because, unlike objects of experi-
ence, sub-atomic particles are not substances about which we can learn 
more by isolating them (NM 74). They can only be spoken of at all in 
so far as they are in relation with other particles. Consequently, there 
are, writes Bachelard, only substantial properties above the microscopic 
scale, whereas ‘the substance of the infi nitely small is contemporane-
ous to the relation’ (NM 74).7 Mathematical physics, quite literally, 
proposes ‘a noumenon beneath the phenomenon’ (NM 76). It describes 
the non-phenomenal conditions of the phenomenal, which is then 
understood as constructed, rather than discovered or disclosed. This 
is a form of experimental metaphysics in which scientifi c rationality 
runs ahead of what is accepted as real, a practice that Bachelard calls 
‘sur-rationalism’ (PN 19). The laws that give form even to phenomena 
as they present themselves at a given moment (so leaving aside future 
innovations in science) are therefore not to be drawn from empirical 
experience. Instead, one has to look for the ‘rational laws we fi nd at the 
level of noumenology’ (NM 76).8 He calls these laws the ‘mathematical 
a priori’, anticipating the phrase that Foucault uses towards the end 
of The Order of Things in recommending a new critical philosophy.9 
Bachelard then picks out two features of the mathematical a priori for 
comment. First, he insists that these conditions are characterised by 
complexity, a judgement he explains elsewhere in terms of the theory-
dependence of the meaning of concepts. Just as particles have no sub-
stantial properties of their own and are only ‘real’ in so far as they are 
in relation with other particles, so concepts are intrinsically relational. 
For example, the basic elements of Newtonian science are those of 
absolute space, absolute time and absolute mass, but relativistic physics 
shows that these ‘notional atoms’ are themselves complex. The mass of 
an object depends on its velocity, and this in turn will depend on the 
frame of reference in which the description is given; and yet in spite of 
this, ‘mass’ remains a basic element of physics (PN 31). The ‘beautiful 
simplicity of realism’ is thereby lost, and reason is presented as a faculty 
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that develops in the direction of increasing complexity (PN 28–9).10 
Second, Bachelard notes that the mathematical a priori is a ‘mere func-
tional a priori, and has nothing of the absolute’, which refl ects the fact 
that the laws proposed are provisional and revisable (NM 77). Taken 
together, these conditions of the mathematical a priori mean that it can 
be closely aligned with Foucault’s conception of complex historical con-
ditions that are not drawn from empirical experience. What Bachelard 
took from mathematical science and passed on to others, including 
Foucault, is that what for Kant were transcendental conditions for the 
possibility of experience, and for the forms of judgement appropriate 
to it, have been removed from consciousness and laid out in the prac-
tice of mathematics. There, freed from what Bachelard calls ‘an almost 
quasi miraculous accord between the principles of the intuition and 
the understanding’ (PN 108), the conditions of experience are open to 
new forms of modifi cation, which include historical change (and here 
one thinks above all of Léon Brunschvicg and Cavaillès) and the work 
of the scientifi c imagination as Bachelard understands it. Whichever 
form it takes, the fundamental requirement for unity that characterised 
Kantian transcendental conditions is relaxed, allowing for the ideas 
of a distributed rationality and a well-ordered dispersion proposed by 
Bachelard. As a corrective to some readings of Bachelard, however, it 
is important to appreciate that he did not entirely promote openness at 
the expense of coherence. Having made room for experimentation in 
the arrangement of intuitions and concepts, Bachelard was also con-
scious that mathematical categories continue to establish objectivity; 
the world is not by any means dissolved into a free play of imaginative 
construction and reconstruction.11 Again, this recognition of the power 
of discourse to construct objects that appear in experience as real, with 
real relations and real effects, is also found in Foucault, both early on 
and in much later work such as The Birth of Biopolitics.12
Both the pluralism of the rational construction of experience and its 
coherence are refl ected in Bachelard’s account of time. In the 1930s, 
Bachelard wrote two books on time: L’intuition de l’instant (1932) 
and La dialectique de la durée (1936). Although he shared with Henri 
Bergson a concern that time should be a condition for the appearance 
of genuinely new phenomena, Bachelard’s account of time was devel-
oped, or at least presented, in direct opposition to the work of Bergson. 
Recounting the failure of his attempts to fi nd within himself the ‘simple 
sweeping lines’ of continuous time, Bachelard writes that he was drawn 
to ever smaller fragments in the hope that his perception of time might 
resolve either into a still image or into the pure fl ow of time as such. 
But he was always frustrated, as ‘however small the fragment under 
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consideration, we had only to examine it microscopically to see in it 
a multiplicity of events’ (TI 77).13 The closer one attends to time, the 
more detail emerges, and so a belief in continuity can only be the result 
of being too easily satisfi ed by general trends. Instead, drawing on the 
work of the historian Gaston Roupnel, Bachelard developed an account 
of time based around the instant.14 Time, he proposed, is made up of 
instants separated not by intervals (which would simply be periods of 
empty time) but by a temporal void, an absence of time. Since time 
was based on the instant and the instant was presented as an act, the 
void is associated with a state of repose. Time, therefore, appears fi rst 
in the form of rhythm and frequency, and it is from these that one can 
construct temporal continuities. In spite of its clear association with 
atomism, Bachelard was wary of describing the instant as an atom of 
time because of the implication that time could be composed of a series 
of instants simply placed alongside one another – an idea Aristotle had 
long ago exposed as incoherent.15 Instead, he proposed the arithmetisa-
tion of time. If, as Bachelard acknowledges, this idea was indeed drawn 
from the work of Roupnel, Bachelard added to it a good deal of his 
own. In particular, the idea of the arithmetisation of time resolves a 
problem that had concerned mathematicians for some time. While it 
was widely accepted that time and space were fundamentally continu-
ous, at its foundations modern mathematics had exchanged the con-
tinuity of the line for the discontinuity of number. The gains in pure 
mathematical terms of the move to number therefore appeared to come 
at the cost of being unable to account for our fundamental intuitions 
of time and space.16 Dealing specifi cally with time, Bachelard neatly 
turns this situation around by arguing that our intuitions of time as 
continuous were mistaken and providing in their place an account of 
time based on the discontinuity characteristic of number.
Having drawn his inspiration for this account of time from a his-
torian, Bachelard refl ects briefl y on its implications for the study of 
history. Close attention, he writes, reveals that ‘every action, however 
simple, must of necessity break up the continuity of life’s becoming’. 
History is ‘full of repetition and anachronism, of things attempted, of 
failure and fresh starts’ (TI 71). Such events are not contained within 
time, and cannot all be allocated a place on a single scale where they can 
be compared. Different times emerge with the various patterns of their 
repetition, and accident is installed as a basic historical principle. One 
of the corollaries of the displacement of the conditions of experience 
from transcendental consciousness to mathematics is that the subject 
no longer secures the unity of experience, allowing time and history to 
settle into a wide variety of patterns that may not be entirely compat-
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ible with one another, and which may overlap and interfere with one 
another, causing further variations. In science, this pluralism manifests 
itself in a multiplicity of theories and approaches that cannot be made 
into a whole from a single point of view. It is what Bachelard calls ‘a 
well ordered method of dispersion’; and the philosophy that engages 
with such science is a dispersed or distributed philosophy (PN 12).
On the basis of the assimilation into mathematics of the categorial 
function of the understanding in Kant, Bachelard sets out an account 
of constructed experience as coherent but complex and irreducible to 
unity, as historical and plural. These initiatives suggest several points 
of proximity with Foucault’s archaeology, although there are naturally 
also signifi cant differences between them. The latter include a diver-
gence over both the nature of the activity by which science develops 
new laws and the nature of the experimentation that gives rise to 
new objects and forms of thought. In archaeology, the activity of the 
subject, already displaced from its foundational role by Bachelard, is 
removed further still, as new events and transformations spring from 
the complex historical process itself.
3 .  J E A N  C A V A I L L È S :  G R O U N D I N G  T H O U G H T  I N 
I T S  O W N  H I S T O R Y
Jean Cavaillès can be placed in the series of epistemologists and phi-
losophers of science that runs from Brunschvicg via Bachelard, Koyre 
and Canguilhem to Foucault. In a now well-known remark, Foucault 
identifi es this group as forming a second tradition of phenomenology in 
twentieth-century French philosophy alongside that constituted by the 
French reception of Husserl and Heidegger, and the original contribu-
tions of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and others.17 It may well be that in 
charting this second tradition of phenomenology in France, Foucault 
indicates at least as much about his own orientation as about the phi-
losophers he names, since their relation to phenomenology is not imme-
diately obvious. Foucault appears to regard Brunschvicg, Bachelard, 
Cavaillès, Koyre and Canguilhem as indicating a possible approach to 
the analysis of experience that is not grounded in the subject. Bearing 
in mind what Foucault writes about the analysis of actual experience 
in The Order of Things (see above pp. 9–11), such an approach would 
repeat a function previously performed by phenomenology, but in a 
quite different way. A line drawn roughly between the work of the fi ve 
fi gures to whom Foucault refers will therefore be at best parallel to phe-
nomenology, and may arguably converge towards it. If so, the point at 
which it intersects might lie in the work of Cavaillès. In fact, Cavaillès 
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engaged with Husserl’s work for only a brief period, which culminated 
in the critique of Husserl presented in the fi nal part of the long essay 
‘On Logic and the Theory of Science’. Famously, it is at the very end 
of that essay that, to clear the way for an adequate account of science, 
Cavaillès calls for the philosophy of the subject to be replaced by a 
philosophy of the concept.18 In view of the trajectory followed by a sig-
nifi cant part of philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century, 
this may be regarded as an astute anticipation of what was to come, 
but the importance of Cavaillès extends beyond this apparently pres-
cient announcement. His work on the historical dimension of formal 
and rational systems set a precedent that others followed; in particular, 
there is a strong connection between Cavaillès’ work and Foucault’s 
critique of post-Kantian philosophy in its phenomenological form as 
well as his development of archaeology.19 Cavaillès’ exploration of the 
historical character of mathematical thought also led him to propose a 
notion of complex intuition based on a form of temporal pluralism. I 
will look at each of these in turn, after outlining the basic components 
and orientation of Cavaillès’ philosophy.
The problems in the philosophy of mathematics that Cavaillès 
addressed revolved around the disputes over the foundation of math-
ematics in the early part of the twentieth century. Cavaillès was critical 
of the principal approaches to this issue, his reservations arising in the 
main from a concern that the provision of a foundation for mathemat-
ics should not rob mathematical thought of its capacity for generating 
wholly new ideas and conceptual objects. For Cavaillès, the status 
of mathematics as a deductive science had to be compatible with the 
potential for creativity. An examination of different approaches to the 
foundation of mathematics led to him fi nding fault with each of them 
in turn. Breaking with the Kantian framework, he denied a founding 
role either to transcendental consciousness or to the abstraction of rules 
of thought from physical reality. In addition, he opposed the logicist 
attempt to ground mathematics in logic, fi nding a naive realism in its 
defi nition of a set of elementary signs and the rules governing their 
organisation. Taking a constructivist line, he argued that even the most 
basic of mathematical objects is the outcome of antecedent acts and 
operations and that the history of such acts is complex, with no simple 
origin. In the early twentieth century, Luitzen Brouwer presented a 
theory of the foundation of mathematics called intuitionism that took 
a constructivist approach.20 Cavaillès agreed that the objects of math-
ematical thought (and truths about them) were not simply there to be 
discovered. However, in his view, because intuitionism regarded math-
ematical objects as essentially linked to distinct mental acts, the devel-
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opment of mathematical concepts was drawn back into the temporal 
fl ow of consciousness, covering over the uniquely historical character 
of their construction. To oppose this tendency, Cavaillès looked to the 
way Bolzano had separated demonstration as a method from the intui-
tion that had continued to underlie it in Kantian thought; an idea that 
was adopted by Hilbert in his attempt to place mathematics as a formal 
discipline on an axiomatic basis. The separation of demonstration from 
intuition made mathematics a purely conceptual matter divorced from 
the conditions of consciousness, and had the added virtue of meaning 
that the foundation of mathematics did not lie outside it, in the mind, 
in experience or in any other structure or discipline. Moreover, the 
Hilbertian conception of the sign as a constructed object in its own 
right without any further representative function underpinned the 
independence of mathematical activity from empirical reality (what-
ever its eventual application may be). All this was viewed positively by 
Cavaillès. However, the idea that one could establish a purely formal 
ground for the totality of all possible mathematical expressions found-
ered with Gödel’s thesis that it is impossible to prove the completeness 
of any formal system. As a consequence, the formal ground for any 
existent totality of statements has to remain subject to revision and 
development.
In a similar vein, Cavaillès’ principal objection to Husserl in ‘On 
Logic and the Theory of Science’ is that to set out a foundation for 
science by defi ning the formal conditions for any possible theory and 
its objects will inevitably constrain in advance the possible develop-
ment of that science. Given the capacity of mathematics for conceptual 
and methodological innovation, this could be an unwelcome con-
straint. The fact that Husserl allowed for an ongoing revision of the 
proposed formal grounds in the light of phenomenological evidence 
changed little for Cavaillès, since in his view mathematics itself should 
determine both what counts as a mathematical object and the forms 
of theoretical construction and methodology that it accepts, meaning 
that mathematics cannot be grounded in the transcendental activity of 
the subject. For if one were to trace an object back to its construction 
in this sense, one would arrive at a fundamental synthetic activity in 
consciousness that cannot itself be represented without lapsing into 
what Cavaillès describes as a confusion between the condition of rep-
resentation and the representation of conditions, or between a ‘procès 
effectif’ and a ‘procès effectué’ (OC 470). Collapsing one into the other 
makes it possible for analysis to grasp the origin of thinking itself in 
a moment of apodicticity. But if the confusion is recognised, then the 
origin of thinking, the synthetic process by virtue of which objects are 
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given to consciousness, will always have already taken place and will 
thereby remain beyond the reach of thinking (except perhaps through 
an affectivity arising from a fundamental fi nitude). This is what, in 
The Order of Things, Foucault called the retreat of the origin, which 
held in place the doubling of the relation between the empirical and 
the transcendental and opened up the space of the fi nitude of man (OT 
328–35, 339–46). As long as conditions are treated as transcendental, 
then thinking will necessarily be bound by this fi nitude, and so by the 
fi gure of man. Either there will be a confusion between conditions 
and conditioned, as Cavaillès fi nds in Kantian philosophy, including 
Husserlian phenomenology, or thinking will be cut off from its own 
conditions. In the latter case, thinking may relate itself back endlessly 
to an opening or origin that it cannot recover, or it may project that 
recovery into a future that awaits at the end of a path marked out 
by a suitable methodology. Rejecting these choices, Cavaillès pro-
poses a distinctive understanding of the historical character of formal 
thought.
In so far as it is the act of synthesis, or construction, that gives think-
ing its object, there is always a process of some kind that precedes 
thinking itself. Rather than situate this in the depths of the transcenden-
tal subject, Cavaillès treats it as historical. Crucially, however, this is a 
history that cannot be assimilated to cultural history or a phenomeno-
logical conception of the lifeworld. It is a history of the transformations 
undergone by concepts and objects as they acquire their form at a par-
ticular moment, in a particular problematic. This is a distinct process, 
the character of which cannot be properly accounted for in terms 
drawn from other disciplines or domains of rational activity – which 
is what Cavaillès fi nds in Kant, as the structures and activities of con-
sciousness pertaining to logic (though not exclusively) are carried over 
into the analysis of mathematical thinking. Similarly, Husserl’s account 
of consciousness in terms of intentionality replicates the same tendency 
to place mathematical thinking within more fundamental, or higher 
order, structures that provide normativity at the expense of novelty. 
Returning to the idea that mathematics should not be grounded in any 
form of external principle, one can now see that if its foundation has to 
be immanent to mathematical thought, and mathematics is continually 
developing, then the foundation itself must have a fundamentally his-
torical dimension; that is, it cannot simply be a revisable form posited 
each time as universal, or a provisional determination on a teleological 
path to completion. The challenge is therefore to understand what this 
really means, and how such an intrinsically historical character does 
not end up compromising mathematics as a science.
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For Cavaillès, the objects of mathematical thinking are constructed, 
and this construction takes place in a pre-established context of 
rules and signs. As Cavaillès describes it, the rules for the use of con-
cepts, and thus the generation of objects, are embedded in each stage 
in the history of mathematics and moreover are modifi ed by each 
successive stage. This involves a process that Cavaillès calls ‘thema-
tisation’, a form of refl exivity directed not towards the objects of an 
earlier stage, but towards the rules underlying their construction (OC 
512).21 Moreover, because the refl ection is not guided by the objects 
constructed, each step and aspect of the process on which it refl ects can 
be grasped for itself rather than as subordinate to the objects towards 
which it led. In this way, thematisation is the elucidation of what for 
Kant had been transcendental conditions. But whereas for Kant the 
conditions are necessarily fi xed, for Cavaillès their thematisation is at 
the same time their transformation. Every element of this process is 
therefore undergoing continual change, which means that the condi-
tions for the existence of objects at a given stage of mathematics do not 
defi ne the formal limits of all possible mathematical objects; that is, 
they are not the conditions for the possibility of (mathematical) experi-
ence as such, as they would be for Kant. Instead, both the conditions 
and the conditioned existence are specifi c to a given historical moment. 
This has two important consequences.
First, given its historical character, there is a question over the unity 
of mathematics, which is necessary in order to secure its character as 
a science. Cavaillès proposes that it be found in the movement of the 
historical development of mathematics, a movement that has no abso-
lute beginning and no end (OC 655). History, instead of being either a 
threat to formal unity or a process that can play a part only if it adheres 
to a formal rule, is itself the condition of the unity of mathematics. It is 
an autonomous movement conditioned immanently by its own history. 
But precisely because there is no transcendental or formal ground for 
this history, its unity cannot be stated in a principle, or easily repre-
sented (OC 504). Second, because there is no general law governing this 
movement, and no limits to the form it can take, the future of math-
ematics is unpredictable. Cavaillès goes so far as to say that the objects 
that exist at one stage of mathematics were impossible at the stage 
that preceded it (OC 470). This means that viewed from the present, 
even the immediate future is impossible and inconceivable. Inevitably, 
this raises the question of how any change at all can occur. First of all, 
while the construction of new objects in mathematics cannot take place 
without a mathematician to conceive them, they do not originate in the 
subject. Change occurs in the rules for the construction of objects, and 
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not just in the variety of objects and what can be said about them. This 
historical change is not itself governed by higher order rules, but neither 
does it come about haphazardly or by chance. For the problems that 
mathematics confronts call for solutions, and even though these may 
not be possible according to the conditions that determine the exist-
ence of concepts and objects when the problem is posed, the state of 
mathematics at the time will make certain changes to these rules more 
likely than others. At one level, then, demonstration unfolds through 
mathematics itself, and this will involve changes to the rules or condi-
tions by which objects are formed, concepts combined, and so on. But 
in addition, the activity of the mathematician plays an important part, 
and this brings intuition back into the picture.
If the process of construction is defi ned as a rule, then for Cavaillès 
the intuition of a new mathematical object is not defi ned by a single 
such rule, but by bringing different rules into relation with one another, 
leading to the transformation of the whole domain of intuition (OC 
470). Methods and theories undergo ‘encounters and reversals’, and as 
a result new rules for mathematical thinking emerge. Intuition reaches 
out beyond any individual schema that constructs current objects of 
mathematical experience, reconfi guring that experience on the basis of 
other schemata and, crucially, the changes that arise as a result of bring-
ing them into contact with one another. The history that characterises 
mathematics is therefore not just a history of objects, concepts and 
methods. It is a history of the rules by which such objects, concepts and 
methods were excluded as impossible at certain times and demanded as 
necessary at others. Because the historical movement of mathematics 
encompasses not only its objects and its concepts, but also the rules of 
the operations by which they can exist and be combined, mathematics 
owes nothing to any external formal principles and can be described as 
autonomous. Mathematical intuition recognises this autonomy of the 
concepts, rules and procedures that are its objects simply because the 
conditions of such objects lie in antecedent acts within the same math-
ematical domain.22 The role of intuition is therefore not to provide an 
original instance or point of evidence to anchor the analysis, and there 
is no ‘fi rst principle’ or origin to which thinking can return. What is 
given in intuition, for Cavaillès, is, ‘at each instant of its history, the 
system of objects addressed by mathematics at the time’ (OC 578). As 
Cavaillès explains, the mathematical object is not constituted origi-
nally, but ‘is always the correlate of acts (gestes) actually accomplished 
by the mathematician in a given situation’ (OC 602). Along with the 
system of objects given in intuition, a system of acts is therefore also 
given. To track the conditions for the appearance of a particular math-
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   21 29/10/2012   08:47
22 Foucault’s Archaeology
ematical activity one has to trace the history of these acts as it ramifi es 
through various stages and contexts.
For Cavaillès, then, the construction of mathematical objects and 
their relations takes place through the demonstration of successive 
developments. However, because different stages of mathematics are 
constructed according to different rules, their objects and concepts 
cannot be schematised from a single view point. This means that math-
ematics is not only intrinsically historical, but also characterised by a 
temporal pluralism, even within what is for Cavaillès the unity of this 
history; something that is possible because mathematics is unifi ed pre-
cisely by its history, and not by principles that defi ne a stable ground 
or fi xed framework. Finally, it also means that a historical analysis of 
mathematics has to follow the train of demonstration from within, re-
enacting the moves that were made, rather than representing them from 
an external standpoint.
4 .  M I C H E L  S E R R E S :  M A T H E M A T I C S , 
E P I S T E M O L O G Y ,  H I S T O R Y
Structure, regularity, multiplicity and temporal pluralism are just 
a few of the themes that feature both in the work of Serres and in 
Foucault’s archaeology. In addition, there is in Serres’ writing a sense 
both of the complexity of history and of the fact that its signifi cance 
for philosophy reaches beyond being an area of study or a resource of 
possibilities. Moreover – and for a consideration of Foucault’s archae-
ology this is very important – Serres did more than any other thinker 
of his time to open philosophy to mathematical modes of thought. 
Since Foucault emphatically rejects appeals to the idea of ‘infl uence’ 
in archaeological approaches to history, there is little to be gained by 
pointing out that Serres and Foucault were colleagues at the University 
of Clermont-Ferrand in the early 1960s and regularly discussed ideas 
that later found a place in The Order of Things.23 However, there are 
many points at which their work intersects or is closely connected with 
respect to the relation between mathematics, epistemology and history, 
and I shall briefl y outline a few of these here.
François Dosse identifi es Serres as ‘the fi rst philosopher to defi ne an 
explicitly structuralist global programme in the fi eld of philosophy’.24 
Serres’ background was in mathematics, not linguistics, and his famili-
arity with the history of mathematics, and in the twentieth century the 
work of Nicolas Bourbaki in particular, set him apart from the main-
stream of structuralist thought.25 Much of his work has been shaped by 
mathematical ideas of space, formal systems, multiplicities and series, 
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but it is perhaps in questions of methodology and the relation of the 
thinker to the matter of thinking that the infl uence of mathematics 
reaches furthest through his work – that is, mathematics exemplifi ed 
a way of thinking from which philosophy could learn, even had to 
learn.
In the Introduction to Hermes I: la communication (written in 1961, 
though the book was not published until 1968), Serres endorses the 
structuralist emphasis on the formal at the expense of the attribution 
of meaning to individual elements in cultural and historical life, and 
sees no obstacle to the extension of this method beyond the fi elds of 
linguistics and anthropology where it had already been deployed. 
However, he is already aware of the limits of orthodox structuralism 
and critical of the way it deals with form and meaning. Whereas the 
critical discourses of the day moved between what he calls the clas-
sicism of a formal discourse concerned with truth and a romanticism 
that explored the meaning of our pluralistic historical and cultural life 
via its symbolic expression, Serres saw in structuralism an opportunity 
for critique to leave behind this uncomfortable conjunction of contrast-
ing methodologies. However, the difference between the two forms of 
analysis is not easily overcome, and as long as it remains, structuralism 
at least risks falling into a division akin to that between positivism and 
eschatology described by Foucault in The Order of Things, thereby 
reproducing the same motif of fi nitude in a new setting. The problem 
concerns the status of the model or structure itself. For at the level of 
symbolic meaning, the model is to be constructed within the fi eld ana-
lysed and the contents themselves are then understood as repetitions 
of a symbolic model, rather than as copies of an ideal form. But at the 
level of structural analysis the model appears to transcend the contents 
of a given fi eld in so far as it allows one to identify patterns of relations 
between elements that are repeated in the structure of distinct fi elds. 
So either there are two senses of the model, or there is an ambiguity 
such that it is drawn from the fi eld in question and yet also suspended 
beyond it, independent of the concrete cultural meanings that move in 
from different quarters to fi ll it out. To avoid this, and for the model to 
work as Serres wishes, there has to be a new relation between form and 
the concreteness of cultural life. This breaks down into a twofold task: 
fi rst, to write a new account of scientifi c rationality, a new epistemol-
ogy; then, to undertake a new form of critique directed at historical and 
cultural life. The second, Serres adds, is underway (which is presum-
ably a reference to Foucault), but cannot be carried through properly 
until progress is made with the fi rst – and, in spite of the lead given by 
Bachelard, at the time Serres was writing he regarded this as something 
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still to be done. The kind of changes he had in mind were already well 
established in mathematics, but his work, and to some extent also that 
of Foucault, would help to extend them to other fi elds.
For some time, Serres writes, epistemology has no longer been a pre-
scriptive ‘science of sciences’ but rather a discourse in a meta-language 
that describes a particular ‘regional’ scientifi c practice (HI 66). But in 
the case of mathematics, epistemology has lost this role too. For math-
ematics ‘has suffi cient meta-languages to speak of itself, to describe 
itself, and even to found itself’ (HI 66). As Serres puts it, epistemol-
ogy is ‘imported’ entirely into the fi eld of mathematics itself (HI 67) 
and there is no theory of mathematics beyond mathematics itself. The 
science of science, he writes, is no longer a view from above, but an 
internal and regional refl ection (HI 65). Moreover, it is through such 
refl ection that mathematics drives itself on to new developments. For 
refl ection achieves fi delity to its object not by taking its distance from it 
(a condition of the disinterested gaze), but by repeating the movement 
through which the regularities that made it what it is were formed. 
This is necessarily a historical form of refl ection. Moreover, the repeti-
tion adds to the pattern of regularities and therefore the refl ection does 
not simply produce an image of its object, it transforms it; something 
that is possible only where there is no separation between language 
and meta-language.26 Although Serres does not use the terms here, this 
mechanism is closely related to both ‘thematisation’ in Cavaillès and 
problematisation in Foucault.
The fact that description is already an intervention in the regulari-
ties that shape its object suggests that the classical distinction between 
descriptive and normative forms of epistemology needs to be reviewed. 
Classical epistemology sought to regulate the discourse to which it was 
addressed, to determine the conditions by which it could state the truth 
and the limits of its domain, and so forth. Since normative powers were 
acquired by virtue of standing above the regulated discourse, to abolish 
the meta-level would seem to entail giving up the right to being norma-
tive, leaving epistemology as purely descriptive. But Serres is quite clear 
that in so far as modern mathematics has become its own epistemology, 
it has also become self-regulating (HI 70). The integration of refl ection 
into its own practice therefore brings with it a normative dimension, 
such that a careful description of scientifi c practice in a given fi eld will 
reveal the norms by which that practice achieved coherence, with the 
power to determine its ‘true’ objects, concepts, methods and problems; 
and there is no reason why that description cannot itself contribute to 
the formation or modifi cation of the regularities giving that determina-
tion its force. This will be important when reading Foucault’s account 
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of the historical a priori as a set of conditions that are neither empirical 
nor transcendental.
Having made the case that mathematics has taken over the role of 
its own epistemology, Serres then remarks that the ‘positive epistemol-
ogy’ emerging there is also emerging elsewhere, as other sciences, both 
natural and human, begin to do the same thing (HI 70). At this point, 
one might wonder whether Serres is describing the shift to naturalised 
epistemology well known in Anglo-American philosophy.27 The ques-
tion cannot be easily answered in a few lines, but two considerations 
suggest that something quite different is happening. The self-regulation 
that Serres has described in the case of mathematics is integrated into 
the practice of mathematics itself, and is not a separate branch of the 
discipline. As such, the refl ection is at once quite specifi c, or narrowly 
defi ned, and ongoing. This appears to contrast with an example such as 
evolutionary epistemology, where principles from biology are applied 
to the development of knowledge in different areas, and with the grant-
ing of a certain authority in questions of knowledge to neuroscience 
and cognitive psychology (to name just two candidates). Moreover, in 
the examples mentioned, the epistemological application is extraneous 
to the practice and development of the fi eld from which it was drawn 
and does not feed back into it. Thomas Kuhn’s historical approach 
to science has more in common with what Serres is describing, but it, 
too, is relatively external to the science whose story it tells and doesn’t 
 contribute to it in any obvious way.28
These considerations lead Serres to speculate that a modern phi-
losophy of science must take the form of a general epistemology of 
the  positive regional epistemologies (HI 77). Contrary to how it might 
sound, this is not an epistemological analogue of a fundamental ontol-
ogy. The primary point of reference is rather Leibniz, and the idea of 
a system with no privileged point of foundation. As a repetition at a 
greater level of generality of the same procedure as he has described 
in the case of the positive epistemology, a general epistemology will 
for Serres be the practice of translating between regions when there 
is no ‘meta’ level or language available from which to represent them 
and their relation to one another. If there is a point of divergence with 
Foucault, it is perhaps here: where Foucault aims to describe the emer-
gence of regularities that shape discourses, which would include the 
regularities between them, Serres may be more likely to follow local 
trails, enacting relations and holding his analysis closer to concrete 
examples. This refl ects a possible criticism of Foucault; namely, that 
he adopts a viewpoint that his own position should make inaccessible. 
This is not entirely fair, however, since Foucault is quite clear that an 
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archaeological analysis has no special privilege and could always be 
repeated with different results.
Serres follows Cavaillès in noting the signifi cance of the fact that 
mathematics remains essentially what it is while at the same time under-
going continual restructuration and transformation, which he encap-
sulates by saying that mathematics is internally open, but externally 
closed (HI 72). As externally closed, it is separate from other sciences, 
and has made the epistemological problematic an element of its own 
practice. In addition, its closure to the outside involves the elimination 
of intuition, evidence, refl ection and foundations, since in different ways 
they each call into play the subject (as sensible, rational, refl exive and 
transcendental respectively) (HI 72). Without the subject to provide a 
foundation, and without a fi xed formal basis, order arises and sustains 
itself through the relations between the elements of the system. This is 
already evident in the opening section of the Introduction to Hermes 
I, where Serres outlines the idea of a ‘network of communication’ that 
draws on graph theory and cybernetics, and which is inspired in no 
small degree by Leibniz. Each point in the network counts as a thesis 
or a defi nable element in an empirical constellation, and each path 
represents a relation between two or more of the points. The network 
is irregular in the sense that the relations do not conform to a preset 
pattern and can be made increasingly complex by the addition of more 
paths, or the displacement of one or more points. In this way, the 
network can vary over time. The key thing for Serres is that this model 
frees thought from the grip of linear reasoning and dialectic, which 
now appear as restricted cases in a much wider set of possible relations 
between the points (HI 12–13). The points themselves may receive, 
and be determined by, many different communications simultaneously, 
meaning that ‘the univocity of opposition is replaced by the differentia-
tion of types and quantities of determination of which each summit is 
the extremity or the source of a plurality’ (HI 14). This pluralism has a 
very signifi cant consequence. The plurality of relations and the irregu-
larity of the spatial distribution of the summits and the paths mean 
that one can conceive and test out or explore [expérimenter], local 
and temporary associations of points that form a well-defi ned group: 
‘In other words, it is possible to cut off from the totality restricted 
sub-wholes [sous-ensembles] that are locally well organized, such that 
their elements may more naturally be referred to this part than to the 
whole ensemble (although they are always referred to it in principle 
[en droit])’ (HI 16). The fi rst thing to say about this is that precisely 
the same form of organisation is found described by Lucretius, and 
again by Serres in his interpretation of Lucretius.29 The second is that 
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the similarity between this and the account of statements combining 
in discursive formations that Foucault sets out roughly fi ve years later 
is striking, and if anything is further reinforced when Serres adds that 
the highly organised local groupings defi ned in this way coexist with 
other such groupings, and that they can produce complex relations 
of interference, which may then modify the groupings themselves.30 It 
is clear, writes Serres, that deductive reasoning and dialectic are ‘too 
weak’ to open up a distinction between the local and the global. Indeed, 
he explains, this is why such approaches end up proposing forms of 
totality that remain very diffi cult to defi ne adequately. There is in this 
a signifi cant methodological principle, which is that by generalising the 
methodology [la technique méthodique] (for example, by moving from 
the two dimensions of linear reason to the three-dimensional table) one 
makes possible descriptions of greater complexity and differentiation, 
and thereby gets closer to the reality one describes (HI 17). To increase 
the level of generalisation is like increasing the scale of a map.
As mentioned, this account of networks was inspired in good part by 
Leibniz, and Serres turns to Leibniz explicitly in Hermes II, published 
three years later in 1972. Casting Leibniz as a precursor of develop-
ments only receiving widespread recognition centuries later, Serres notes 
that different readers of Leibniz produce readings that are so divergent 
as to appear irreconcilable, but that this does not lead to incoherence. 
As in a network, the coherence of a system is not defi ned by the deduc-
tive relations between its various elements, since deductivity is only one 
form of coherence.31 Instead, Serres writes, one can trace in Leibniz an 
itinerary that moves from one area of mathematics to another, gradu-
ally exploring it all. Moreover, each area of mathematics itself leads to 
a philosophical refl ection on its own status: for example, from algebra 
one moves to nominalism, from the theory of numbers to the question of 
realism. Driven from within, ‘mathematics is no longer theoretically The 
mathematics, unique and unitary by divine right’ (HII 46). It is, he adds, 
a world; a rich collection of objects and experiences that are related 
without being bound tightly in a deductive system. Strikingly, Serres also 
notes that in tracing the form of that world and the relations between 
its parts, mathematics is closer to phenomenology than it might realise 
or wish. It is as if mathematics were drawing a map of the ‘different 
functions or distinct regulations’ of the understanding. In other words, 
he concludes, it is as if the world mapped by mathematics were itself ‘a 
formal analytic of pure reason’ (HII 46). This mathematical world is at 
once the set of objects to be experienced and the form of the understand-
ing that gives structure to that experience. Philosophy can take note of 
it, but cannot add anything new, as it would once have done.
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Serres sees mathematics as what Foucault might call an analysis of 
actual experience, but one in which the experience is a particular case, 
restricted to the world of numbers, algebra, sets, topological relations 
and so forth. However, it is distinctive in that the world itself is its 
own analytic; the rules that give form to experience take shape within 
that experience, and are not imposed from outside. In this respect, it 
modifi es the analysis of actual experience that Foucault describes in 
The Order of Things, which, regardless of the intentions behind it, 
reproduced the doubling between positivism and eschatology that it 
sought to resolve into a more fundamental discourse. If mathematics is 
taken as providing a model that can be extended more widely, then one 
can see why Foucault called for a new critique of pure reason based on 
the mathematical a priori. Serres himself is quite sure that the model 
of mathematics can be extended in this way; or rather, that the exten-
sion has already taken place. In his study of Leibniz, he writes that the 
distinction between a scientifi c domain of activity and the philosophy 
that legislates for it is a ‘a retrograde illusion of the moderns’.32 Having 
split philosophy and science from one another, they have to invent 
epistemology as a way of bringing them back into relation. But the 
fact that epistemology exists sustains the very division it is intended to 
resolve. Reading Leibniz from the dubious vantage point of modernity, 
maintains Serres, we see him continually forging relations between 
mathematics and philosophy, but there is no such thing as a Leibnizian 
epistemology: ‘there is always philosophy, even in mathematics, there 
is always mathematics, even in philosophy’.33 It is in this sense that 
mathematics permeates Serres’ philosophy. Less obviously, perhaps, it 
may also be in this sense that it runs through Foucault’s archaeology.
5 .  M I C H E L  S E R R E S :  A T O M I S M
In 1977, Serres published La naissance de la physique dans le texte de 
Lucrèce, a refl ection on De rerum natura, the exposition by Lucretius 
of Epicurean atomism.34 Lucretius gives a materialistic account of the 
formation of galaxies, weather systems, the living world, the human 
mind, and much else besides, all of which emerge from a single itera-
tive process repeated across different levels of existence. Moving from 
topic to topic, the account takes in physics, history, morality and other 
forms of knowledge, which themselves describe variations on the same 
material process. At least in part because the text is in verse, it has 
often been regarded as a non-rigorous exposition, but Serres takes a 
different view. Pairing it with Archimedean mathematics, he draws out 
a philosophically and scientifi cally coherent description that prefi gures 
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both non-linear dynamics and contemporary theories of complexity 
and emergence.
Following Epicurus, Lucretius writes that all things are composed 
of atoms and void. Although the universe was not created and there 
is no origin as such, what Serres calls the ‘fi rst model’ begins with an 
infi nity of atoms raining down through the void in parallel lines. For 
collisions to occur, at least some of the atoms must deviate from their 
path. This deviation, which Lucretius calls the ‘clinamen’, occurs spon-
taneously, ‘at an indefi nite time and place’.35 It has traditionally been 
put down as a chance event, but all this really means is that the event 
cannot be located in a causal chain: one doesn’t know ‘why’ it happens. 
For Lucretius, however, this indeterminacy is a positive characteristic 
of the clinamen. The tiny deviations lead to collisions between atoms, 
turbulence and the formation of vortices in which atoms and combina-
tions of atoms settle into patterns of regular movement. These vortices 
are the order we see all around us in the physical world and in every 
sphere of natural, social, economic and moral life. All order is therefore 
dynamic, a nearly stable recurrence whose dissolution will at some 
point begin to accelerate, the order breaking down and returning the 
atoms to the cosmic fl ux, perhaps to reappear in fresh confi gurations of 
order elsewhere.
Because order is the outcome of an essentially aleatory process, there 
are no laws that determine how atoms fi rst combine to form groups 
and stable structures. As Serres writes, the ‘pre-model of the fundamen-
tal physics has no laws’ (BP 122). A law can only be expressed once a 
phenomenon occurs, as this involves a combination of atoms that is 
stable to at least some degree, and therefore displays some regularity. 
The laws that emerge here are ‘just a federation’, and like all federa-
tions they are localised in both space and time; that is, different spatial 
regions will be governed by different laws, and the same will be true 
of different temporal and discursive regions as well. The laws precede 
the system to which they are applied only in the sense that they have 
emerged from earlier stages of that same system: as Serres puts it, ‘The 
law repeats the fact itself’ (BP 123). Material order, knowledge and 
time are therefore interwoven. Each thing is itself history, as the con-
densation of a trajectory or fl ow that began by chance and settled into 
a regular form.36
Variations occur through an underdetermination within a local 
system, as a result of the clinamen, and through interference from 
competing regularities in other systems. Patterns of fl ow are therefore 
always local, complex and in transformation. Moreover, this locali-
sation in the emergence of order is not operative only at the level of 
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 physical reality. Although Lucretius’ account describes history, the 
weather, morality, biology and much else besides as derived from the 
movement of atoms in the void, the absence of any fundamental and 
universal laws governing the movement of atoms (and the absence 
of any basic metric properties of the void), means that these higher 
order structures cannot be explained by reducing them to a more basic 
reality from which they emerge. So, for example, Serres can, and does, 
say repeatedly that morality is physics without conceding anything to 
physical reductionism. To put this another way, the sense of locality 
found in the spread of regularities at the level of the physical world is 
reproduced between discursive realities. Moving from physics to eco-
nomics, or from history to morality, is like moving from one corner of 
the universe to another; there will be no predetermined way to move 
from the local to the global, and not even a marked out path from one 
locale to another – and all this in spite of the fact that in every region 
(physical and discursive) there operate the same principles of atoms 
moving in the void, turbulence, vortices and so forth. The system is 
the pattern of links, but as one does not begin with a whole that sets 
the conditions for the possibility of each part, the links have to be 
made. The atomism that Serres describes therefore does not permit 
the reduction of phenomena back to a set of ‘basic’ laws, but is rather 
a basic condition for the emergence of non-linearity, multiplicity, the 
unpredictable character of the future, and the necessity for an inquiry 
into any physical, historical, moral or discursive system to examine 
the patterns from which its phenomena are formed, patterns that will 
themselves have been formed locally by its history and its relation with 
adjacent systems. Because these patterns will have been formed by the 
relations between one system and another (and not just by relations 
between the systems en bloc, but also by cross-system relations between 
elements within each), there is little point in applying global theories 
to account for what has happened, or to predict what might be about 
to happen next. Such theories assume a degree of generality in the 
laws governing the behaviour of the elements from which a system is 
formed that may not actually exist. Underpinning such generality is a 
one-way relation between the law and what is bound by it: for example, 
Newton’s laws of motion do not evolve with the systems they govern. 
By contrast, atomism proposes that the regularities both condition 
and are conditioned by the system they describe, and this commits the 
atomist to taking up a local perspective. The only instructive account 
is one that tells the story of local exchanges, and the trends that arose 
from them. Although what counts as ‘local’ will depend on the nature 
and scale of the system in question (it could be restricted to a specifi c 
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scientifi c specialism, or to a form of thought, such as atomism itself, 
that has recurred over many centuries and in different scientifi c and 
philosophical cultures), analysis is still drawn to specifi c forms embed-
ded in actual events and phenomena. Its medium is therefore history 
before it is philosophy (or at least any kind of philosophy that aspires 
to foundationalism). Moreover, the act of thinking and writing is itself 
a material act that intervenes in the same process, potentially leading 
to the modifi cation of the pattern of links. Echoing Serres’ description 
of the system in Leibniz, this means that a conception of the system as 
a whole (indeed, of any given system of related regions) involves the 
relation of all the regions – and that to conceive of this totality of rela-
tions one must map them. Because there is no formal and invariant set 
of relations binding the regions into a whole, the map you end up with 
will depend on where you begin, on the path you strike, and perhaps 
even on your preferred mode of travel (which will determine the level 
of detail one can take in).
Whereas for Cavaillès the history of mathematics was necessarily a 
unity constructed through its movement, for Serres history is at once 
generalised beyond mathematics and localised into pockets, patches, or 
worlds of order that may fl ow into one another without being formally 
continuous.
6 .  T H E  M A T H E M A T I C A L  A  P R I O R I
When Foucault introduces the idea of the analysis of actual experience 
in The Order of Things he invokes the Kantian legacy that shapes the 
situation in which it arises. The analysis of experience, he writes, is 
intended to stand between the empirical and the transcendental, bring-
ing them into relation by analysing man as ‘a locus of knowledge which 
has been empirically acquired but referred back as closely as possible 
to what makes it possible, and as a pure form immediately present to 
those contents’ (OT 320–1, 331). It is intended, in short, to bridge the 
gap between a determination of man as object and as subject. Foucault 
goes on to say that such an analysis would play the role of an analytic 
‘in relation to quasi-aesthetics and quasi-dialectics’ (OT 321, 331). 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant allocates sensibility to the tran-
scendental aesthetic, understanding to the transcendental analytic, and 
reason to the transcendental dialectic. Foucault thereby implies that 
the analysis of actual experience plays the role of the analytic situated 
between the positive sciences and the questioning after their uncondi-
tioned ground (the quasi-aesthetics and quasi-dialectics respectively). 
In addition, the analytic is where Kant deduces the categories of the 
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understanding, derives the idea of the subject as the transcendental 
unity of  wapperception, and introduces the transcendental imagina-
tion as the operation of synthesis by which concepts and intuitions are 
brought together to constitute experience. All this will be important 
when considering how archaeology can be seen as Foucault’s proposal 
of an alternative to the analysis of actual experience. But fi rst there are 
a few points to note. The need to introduce an analysis of actual expe-
rience only comes about because, after Kant, the role of the analytic 
came to be taken over by empirical sciences such as psychology, as well 
as various forms of naturalised philosophy that have sought to provide 
their own account of the conditions of experience. One need only look 
at the alliance between neuroscience and cognitive science today to see 
that the project has continued into the twenty-fi rst century. As I have 
outlined in the previous section, Foucault thinks that the analysis of 
experience fails to solve the problem it addresses because it gives too 
much away to the branches of inquiry it is supposed to reach beneath 
and ends up falling apart into an empirical component and a transcen-
dental component.
When looking at Foucault’s own development of archaeology and 
the idea of the historical a priori, one may wonder whether the lesson 
has been adequately learnt, and whether archaeology can avoid a 
similar fate. This is something on which I hope the commentary on 
The Archaeology of Knowledge that follows may shed some light. But 
there is an important clue as to how Foucault proceeds given near the 
end of The Order of Things. In the course of a discussion of math-
ematics, language and literature, Foucault writes that the interest in 
formal languages opens up ‘the possibility, and the task, of applying a 
second critique of pure reason on the basis of new forms of the math-
ematical a priori’ (OT 383, 394). Having announced this tantalising 
challenge, Foucault moves on without further comment. However, the 
reference seems to be to Bachelard’s proposal that the synthetic activ-
ity which forms experience should no longer be protected deep within 
the subject and bound to sensible intuition. Transcendental conditions 
are opened up and give way to mathematical construction, from which 
forms of experience arise that were previously impossible, or even 
inconceivable. Foucault regards this displacement of the construction 
of experience from the subject to a formal discourse as contributing 
to a possible reformulation of Kant’s critical project. But what is the 
relation between a priori conditions modelled on formalism in math-
ematics and the notion of the historical a priori that Foucault goes on 
to develop in The Archaeology of Knowledge? Two points stand out as 
important. First, the conception of mathematical formalism to which 
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Foucault is referring is almost certainly that of Cavaillès, whose work 
on formalism was widely known, in part as a consequence of editions 
prepared posthumously by his close friend Canguilhem.37 If Cavaillès’ 
understanding of mathematics as an autonomous formal discourse that 
is also historical were adopted, then re-applying the critique of pure 
reason on the basis of the mathematical a priori would mean putting 
in place a discourse that supplies conditions for experience that are 
historical, not transcendental. Yet, as formal, they would be irreducible 
to the level of empirical experience. In this way, a critique based on the 
mathematical a priori would avoid the split that led to the analysis of 
actual experience falling back into empirical studies on the one hand 
and a transcendental component on the other. Finally, the turn to 
mathematics would mean that the fundamental event with which the 
analysis of discourse deals is construction, not disclosure. This would at 
least extend the possibility that the analysis of discourse might shake off 
the nagging presence of the unthought, and the impossibility of taking 
hold of the origin from which its relation to the unthought springs. This 
is certainly implied by Cavaillès’ critique of Kantian philosophy in the 
essay ‘Transfi ni et continu’, where he points to the inevitability with 
which the construction of objects (and thus of experience) in transcen-
dental philosophy must elude all representation; or, more specifi cally, 
that the time of construction must elude representation, thereby itself 
becoming the unconditioned ground (OC 470). As a consequence, an 
analysis of discourse based on the mathematical a priori would avoid 
what Foucault describes as the return and recession of the origin, the 
movement that both shapes the analysis of actual experience and rein-
forces the fi gure of the fi nitude of man at the centre of the whole drama 
of thought in modernity. It remains to be seen, but taken together these 
considerations therefore suggest that an analysis based on the math-
ematical a priori can avoid what Foucault describes as the ‘doubling’ 
characteristic of the earlier attempts to provide an account of the condi-
tions of knowledge in modernity. If it can, then it opens up the prospect 
of a form of thought that no longer turns on the fi gure of the fi nitude 
of man, and which is no longer structured by the tension between the 
empirical and the transcendental. There is a great deal to clarify here, 
but one of the main points Foucault will have to address is simply what 
it means to assert the existence of a condition that is neither empirical 
nor transcendental; that is, how a condition can be a non-causal condi-
tion of experience, without standing above or apart from the experience 
it conditions. The two alternatives seem to exhaust all conceivable pos-
sibilities. Yet the mathematical a priori does offer an alternative, as long 
as one takes seriously the role of history and is prepared to  reinterpret 
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time in the account of what used to be synthesis and has now become 
the historical construction of experience (its objects, concepts and 
the modalities of the subjectivity associated with them). To see how 
Foucault tries to make this work, and to evaluate how successful he 
was, requires a familiarity with the work of Cavaillès, but also with 
two further ideas. The fi rst of these is the idea of rules as regularities. 
Arguably, the most important historical source for this is mathematics, 
where rules play a vital role in the process of construction. However, 
Serres’ study of Lucretian atomism in The Birth of Physics provides an 
extended and in many ways more relevant elaboration of the idea. This 
has been covered above. The second is that of temporal dispersion, 
which features in The Archaeology of Knowledge having fi rst been 
introduced in Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology.38
7 .  T E M P O R A L  D I S P E R S I O N
The theme of temporal dispersion is raised early on in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge and is never too far from the analysis as it unfolds. Its 
importance rests on the fact that it is the temporal form Foucault asso-
ciates with archaeological history, in so far as this takes over from the 
analysis of fi nite experience. The analysis was intended to hold together 
the fi gure of man as a transcendental-empirical double, and to ground 
the twin tracks of thought that Foucault calls eschatology and positiv-
ism. Since the fi nitude of man has been addressed primarily in terms of 
time, to understand what has become of thought as modernity comes 
to an end, and why Foucault is proposing archaeology as an approach 
to history, one has to clarify the form time takes when it is no longer 
bound to this fi nitude, and to the condition of unity that it imposes. 
Although Foucault gives very little away in this respect, it is clear that 
for him dispersion is the basic temporal structure of discourse. I shall 
cover two points here. The fi rst is the strategic role played by the idea 
of temporal dispersion, which will involve looking briefl y at both 
Foucault’s and Heidegger’s responses to Kant’s anthropology. In addi-
tion, it will be important to clarify what is meant by temporal disper-
sion itself.
In The Order of Things, Foucault describes how anthropology took 
on a central role in modernity when Kant referred the three basic ques-
tions of critical philosophy (What can I know? What must I do? What 
am I permitted to hope?) to a fourth: What is man? (OT 341, 352). With 
this move on Kant’s part, the question of the relation between knowl-
edge and its ground opens up in the direction of what Foucault calls the 
analytic of fi nitude. For Heidegger, it is a signifi cant moment in so far 
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as it appears to respond to his own concern that Kant’s critical philoso-
phy lacked a radical foundation because it failed to ask the question of 
the Being of the subject.39 But Heidegger remained critical, arguing in 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics that Kant’s anthropology did not 
compensate for this omission and remained an empirical inquiry that 
failed to open up an ontological analysis of the subject. In Being and 
Time, Heidegger responds by laying out an analysis of the ontological 
structure of Dasein as that being through which Being is disclosed, and 
the analysis is then made properly ontological in Division Two of Being 
and Time, where Heidegger sets out the temporal structures that under-
pin it. Foucault’s response to the way Kant makes the question of man 
fundamental diverges signifi cantly from Heidegger’s approach. 
Making the question of man fundamental means that any inquiry 
into the role of construction in human experience and what can be 
known of it is sent on a detour through anthropology; in effect, the 
itinerary of the Critique of Pure Reason is made to pass by way of 
the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. However, where 
Heidegger thinks this leads Kant into empirical inquiries that distract 
from the ontological problematic, Foucault fi nds something that, in 
his view, helps to set in train the disappearance of man that will carry 
thinking free from the division between eschatology and positivism (or 
the transcendental and the empirical). It is, however, only an indica-
tion, since Kant’s anthropology is in Foucault’s view articulated within 
the structure that has to break down for thought to move free of the 
pattern set for it by the fi gure of man as an empirico-transcendental 
double. Foucault draws attention to the different roles played by 
time in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Anthropology, a differ-
ence which arises from the nature of the Anthropology’s inquiry into 
what the human individual ‘as a free-acting being makes of himself, or 
can and should make of himself’,40 not only by shaping his conduct, 
but also by cultivating his sensibility, understanding and taste. Kant 
explores this fi rstly through a rehearsal of structures familiar from the 
Critique of Pure Reason (sensibility, understanding, reason), and then 
through a consideration of pleasure, displeasure and desire that takes 
in discussions of topics such as distraction, mental illness, dreams, wit, 
boredom, eating alone, and much else besides. This treatment contrasts 
sharply with that adopted in the Critique of Pure Reason where the 
subject is divided between a transcendental unity that anchors the oper-
ation of the syntheses and the empirical self that appears as an object 
of sensible intuition, the whole account thereby conforming precisely to 
the fi gure of the empirico-transcendental double that Foucault identifi es 
in The Order of Things. By contrast, in the Anthropology the subject 
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engages in an elaboration of itself as a subject. Lodged in a dimension 
bounded by a priori conditions on one side, and the empirical fact of its 
existence, language and the time that carries events on around it on the 
other, the subject tries out variations, each of which may be modifi ed or 
undone in turn. As it does so, the subject draws the two sides together, 
causing ‘the practical and the theoretical to intersect’, a convergence 
that Foucault describes in terms of freedom and truth (IK 92). Foucault 
explains that this intersection has a distinctive temporal character. In 
the Critique of Pure Reason, he writes, the multiplicity of the given is 
presented by a form of intuition and inner sense through ‘a construc-
tive activity that is already at work’ (IK 89). As such, it is presented in 
the form of unity, anchored by the transcendental unity of appercep-
tion. By contrast, the time of anthropology is ‘assured by a dispersion 
which cannot be contained’ (IK 89). The reason it cannot be contained 
is that in the Critique of Pure Reason the dispersion would have been 
associated with sensibility and contained by the synthetic activity that 
shapes experience and gives it unity, whereas here in the Anthropology 
it is ‘the dispersion of the synthetic activity with regard to itself’ (IK 
89), the non-coincidence of synthesis with itself as it works through 
time. By virtue of this structural incompleteness, Foucault writes, the 
time of the Anthropology eats away at the coherence of synthesis from 
within, making room for error, correction, repetition, and thereby also 
a certain freedom (IK 91). This imposes a different task on theoretical 
thought, now entangled with the practical. It can no longer track back 
to a beginning, whether it be fact, law or the structures of the a priori. 
Instead, it has to articulate, and thereby recover, the temporal frame-
work in which it exists. It has to relate itself to time. Foucault concludes 
from this that Kant’s Anthropology introduces a new demand for 
thinking: ‘repeat the a priori of the Critique in the originary, that is in 
a truly temporal dimension’ (IK 93).
Like Heidegger, then, Foucault sees time as the key to Kant’s anthro-
pology; and like Heidegger, Foucault tries to identify the temporal 
structure of synthesis itself. However, where Heidegger directs his 
attention to the temporal dimension of the synthetic activity of the 
transcendental imagination, restoring its priority over the dispersion of 
what he calls the time of the everyday, Foucault follows the movement 
that Kant initiates in the Anthropology and re-situates the question of 
time within the dispersion characteristic of the practical life of man. 
The mixed character of the analyses there were enough for Heidegger 
to dismiss them as too empirical to have any ontological signifi cance, 
but for Foucault it is precisely by virtue of this mixed character that the 
analyses promise to break down the dichotomy between eschatology 
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and positivism that defi nes modernity. Paradoxically, it is in Kant’s 
Anthropology that Foucault fi nds the fi rst traces of a process that will 
lead to the disappearance of man.
However, the account as it is given in the Anthropology only indi-
cates a possibility for the future, as the structures that Foucault believes 
will break down with the disappearance of man are still holding fi rm. 
Referring to time in the Anthropology, Foucault writes that it maintains 
the dispersion of syntheses, but also the possibility that they ‘elude one 
another’ (IK 89–90). Time, therefore, ‘is not that in which, through 
which, and by which synthesis is achieved; it wears away the synthetic 
activity itself’ (IK 90). The implication is that time affects synthesis, if 
not from outside, then still as paired with it in some way, intimately 
there to undo its work. In this separation, however slight, the doubling 
of the transcendental and the empirical is repeated and the fi gure of 
man sustained. When Foucault writes that the a priori of the Critique 
of Pure Reason has to be repeated ‘in a truly temporal dimension’ 
(IK 93), he appears to be proposing not simply that the a priori be 
related to time (as if the formal were to be subjected to time), but that 
it should itself be temporal. If it were objected that synthesis is already 
a temporal process and that this is just what Heidegger emphasised in 
his reading of Kant, one can point out that such a process is held in 
a privileged position, with priority over the dispersion of time as the 
order of empirical events. To repeat the Critique in a temporal dimen-
sion means that the a priori must genuinely take shape in and through a 
temporal process, that the separation between synthetic activity and its 
undoing be reduced entirely. Dispersion would then not be a secondary 
process, but rather the operation of synthesis itself, only as a process 
that is always incomplete, and in which the condition of the formation 
of experience is at the same time the condition of its transformation.
It is worth noting that language plays an important role here, too. 
If time itself is the dimension of the ‘original’ (l’originaire), Foucault 
endorses the view that it ‘is not to be found in an already given, secret 
meaning, but in what is the most manifest path of the exchange’ (IK 
102–3). This becomes problematic, in Foucault’s view, because Kant 
adopts a ‘popular’ idiom for the Anthropology. By appealing to a 
common language, shared between author and public, it encourages 
the belief that in spite of the dispersion of time, something clear and 
whole is nonetheless given, or at least is almost within our grasp. The 
Anthropology takes up a language that is already familiar from the 
common understanding of the world and uses it to grasp the human. 
But in this way, time is confi rmed as an order of empirical events, the 
separation between the a priori and its dispersion is maintained, and 
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the radical potential of temporal dispersion is tempered, if not lost 
altogether. For the transformative potential within the Anthropology 
to be realised, the screen of self-evidence placed around it when Kant 
cast anthropology as a ‘popular’ discourse has to be removed, and 
this is something that one can see Foucault undertaking in works pub-
lished later in the 1960s (no one can pretend that The Archaeology of 
Knowledge adopts a common idiom). Moreover, mathematics plays a 
signifi cant part in all this. First, as Bachelard stressed, modern math-
ematics no longer constructs its objects in alliance with sensible intui-
tion, and for this reason it will almost by defi nition speak a language 
that is unfamiliar. Then its formalism, albeit thoroughly historical for 
someone like Cavaillès, ejects the subject from its central role in the 
drama of thought in modernity.
Finally, Foucault’s remarks on the need to repeat Kant’s critical 
philosophy in a truly temporal dimension can be read alongside his 
proposal in The Order of Things that it be repeated on the basis of the 
mathematical a priori. These features are played out through Foucault’s 
account of archaeology, and in particular in the way it suspends ready-
made unities, in its exposition of history as the gradual, piecemeal and 
provisional formation of such unities, their temporary stability, and 
their ultimate deformation. In this way, the operation of synthesis is 
exposed to temporal dispersion more radically than before, with the 
result that the closed dimension in which the fi gure of man was lodged 
(his last refuge?) is thrown open. Of course, this does not mean the end 
for any consideration of the subject, or of the subject’s role in thought, 
as the remainder of Foucault’s work very clearly demonstrates. But it 
does entail a serious revision of both the form and aims of thinking, and 
this entails changes in the way that the subject is involved in the practice 
of thinking – a theme that recurs in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
and which is addressed below in the sections on the Introduction 
(p. 41), III.4 (p. 105) and the Conclusion (p. 152).
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PART I: Introduction
Historical accounts can be pitched at different levels and these will 
generally change at different rates. ‘Deeper’ strata, such as the histories 
of sea routes or crop rotation, move more slowly than the ‘surface’ 
histories of governments and wars, and this means that different kinds 
of methodological questions are asked. A concern with how to estab-
lish causal sequences or whether totalities can be defi ned from a nexus 
of relations gives way to questions over what type of strata should be 
isolated for study, and the periodisation that should be adopted (AK 4, 
10). While the focus in history was moving towards patterns on a large 
scale, specifi c histories dealing with strands of culture and knowledge 
(e.g., the history of ideas, of science, or of literature) appeared to move 
in the opposite direction towards a concern with rupture and disconti-
nuity. The fi gures Foucault mentions in outlining this second tendency 
are among those whose work is most clearly a point of reference for the 
analyses that follow: Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, Michel 
Serres and Martial Guéroult. 
Of these, Bachelard arguably made the most infl uential contribution 
through his understanding of science as an open and episodic invention 
of new realities that are not drawn from empirical experience. Although 
Foucault does not mention them in the Introduction, Bachelard’s con-
victions that philosophy should learn lessons from the mathematical sci-
ences, and that it should not impose on scientifi c thought a conceptual 
framework that science itself had left behind, were also both important 
for the notion of discourse and its analysis that Foucault introduces 
in this book, as was Bachelard’s writing on temporal atomism, or the 
arithmetisation of time (these themes are discussed in the section on 
Bachelard above). Canguilhem recognised that concepts have singular 
histories that do not usually conform to the pattern of gradual refi ne-
ment, and focused attention on how the rules that determine the use of 
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concepts change. His attention to variations in the way concepts occur in 
different contexts, and on the fact that histories take on different formal 
or structural features according to the scale of the analysis, both have 
great signifi cance for archaeology. The work of Serres is at least as sig-
nifi cant for Foucault’s thought in this period. Here in the Introduction, 
Foucault mentions the idea of recurrent distributions and its importance 
for historical description, but he might also have mentioned Serres’ 
understanding of how the fact that mathematics had become its own 
epistemology had changed the practice of history and of philosophy, his 
appreciation that thinking is too rich and varied a practice to be defi ned 
by narrow rules or principles of any kind, his temporal pluralism, and 
fi nally (in this short and incomplete list) his appreciation that contin-
gency and indeterminacy are not extrinsic to the emergence of rational 
systems. In relation to this last point, Serres’ interpretation (or assimila-
tion) of ancient atomism is also important, not least for the conception 
of rules as regularities which will be essential to almost everything that 
Foucault has to say about discourse and the historical a priori. Martial 
Guèroult is a lesser known fi gure in the English speaking world, but his 
books on Descartes and Spinoza were infl uential for those who regarded 
philosophical thought as a systematic order, rather than the inspired 
creation of an individual mind. Foucault refers to Guèroult’s focus on 
internal coherences, compatibilities and connections, but he might also 
have noted his antipathy towards hermeneutic philosophy, which is 
shared by Foucault at several points in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
If one were to select some of the main points that can be drawn from 
each of the four fi gures the Foucault mentions here, the list would give 
a very good indication of what lies ahead: the constructive character 
of thinking no longer tied to sensible intuition; the complexity of the 
history of concepts as it spans different scales; temporal pluralism 
and the ordering of discourse by regularities; and the importance of 
attention to the systematic character of coherences and connections 
that work both within and across the forms of unity that are usually 
taken to populate discourse. The historical analyses to which Foucault 
refers aim to uncover not underlying principles and foundations but 
rather limits and transformations (AK 6, 12–13). Familiar questions 
give way to new ones concerning the specifi cation of different forms 
of discontinuity and the criteria by which one is to isolate the unities 
that do feature (science, oeuvre, theory, concept, text). These are in fact 
questions to which Foucault’s analysis of archaeology intends at least 
to begin providing an answer.
As Foucault notes, it appears as though the history of thought, 
philosophy, knowledge and literature has been moving towards dis-
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   42 29/10/2012   08:47
 Commentary 43
continuity just as ‘history itself’ has been moving in the other direction 
towards the study of greater continuities. But this is not so, he explains, 
since, ‘In fact, the same problems are being posed in either case, but 
they have provoked opposite effects on the surface’ (AK 6, 13). The 
two approaches intersect at the document. This, Foucault writes, is no 
longer treated as ‘the language of a voice since reduced to silence’ (AK 
7, 14). That is to say, the aim of history is not to learn more about a 
subject whose expressions are everywhere and yet whose truth remains 
obscure. Instead of committing itself to the elucidation of man, history 
works with and on documents to explore the various patterns into 
which they spontaneously fall or can be fi tted. Achieving this will mean 
splitting history from memory. What this means in a more concrete 
sense can be seen in Foucault’s example of the relation between the 
document and society: history, he writes, ‘is one way in which a society 
recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is 
inextricably linked’ (AK 7, 14). Such an approach rules out treating 
society as a collective subject that can be the unifying ground of all the 
documents, while also ruling out society’s dependence on some other 
(presumably external) principle for its existence as a unity. Instead, it 
is in and through history that society coheres, even as a good deal of 
historical study appears to seek out discontinuity and division.
Again contrasting two apparently confl icting approaches to one 
another, Foucault observes that if history once aimed to transform 
‘monuments’ into documents, giving voice to an otherwise silent 
expression rising from the past, now it does the reverse, turning docu-
ments into ‘monuments’. This has four consequences, which Foucault 
sets out over the next fi ve pages, and which explain how the two appar-
ently confl icting accounts of history outlined in the chapter so far are in 
fact just surface effects from the same process.
First, where history once forged causal links between empirical 
events, it now constitutes series, and series of series, adding layers to 
form tables. As Serres writes in the ‘Introduction’ to Hermes I, the line 
as a model is exchanged for the table, in which the route (or ensemble 
of routes) actually followed in the evolution of any mobile situation, 
including history, is picked out from what can be an entirely aleatory 
distribution (HI 13). This allows historical description to map greater 
complexity, but faced with more alternatives than ever before there is a 
need for a more subtle discrimination between different kinds of event, 
and between the forms of relation that exist between them. This in 
turn leads to a recognition that different kinds of event are linked over 
 different scales. The appearance of long time-scales in historical studies 
can therefore be seen as following from the deliberate methodological 
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decision to develop series (AK 8–9, 15–16). Conversely, the history of 
ideas, of thought, and of the sciences have seen the same change bring 
about the opposite effect as longer series organised by, for example, the 
teleology of reason are replaced by shorter series that are ‘irreducible to 
a single law’ (AK 9, 16).
The second consequence is that discontinuity takes on a role of 
central importance in contemporary history. It had always been the 
task of the historian to take the raw material of discontinuity and work 
it into a form of unity, demonstrating the relation between apparently 
disparate events, discovering the common principle they share, or the 
hidden narrative. Its role in contemporary historical analysis is quite 
different. As Foucault writes, seeing discontinuity as a constituted con-
dition rather than an intrinsic quality of events in their raw state almost 
obliges the historian to refl ect on the way different levels of analysis are 
distinguished from one another. But in addition to being produced by 
historical discourse, and used by it as a methodological device, disconti-
nuity is also studied in the variety of its forms. As such, it switches from 
concept to object and back as history hones its descriptive tools not 
on a fi xed external reality but on a constructed experience. One might 
object here that an account in which history is at once construction and 
constructed is at risk of losing touch with ‘reality’ altogether and enter-
ing the realm of fi ction, but the sense of history intended here comprises 
the formation of the rules by which objects, concepts and methods are 
‘there’ for us at all. As such, the ‘realist’ objection would always be 
raised too late, having neglected the conditions for the experience on 
which it is based. More troubling may be the concern that history itself 
has taken over the structure that in modernity belonged to the fi gure 
of man as an empirico-transcendental double, as both the object of 
knowledge and the ground of that knowledge. If so, then archaeology 
will have failed to break out of the closure Foucault described in The 
Order of Things. Whether archaeology manages to avoid this diffi culty 
remains to be seen.
The move from a linear to a tabular model of history is refl ected in 
the replacement of what Foucault calls total history by general history. 
Where the former fi nds the same kind of relation between events 
repeated in different series, which therefore become linked analogi-
cally, general history determines the specifi city of such series, with their 
particular limits, divisions and forms of relation. It then considers what 
relations may be found between such series, or elements within series, 
and what effects follow from their displacement with respect to one 
another or their superposition on one another; in other words, it con-
siders ‘what “tables” it is possible to draw up’ (AK 11, 18–19). Where 
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a total history occupies a unifi ed space organised around a central 
principle of some kind, general history ramifi es through ‘the space of 
a dispersion’ (AK 11, 19). The idea of dispersion features repeatedly 
in Foucault’s analysis, often with reference to time rather than space, 
and this is a fi rst clue in the text itself as to how it is used. It appears 
that ‘dispersion’ does not designate a scattering of points or elements 
in either time or space, since this would assume a unifi ed dimension, 
which would in turn imply the existence of a single principle, thereby 
returning the analysis of experience back to an analytic of fi nitude in the 
style of phenomenology. Instead, ‘dispersion’ designates a multiplicity 
of times or spaces that may or may not be compatible with one another, 
and which may be modifi ed structurally through their contact with 
other times or spaces. The dispersion is therefore operative fi rst of all at 
the level of rules, rather than things, events or elements. In addition to 
being irreducible to the unity of time characteristic of phenomenology, 
this also departs from a reading of dispersion in Kant’s Anthropology 
as the work of linear time (cf. pp. 36–7 above).
The fi nal consequence of the new relation to the document is that 
a series of methodological questions have to be addressed, some of 
which are new and some of which are quite old. If bodies of documents 
are to be assembled, principles of choice have to be established, levels 
and methods of analysis defi ned, and various groups and sub-groups 
determined.
All these problems show that the methodological issues confronted 
by the new practice of historical analysis have not been taken over from 
the philosophy of history as traditionally understood. While the set of 
problems identifi ed is not unique to archaeology, Foucault denies that 
they can all be grouped under the heading of structuralism. There may 
be several reasons for his reluctance to do this. First of all, structuralism 
as it was predominantly understood at the time had been drawn pri-
marily from linguistics and ethnology, whereas archaeology is shaped 
by developments in mathematics and the sciences, as fi ltered through 
the works of Bachelard, Serres, Cavaillès, Canguilhem and others. 
Interestingly, Foucault also notes that many of problems addressed by 
the form of history he is describing were taken over from the discipline 
of economic history (one of the main areas analysed in The Order 
of Things), which suggests that the specifi c choices this involved and 
their impact on the practice of archaeology might themselves be an 
interesting topic of analysis. Second, linking archaeology to structural-
ism would encourage an easy assumption of methodological stability 
that Foucault discourages. One of the reasons why The Archaeology 
of Knowledge can be a challenging and sometimes frustrating book to 
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read is that archaeology has a certain openness and revisability built 
into it. Foucault’s closing remark in this section is that the opposition 
between structure and development has little or no relevance to the 
practice of history he is describing, and that historians have not been 
troubled by it for a long time. Although no explanation is offered, one 
suspects that the perception of a confl ict between structure and devel-
opment has troubled philosophers rather more than anyone else, and 
that this may say more about the conception of structure prevailing in 
philosophy than about the carelessness of practitioners in other fi elds. 
It was certainly not a concern for Cavaillès, for whom the structure of 
science was strictly identifi ed with demonstration, and thereby with the 
movement unfolding through it. For him, ‘There is in reality no essential 
distinction between the hardened rings which seem to mark the terms 
and the movement that traverses them’ (OC 507). One can certainly say 
that the archaeological analysis of discourse requires a close alternation 
between construction and constructed, condition and conditioned, and 
therefore also between structure and development. Again, this draws 
attention back to the question of whether archaeology avoids the dou-
bling of the transcendental and the empirical that Foucault identifi es as 
constituting the impasse for knowledge in modernity, and it is a theme 
that will run through much of what follows.
Foucault observes that the ‘epistemological mutation’ of history is 
still underway (AK 12, 21). He attributes its inception to Marx, but 
goes on to refl ect that history, and especially the history of thought, 
seems to have resisted the change. It is, he writes, as though our desire 
to see in history a means to the recovery of an origin has left us ‘afraid 
to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought’ (AK 13, 21). 
This is a striking phrase. In spite of its Levinasian resonances, it is less 
an allusion to alterity in a directly ethical sense than a warning against 
treating time as a unity and, through memory, as the privileged form 
of interiority. The time of discourse is temporal dispersion, and to 
welcome the Other into the time of our own thought is therefore to 
expose ‘our own thought’ to an unpredictable becoming. This, it turns 
out, will prove to be the condition of thinking; that is, the critical and 
transformative practice Foucault elaborates as archaeological analysis 
(see AK III.4; below p. 108 and p. 157). Opposed to this, continuous 
history is ‘the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the 
subject’; it is the promise that anything that is lost will be restored, that 
any disruption, revolution or catastrophe is encompassed by the con-
sciousness to which it is presented (or the spirit of which it is a passing 
manifestation) (AK 13–14, 22). To believe in such a promise is to 
defend the sovereignty the subject, and thus also to preserve the central 
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function of anthropology in the structure of knowledge in modernity. It 
leads, in Foucault’s view, to readings of Marx and Nietzsche that place 
them in the tradition of transcendental philosophy while misleadingly 
declaring a commitment to ‘the living openness of history’ (AK 14, 
23). The litany of complaints that Foucault directs against this kind 
of interpretation makes it quite clear that history is a crucial staging 
post in the disappearance of man and the reconfi guration of knowledge 
at the end of modernity. Archaeology, he insists, does not do away 
with history, but only with a form of history that serves as ‘a place of 
rest, certainty, reconciliation, a place of tranquillized sleep’ (AK 16, 
24). To some extent the analyses that follow codify the approach that 
Foucault had already put into practice in The History of Madness, The 
Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things, but he admits that they 
also include corrections and criticisms of his earlier work. Above all, 
The Archaeology of Knowledge is attempt to lay out an alternative 
form of history, one in which the functions previously accorded to 
transcendental philosophy are taken over by history, and in which a 
priori conditions are historical without being reducible to the empirical 
level. As I have noted already, it is a conception of history prefi gured in 
works on the history and epistemology of the mathematical sciences by 
Bachelard, Cavaillès, Serres and others.
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Part II: The Discursive 
Regularities
1 .  T H E  U N I T I E S  O F  D I S C O U R S E
In this fi rst chapter Foucault sets out a series of methodological deci-
sions that inform the analyses to come, outlining his conception of 
discourse and the idea of the statement that will be central to much of 
what follows. The unities to which the title of the chapter refers are 
those around which historical studies were, and still are, commonly 
based, and which in Foucault’s view have been accepted at the cost of 
reinforcing the constraints from which thinking in modernity has strug-
gled to escape. Archaeology, it is intended, will break them down to 
reveal their construction and transformation, exposing to view a level 
of events that had previously been concealed behind a façade of ready-
made concepts, subjects, objects and assumptions about the nature of 
change.
The chapter begins with a list of concepts that Foucault proposes 
to use, or whose use he will analyse: discontinuity, rupture, threshold, 
limit, series and transformation. With the exception of ‘rupture’, all 
of these terms are derived from mathematics and were, at the time 
Foucault was writing, most rigorously defi ned there. Even the term 
‘rupture’, apparently the odd one out, is associated with Bachelard’s 
philosophy of science (where it designates the discontinuity between 
science and the forms of understanding that precede it), and so can 
also be traced back to the same neighbourhood. It is clear then, even 
without placing Foucault in relation to Bachelard, Cavaillès and Serres, 
that his text will draw on resources from science and mathematics to 
undo habits of thought entrenched in philosophy, and above all in 
forms of thought allied to the human sciences through their shared 
commitment to the idea of the human. But seeing these terms occur 
here, it could be argued that they should fi rst be defi ned as they are 
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employed in mathematics, and this benchmark then used to determine 
whether Foucault has adopted them ‘properly’, or is somehow employ-
ing them ‘illicitly’ for his own ends. This would be a mistake, because 
one cannot prohibit concepts arising in one fi eld of inquiry from cross-
ing borders to other fi elds, isolating each from every other as if it the 
concepts were drawn exclusively from the experience to which they 
give form. While terms cannot easily be translated in this way, and 
such translations will entail consequences of some kind, to deny that 
they can legitimately be undertaken at all is incoherent. To apply the 
same rule to sub-disciplines within fi elds of inquiry would mean that 
concepts arising in the analysis of poetry could not be used in critical 
approaches to other forms of literature, and that an entirely different 
conceptual apparatus would be required to write, for instance, about 
the nineteenth-century novel than about the twentieth-century novel. In 
situations such as these, one simply has to weigh with care the changes 
involved, and the effects that may follow from them; but they are not 
faults for which one must compensate, and to treat them as if they were 
would be to make assumptions about the origin and foundation of 
discourses that Foucault argues is ill-conceived. In adopting these terms 
from mathematics, Foucault is not trying to borrow authority from 
science to shore up his critique of history. Rather, their appearance 
here has a strategic sense that draws on developments in mathematics, 
its break with sensible intuition, its capacity to construct new objects, 
and the importance of its historical dimension. In view of this, it is not 
necessary that the precise mathematical sense of the terms be under-
stood in detail. However, it is useful to recall that the terms entered into 
mathematics, or were given new signifi cance, in the nineteenth century, 
as the discipline was transformed by the development of analysis and 
set theory and the reformulation of mathematics in terms of arithmetic 
rather than geometry. This involved a radical shift in the character of 
the elements of mathematical thought: where geometry was based on 
the line, and therefore on continuity, arithmetic was based on number, 
and therefore on discontinuity. For its part, set theory introduced a 
way of understanding the construction of the objects of mathematical 
thought that changed the relation of thought to intuition (see p. 17 
above). Bachelard remarked that Cavaillès had hoped the way math-
ematics was giving a new signifi cance to familiar and fundamental 
concepts, such as whole, infi nity, limit, intuition, concept, object and 
construction, would come to be more widely appreciated, especially 
among philosophers. Foucault’s strategic use of these terms to open 
up a critical distance towards familiar problems and ways of thinking 
would probably have pleased him.
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Before engaging the theoretical problems that he has in his sights, 
Foucault undertakes some ‘negative work’. This involves identifying a 
series of concepts commonly used in historical analysis that he then dis-
places by removing the principle of continuity on which they depend. I 
shall discuss each in turn, but will look more closely at the fi rst two or 
three. The fi rst concept linked to continuity is that of tradition, which 
allows events to be grouped together as belonging to the same order 
of succession, above all on the basis of a perceived similarity between 
them. This has, in Foucault’s eyes, a twofold effect, in that it reduces 
‘the difference proper to every beginning’, thereby bringing the origin 
closer, while at the same time encouraging an ‘endless search for the 
origin’ (AK 23, 31), since the pursuit of the limit within a continuous 
dimension will always allow another step to be taken – the extension of 
the line, or its further sub-division. If origins are for this reason made 
elusive, the homogeneity of tradition allows the ‘new’ to stand out. 
However, because tradition gathers events together to form a whole, 
what is new must appear as an interruption or break caused by some-
thing that comes from outside, such as a muse, madness, or the fi gure 
of genius. This sense that the rationality of a system precluded its capac-
ity to generate something new or unpredictable had been a criticism 
directed at various philosophies, and in particular at Hegelian dialectic 
and the Husserlian conception of a nomological science.1 Cavaillès 
made the question of how a deductive science like mathematics could 
be genuinely historical, in the sense that successive stages are unpredict-
able, a central problem in his work. His aim was to show that a rational 
system could generate genuine innovations without compromising its 
scientifi c character, and without attributing the unpredictability to epis-
temological weakness, and thereby to the fi nitude of the subject. The 
fact that Cavaillès dedicated the fi nal part of ‘On Logic and the Theory 
of Science’ to a critique of Husserl’s phenomenology, ending with a call 
for the philosophy of the subject to be exchanged for a philosophy of 
the concept, is in itself suffi cient indication of the importance his work 
has for Foucault. But with reference to history specifi cally, Cavaillès’ 
work showed how to break down a dichotomy between treating history 
as ordered by an underlying rule, which secures its rationality at the 
expense of its capacity to generate anything truly new, and treating it 
as a collection of empirical events, in relation to which any ‘rational’ 
explanation could only be a construction imposed on what in itself 
remained without order or sense. Foucault’s concern is similar here, 
only it is about the history of ideas, thought, science and knowledge, 
rather than mathematics alone.
In writing of the relation between Foucault and Cavaillès (among 
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others), one has to confront the topic of Foucault’s objection to the 
next in the series of concepts related to continuity, namely, ‘infl u-
ence’. The issue here is straightforward, however. Foucault declares 
that ‘infl uence’ should have no explanatory force, in so far as it relies 
on there being a causal link that passes from one text to another via 
the inner thoughts and intentions of an author, which are closed to 
inspection. Where connections are to be drawn, they should be between 
the works themselves and the ideas and patterns of thought that run 
through them; the connections need not pass through the subject as the 
ground of the true meaning of the work. Instead of infl uence, one can 
therefore talk of precedent, transformation and the establishment and 
modifi cation of regularities.
Following on from this, Foucault turns to the concepts of devel-
opment and evolution. The diffi culty with the fi rst of these, from 
Foucault’s point of view, is clear, in that it invites one to consider a 
given history as the unfolding of a single idea, which thereby confers 
unity on the process (as though the idea were a substance undergo-
ing change, but remaining essentially itself). Foucault is direct in his 
criticism of any attempt to describe the present condition of thought in 
terms of principles or structures whose force in the present depends on 
a future unity and coherence yet to be achieved. The Hegelian notion of 
spirit seems to be his primary target here, but any teleological approach 
will fi nd itself in the fi ring line; that is, any approach that secures the 
coherence of the present by projecting unity into a future to which it 
is linked by a continuous history. Foucault describes this as an attempt 
‘to master time through a perpetually reversible relation between an 
origin and a term that are never given, but are always at work’ (AK 
24, 32). But giving up such an appeal does not mean that attention has 
to be confi ned to the present, and the simplicity of the present ‘facts’, 
as though an order of events, time and history were all constructions, 
or ideal inventions. It means that a different sense of history will be 
required, which is what Foucault’s text explicitly sets out to explore; 
and in turn this means that a different sense of time will be required, 
which is an issue to which Foucault alludes without addressing it 
directly. A further indication of the need to do so emerges at the end of 
this paragraph, where Foucault writes that, having set aside the ‘ready-
made syntheses’ with which we too readily interpret events, we should 
instead accept that ‘they concern only a population of dispersed events’ 
(AK 24, 32). There are two related issues to mention here. First, the 
reference to ‘population’ may well be a reference to ‘population think-
ing’ in evolutionary theory. Associated with Ernst Mayr, population 
thinking treats species as a population of unique individuals, rather 
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than as a class, and recognises that a species will be made up of many 
local populations.2 This qualifi es Foucault’s earlier dismissal of ‘evolu-
tion’ in the same breath as ‘development’. In addition, the reference to 
dispersed events is echoed later in this chapter by the suggestion that 
each moment of discourse be received in the ‘temporal dispersion’ in 
which it occurs (AK 28, 37).
The next unities that Foucault looks to suspend are those of the 
book and the oeuvre. A book cannot easily be defi ned by its mate-
rial unity, and exists as a node in a network of references to other 
works. The network will vary according to the kind of text, making 
the defi nition of the book as a unity still more problematic. The oeuvre 
fares no better, on account of the many decisions that are required to 
establish its ‘defi nitive’ form, which leave translations, posthumous edi-
tions, abandoned sketches and notebooks in a grey area. Both of these 
examples illustrate the tendency to construct unities which can then 
become the protagonists of stories told about literature, philosophy or 
music, but also about science or any aspect of culture. Suspending them 
will allow Foucault to explore the complex relations that make them 
plausible but not necessary, and which are concealed by the unities 
laid over them. To borrow a visual metaphor, it is as if Foucault were 
adjusting the focus of the lens through which discourse is viewed to 
resolve blocks of colour into unexpected detail. Each moment of dis-
course is said to occur as a ‘sudden irruption’ and in a certain ‘punc-
tuality’ (AK 28, 37). Bachelard’s account of the instant and temporal 
discontinuity is relevant here, and in particular his description of the 
way a microscopic examination reveals many discrete events in even 
the smallest fragment. It is, then, always possible to draw back a veil 
of unity to fi nd multiplicity beneath, and this applies as much to divi-
sions and distinctions (e.g. between periods, discursive formations, 
and the various elements that Foucault will describe in the chapters 
to come) as it does to substantial unities such as a book, oeuvre or 
tradition.
This is a reminder, if any were needed, that Foucault’s text is a 
response to Kant’s account of the synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. For 
Foucault, it is possible, and indeed necessary from the point of view of 
archaeology, to see events as a multiplicity, in their ‘pure dispersion’, in 
order that the fundamentally contingent relations into which they have 
entered with other events, and in many cases by virtue of which they 
exist at all, can be described. Since, for Kant, to see anything at all con-
sciousness must already have carried out the synthesis of the multiplic-
ity characteristic of intuition, the idea of seeing events as a multiplicity 
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clearly requires some explanation. The fact that Foucault provides 
very little in the way of such an explanation in this text is one reason 
why it can appear so problematic, like an experiment that hasn’t been 
fully thought through. However, the resources to make up for what is 
missing in this respect can be found in Bachelard, Cavaillès and Serres 
(as outlined in the Introduction to this book).
It is also the case that Foucault often tackles a question obliquely, 
and this is evident in the following passages, where he reiterates his 
rejection of discourse as a unity, this time on the basis that it is not the 
articulation of an origin that remains out of reach as a precursor to 
discourse. Such an origin might be ‘already said’, concealed precisely 
as the condition for what appears, and yet also ‘never said’, in the 
sense that it cannot be determinate in the way that the events within 
discourse are. Foucault is dealing rather quickly here with large themes 
in the history of philosophy, but if the idea of discourse as the articula-
tion of an origin that cannot itself appear in discourse is a motif easily 
recognisable from classical metaphysics, its combination with the idea 
of the ‘already said’ being at the same time a ‘never said’ looks back 
to his account of the retreat and return of the origin in The Order of 
Things, and is also clearly a reference to Heidegger, to the ontological 
difference, and to thinking as a listening to what is ‘not-said’ (AK 28, 
36). In the Introduction, I set out how Foucault’s counter-reading to 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropology leads him to propose 
a re-writing of Kant’s critical philosophy, and of the analytic in par-
ticular, on the basis of temporal dispersion; so it is no surprise to see 
Foucault now insisting that discourse should not be treated as a cipher 
for an origin that confers unity while remaining itself out of reach. 
Instead, discourse should be received ‘in that temporal dispersion that 
allows it to be repeated, known, transformed’, or even erased and for-
gotten (AK 28, 37). The theme of repetition also ties this account back 
to Bachelard, for whom the instant was the condition for repetition, 
and thereby for the construction of what is experienced as continuity 
and duration (TI 85).
The closing pages of this fi rst chapter deal with a series of closely 
related themes, some of which have already been aired. First, Foucault 
notes that the suspension of the unities of discourse is not intended to 
banish such forms for good, as if they were illegitimate illusions whose 
removal would clear a path to the truth. Foucault’s interest is rather in 
how they came to be there, by what means they are sustained in exist-
ence, and with what effects. To expose discursive events and their rela-
tions in such a way as to make this possible requires allowing the whole 
fi eld of the ‘facts of discourse’ to appear in ‘its non-synthetic purity’ 
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(AK 29, 38). That Foucault aims to open up the synthesis of experience 
to reveal its operation as a historical process has been noted already. 
What is new here is the addition of the idea of purity, a term that is used 
twice more in relation to archaeology before the end of the chapter. 
In the context of a discussion of synthesis and the conditions for the 
existence of events, it is impossible to read the terms ‘pure’ and ‘purity’ 
without thinking of Kant, for whom they denote a region of a priori 
description accessible to reason alone with no dependence on empirical 
experience; typically, intuitions of space and time, and the categories 
of the understanding, are designated ‘pure’. From this perspective, the 
idea of a ‘fi eld of facts’ appearing in its non-synthetic purity makes no 
sense, since no phenomenon can appear without having passed by way 
of synthesis, and to maintain otherwise would be to revert to a naively 
pre-critical position. However, this is not what Foucault intended, and 
the work of Bachelard, and in certain respects Cavaillès, offers an alter-
native interpretation.
For Bachelard, modern science is distinguished by the fact that it 
elaborates a world quite distinct from that of our everyday experience. 
It is not just that science has to break with common sense and the 
world that is familiar to us through our senses, and not even that the 
objects it describes are not directly given to sensibility; it is rather that 
the objects of scientifi c theory are not objects at all, in the familiar sense 
of substantial things that bear properties. Instead, they are intrinsically 
relational, and cannot appear to us except in and through their rela-
tions with other things. As such, physics describes a world that does 
not appear, populated with things that cannot appear, and which is the 
condition for the world as it is experienced. It is a form of experimental 
metaphysics. As Bachelard writes, the basic concepts of Newtonian 
science, such as absolute space, time and mass, could be regarded as the 
elements from which its theoretical constructions were built. They were 
‘notional atoms’ (atomes notionnels) (PN 30–1). But the transition 
from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics revealed that the atom was itself 
complex: ‘In short, the simple notion gave way to a complex notion’ 
(PN 31). Something very similar takes place with Foucault’s archaeol-
ogy and the fi eld of the facts of discourse appearing in its non-synthetic 
purity. This is to say, it is not that the facts appear in stark isolation, 
but rather that they appear with the relations that defi ne and sustain 
their existence. It is the story of the formation and transformation of 
these relations that archaeological history tells. So when Foucault uses 
the terms ‘purity’ and ‘pure’ in these pages, he is doing so in a sense 
consistent with the idea of the historical a priori that he will go on to 
elaborate in this book, and not directly in reference to Kant.
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   54 29/10/2012   08:47
 Commentary 55
With the suspension of the unities underpinned by continuity, 
Foucault writes that ‘an entire fi eld is set free’, made up of all actu-
ally existing statements. This forms a fi nite, if vast, totality of events 
on which to draw in analysing how a particular unity emerged, and 
what became of it. The task of archaeology here is to undertake a 
‘pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search for 
unities that form within it’ (AK 29–30, 38–9). What is perhaps most 
notable is that whereas earlier it was the fi eld of discursive facts that 
was to be described in its purity, now it is the events themselves. As 
will become clear later, this conjunction simply means that the space 
is defi ned by the events that occur within it, and does not have any 
properties that serve as constraints or conditions upon the events or 
facts of discourse. In a note anticipating the move from archaeology to 
genealogy, Foucault adds that the description of discursive events tries 
to determine how one statement emerged rather than another. While 
this may appear similar to the practice of looking for the rule on the 
basis of which a given event was possible, the more orthodox form of 
inquiry tends towards the discovery of fi xed rules and models, whereas 
the momentum of archaeology carries it beyond simply fi nding the 
rule on the basis of which an event occurred to look at the historical 
development of that rule. Archaeology searches for the fi nest difference 
between statements or discursive events to identify where a statement 
could not have appeared on the basis of existing rules for the formation 
of propositions or the production of meaning. Such a point indicates 
that a change in the formation of rules has taken place, and it is the 
history of these changes that is traced by archaeology.
The suspension of familiar forms of unity leads to a further possibil-
ity that is very important both for Foucault’s archaeology and for the 
conception of critique he articulated many years later. Once the ‘facts 
of discourse’ are freed from groupings ‘that purport to be natural, 
immediate, universal entities’ (AK 32, 41), one can begin to describe 
links between the elements of discourse that had previously been invis-
ible or obscured. These links may be relatively weak or strong, recur-
rent or occasional. What is important is that they can be explored, 
and that they contribute to a sense of discursive space as complex. 
As Foucault writes, the statement is isolated in order to bring forms 
of regularity into view that had previously been hidden. He lists four 
forms of relation that are fundamental to everything that follows, and 
to which he will refer repeatedly in the remainder of the text: 1) rela-
tions between statements; 2) relations between groups of statements; 3) 
relations between statements and groups of statements; and 4) relations 
between statements, and groups of statements, and events of a quite 
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different kind. This last set of relations explicitly includes relations 
between events that are straightforwardly discursive and events that 
are ‘technical, economic, social, political’ (AK 32, 41), which shows 
that Foucault’s archaeological analysis of discourse already extended 
beyond linguistic forms to take in regularities in different dimensions 
of life.
Shortly before the end of the chapter, Foucault makes what seems 
to be a relatively unimportant clarifi cation that on closer inspection 
reveals something signifi cant about the whole purpose of the inquiry. 
In spite of the care he brings to the analyses, Foucault concedes that 
there is a risk that archaeology will be infl uenced by the forms of unity 
it means to suspend; namely, unities and syntheses that concern the 
speaking subject, the author, and other ‘anthropological categories’ 
(AK 33, 43). I have outlined in the Introduction Foucault’s concern 
to avoid anthropology, the parallels with Heidegger, and ultimately 
the difference between their approaches, and so I can be brief here. In 
Being and Time, Dasein is chosen as a theme of study because it is that 
being through which Being is disclosed. Heidegger then suspends the 
categories of anthropology by laying out the ontological constitution 
of Dasein as Care, which is given a temporal interpretation. Rather 
than taking ‘man’ as his theme, Foucault takes the human sciences by 
which the fi gure of man has been defi ned and, as he writes, from which 
the anthropological categories are constituted. This may look like an 
epistemological analogue of Heidegger’s ontology, but it may prove 
more accurate to describe it as an alternative ontology, one in which the 
formal conditions of existence are wholly historical.
2 .  D I S C U R S I V E  F O R M A T I O N S
The chapter begins with Foucault in a Cartesian frame of mind, noting 
that he has chosen to describe the relations between statements without 
recourse to the normally accepted forms of unity, thereby disrupting 
old habits and careless assumptions. Like Descartes’ Meditations, then, 
this book can be read as a kind of experiment aiming at the possibility 
of a new way of thinking. Turning his attention to all forms of discon-
tinuity, break, threshold or limit, Foucault says that the analysis will 
open up the fi eld of discourse in which statements occur to describe ‘the 
relations of which they are capable’ (AK 34, 44). Leaving a considera-
tion of the specifi c terms in which the account is presented until later, 
in this chapter Foucault sets out to examine the relations found within 
the groupings that make up accepted forms of unity.
The bulk of the chapter is taken up with the discussion of four 
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hypotheses, each of which identifi es a mechanism by which a recog-
nised discursive form achieves unity, problematises that mechanism, 
and then proposes an alternative in its place. As Foucault sets out 
what he is going to do, the question of the legitimacy or validity of the 
descriptions he will propose is raised twice. It is not clear what to make 
of this, given that later in the book he pointedly denies that archaeol-
ogy concerns itself with the legitimacy of the discourses it analyses.3 
Although it could simply be that Foucault wishes to make his account 
of archaeology plausible, his comments here may also refl ect a concern 
to balance the disruptive force of archaeology with criteria that provide 
a structure on which thought can continue to rely. Archaeology is not 
a call to radical scepticism, and is not intended to initiate a form of 
hyperbolic critique.
The fi rst hypothesis is that statements form a group in so far as 
they refer to the same object. Foucault’s example is that statements 
belonging to psychopathology all appear to refer to madness (AK 35, 
45). However, he notes that it would be impossible to draw from an 
examination of ‘madness itself’ the means to identify a group of state-
ments defi ned by regular and consistent relations. Madness cannot be 
identifi ed independently of the statements that name it, and no single 
object emerges from the analysis of different groups of statements (for 
example, those of medical discourse and legal discourse), or differ-
ent sub-groups within the overall group named ‘psychopathology’. In 
effect, one is led in circles without ever reaching a clear and well-defi ned 
answer. This is a variation on the theme, familiar from the philosophy 
of science, that theoretical terms receive their meaning from the theories 
in which they appear and therefore cannot easily be translated between 
theories: for example, ‘mass’ in Newtonian physics is different to ‘mass’ 
in Einsteinian physics, since in the former it is constant whereas in the 
latter it can be converted into energy and is therefore variable. Examples 
of this kind have been taken by some to lead to the incommensurability 
of theories; that is, to a situation in which each theory is isolated from 
others by the impossibility of translating between them, making it dif-
fi cult or even impossible to evaluate one against another. In spite of the 
fact that Foucault clearly takes a strong line on the ‘theory dependence’ 
of objects such as ‘madness’, he never arrives at this extreme position. 
For incommensurability arises when a term defi ned within one context 
cannot be translated into another, in which case the two terms are in 
effect homonyms and there is nothing further to say. But the emphasis 
in archaeology on breaking down sharp distinctions in discourse means 
that there will generally be intermediary steps to describe; and where 
this is not possible, other relations between discursive regions may be 
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consistent. What is important is that the focus of attention shifts from 
the constitution of a stable object to the broad discursive space in which 
‘objects emerge and are continuously transformed’ (AK 36, 46), and 
from there to the rules that allow the appearance of specifi c objects at 
specifi c times and places. Crucially, however, there is a further shift 
of attention from the appearance of objects to their transformation. 
It is the rules that defi ne these transformations, and therefore the 
‘non- identity through time’ of the objects in question, that bring the 
 defi nition of a group of statements within reach.
If it is possible to determine the unity of a given discourse, it will 
be through the transformations that it undergoes, through the change 
that breaks it open and disrupts it. One therefore comes full circle to 
fi nd that in order to understand the unities to which history refers one 
must have recourse to history itself, albeit now in a different sense. As 
Foucault writes, to defi ne a group of statements will be to defi ne the 
‘interstices’ between the objects to which they refer, and ‘to formulate 
the law of their division’ (AK 36, 47). There is something odd about 
this, in so far as a law or rule might generally be thought to bind things 
together, or to establish a division only by fi rst creating unities which 
the law demarcates. However, a law will be understood in this book 
as a regularity, and regularity involves the construction of a series of 
instances that exist as a group by virtue of their difference from one 
another (for example, a series of points, or a series of numbers). The 
rules or laws governing the appearance of an object and the transforma-
tions it undergoes are identifi able, and it is with these transformations 
that archaeology occupies itself. As such, its ‘objects’ will be these rules 
at least as much as the things to whose transformations they give form. 
Their status will be one of the central themes of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, since they can be neither transcendental nor simply empiri-
cal in the sense that they are given along with the objects whose trans-
formations they govern. It is in part because this level of determination 
has been ignored that, in the previous chapter, Foucault wrote that his 
analysis will bring into view links between the elements of a group that 
had previously been invisible.
The second hypothesis Foucault explores in this chapter is that 
statements can be grouped together according to ‘their form and type 
of connexion’ (AK 36, 47). Is there not, he suggests, a certain way of 
approaching the ‘division of the perceptual fi eld’ or of ‘transcribing 
what one perceived in what one said’ (AK 36–7, 47) that is shared by 
statements belonging to a particular fi eld?4 Foucault reports that he 
had to abandon this idea when he realised that what was supposed to 
be a principle of unifi cation, when reapplied at different levels, invited 
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the identifi cation of further unities that led to an increasing division 
of the fi eld as a whole rather than the reverse; for example, observa-
tion in medicine could be divided into visual inspection, auscultation, 
palpitation, and the use of microscopes and biological tests – to which 
we would now add MRI scans and many other techniques. Foucault 
lists other cases of a similar kind, leading to the conclusion that ‘If one 
wished to defi ne this discourse by a codifi ed and normative system of 
statement, one would have to recognize that this medicine disintegrated 
as soon as it appeared’ (AK 37, 48). The problem, as before, arises 
when one assumes either that a given fi eld will be defi ned by a law or 
rule that embraces its development entirely, or that there is a law or rule 
that can in some sense act as the thread linking its variations and suc-
cessive stages. Instead, Foucault draws attention back once again to the 
heterogeneity of statements, and thereby to the relations between the 
various rules of their formation. Elaborating on the idea that unity is 
found in ‘a law of division’, Foucault now writes that it will be found in 
the relation of these rules to each other, which means that it will depend 
on patterns found in the transformation of one rule into another.
A similar point follows, as Foucault considers the possibility that 
statements could be grouped according to key concepts. Again, the 
hypothesis founders as Foucault sees too many degrees of change 
arising to allow the anchor points to hold convincingly. Instead, he 
speculates that discursive unities might be found in the difference, 
and even incompatibility, between concepts (AK 38, 49). Rather than 
seeking to build up a structure of general concepts to embrace all 
others, the point would be ‘to analyse the interplay of their appear-
ances and dispersion’ (AK 38–9, 49). Here, one can perhaps identify a 
different target for Foucault’s criticism, albeit again unnamed. The idea 
of an architecture of abstract terms framing a set of concepts related 
to one another deductively recalls the idea of a formal system such as 
Husserl’s notion of a nomological science, in which a formal ontology 
that determines all possible objects is coupled with a formal apophan-
tics that determines all possible forms of judgement about those objects 
to provide the basis for a nomological science.5 Two related features 
of such a system leap out as having already been targeted by Foucault. 
First, that it aims to capture rules that govern not only the emergence of 
concepts and objects that actually exist, but also all those that are pos-
sible. As such, it constructs a unity within which history unfolds, rather 
than discerning unity in historical development itself. Second, it thereby 
undermines the capacity of the historical process to generate anything 
that had not been anticipated. Both points convinced Cavaillès that 
phenomenology could not provide an adequate theory of science, and 
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that a philosophy of the subject should give way to a philosophy of the 
concept (OC 560).
The fi nal hypothesis Foucault proposes is that statements may be 
grouped together by theme. This seems to make possible a differ-
ent kind of grouping, looser and more amenable to the migration of 
concepts across disciplinary boundaries. For example, the theme of 
‘evolution’ extends beyond biology to philosophy and cosmology. Such 
themes might be less explicit in their guidance of research but be all the 
more effective for that. However, Foucault raises an objection similar 
to those already noted, in so far as a theme that appears to group two 
more approaches together may, viewed differently, reveal signifi cant 
divisions; for example, evolution was understood at one time in terms 
of the continuous kinship of species, but at another in terms of discon-
tinuous groups. Such discourses are different in ways that an appeal to 
a similarity in theme simply masks, leading Foucault to suggest that the 
principles by which discourses are individualised might be sought in the 
way they relate to other themes and, going beyond themes alone, other 
discursive strategies and interests (AK 40, 51).
To sum up, Foucault fi nds an inconsistency in attempts to defi ne 
groups of statements in terms of shared objects, shared concepts, 
fundamental formal principles, or persistent themes. In each case, he 
fi nds himself led back from unity to multiplicity, from things to their 
relations, and from a defi ned form or relation to a variety of relations. 
Contrasting his approach to that of historians of science and philoso-
phy (who address chains of inference), and to that of linguists (who 
address tables of difference), he proposes to describe ‘systems of disper-
sion’ (AK 41, 53). Although Foucault has already introduced this idea, 
it is by no means clear and he doesn’t offer much more in the way of 
explanation here. However, he does add that wherever ‘objects, types 
of statement, concepts or thematic choices’ exhibit a regularity (for 
example, in their order, correlation, position, function or transforma-
tion), one can identify a ‘discursive formation’ (AK 41, 53). Any such 
discursive formation will in turn be subject to ‘rules of formation’ that 
condition the actual existence of its elements. As noted already, the 
restriction of these conditions to the actual existence of elements within 
a given discursive formation, rather than all possible elements (or all 
their possible relations to one another), means that transformation is 
placed at the heart of the account. History is the condition par excel-
lence by virtue of which discursive formations can arise, but no master 
discourse of history is proposed that will govern the elements Foucault 
has enumerated, or the possible forms of their relation to one another.
The work of Cavaillès is again worth recalling here, in so far as he 
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proposed not only that the history of science be the condition of its 
being science at all, but also that there is no single rule giving form to 
that history. Serres takes this idea further in developing a conception of 
history on the basis not of linear geometry but of topology, and of dis-
continuous topologies. Foucault appears broadly to accept these points, 
while translating them from mathematics to the human sciences.
In the closing paragraph of the chapter, Foucault entertains the pos-
sibility that the ‘familiar’ groupings with which he began may disap-
pear as his account proceeds, or that the account will fail to provide 
a criterion on the basis of which to judge the scientifi c character or 
otherwise of the discursive formations addressed. One is tempted to 
add that the whole debate on whether the human sciences are ‘proper’ 
sciences may be revealed as misplaced because it does not examine its 
own concepts and objects carefully enough to see the dispersion within 
them. Looking ahead in Foucault’s work, what becomes crucial are the 
effects produced by the relation between knowledge and institutional 
forms (an issue to which Foucault has already alluded in the reference 
to non-discursive events at the end of Chapter 1), and as there are other 
forces at play this depends only in part on a candidate passing a test for 
scientifi c status set by some meta-level discourse. Signifi cantly, he spec-
ulates that his analysis may be situated at a different level, ‘constituting 
a description that is irreducible to epistemology or the history of the sci-
ences’ (AK 42, 54).6 The alternative presented is one between a norma-
tive epistemology of what science should be (what true science is) and 
an ‘empirical’ history of what has been called science; or between the 
‘internal’ history of the development of science (a refi nement of logic, 
methodology, etc.) and the ‘external’ history (the sociology of science). 
Serres describes how this distinction breaks down in modern mathemat-
ics (HI 70–1), and this is important for Foucault’s conception of archae-
ology here. If archaeology is indeed irreducible to these alternatives, it 
breaks open what have hitherto been the only recognised approaches to 
the understanding of science, raising the prospect of a third alternative: 
namely, a discourse concerned with the claim to scientifi c character 
that focuses on the historical transformation of its various elements to 
such an extent that historical change fractures into multiple levels of 
becoming and the integrity of the discourse itself is put in question, its 
borders with other disciplines and sub-disciplines losing their defi ni-
tion. Indeed, when Foucault goes on to identify a danger that instead 
of the present experiment confi rming a familiar picture, it may force 
one to advance ‘towards an as yet uncharted land and unforeseeable 
conclusion’, there is a temptation to suppose that this is not a danger he 
is inclined to avoid (AK 42, 54). But when he adds that the historian, 
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losing all familiar points of reference, may be left with nothing more 
than ‘a blank, indifferent space, lacking in both interiority and promise’ 
(AK 43, 54), it seems clear that this is an outcome he already knows will 
not materialise, which is presented now more for dramatic effect than 
anything else. For however disorienting and unfamiliar the space may 
turn out to be, it will be full – of unexpected relations, fl eeting objects, 
different subject positions, and concepts drawn more fi nely than before. 
And yet, the ‘experimental’ aspect of all this needs to be balanced 
against what remain more orthodox concerns. The ‘critical’ impulse to 
determine the ‘proper’ bounds of a given discourse has been preserved, 
but displaced. The rules that determine these bounds now spring from 
the fi eld in which they apply. As regularities drawn from the elements 
themselves, they describe the conditions of the actual emergence of this 
or that form, without setting conditions for all possible forms, and they 
themselves will change along with the complex relations they describe. 
Without reading back retrospectively from later texts of Foucault, and 
in contrast to the earlier reference to conditions of legitimacy, one can 
already see here that the determination of limits is intended not to 
defi ne what is possible, but to frame precisely the conditions of what 
has occurred, placing those conditions in relation to other rules and 
exposing them to the possibility of variation.
3 .  F O R M A T I O N  O F  O B J E C T S
In The Order of Things, whose original title was Les mots et les choses, 
Foucault described how thought in modernity had sought a way to 
stabilise the fl uctuation between the empirical and transcendental levels 
of analysis that had characterised post-Kantian thought and held it in 
an impasse. If the conception of discourse that Foucault develops in 
these chapters can be read broadly as an attempt to release thinking 
from this position, the present chapter in particular aims to open up a 
gap between words and things in which objects are formed and their 
relations established, thereby driving a wedge between a simple positiv-
ism (or realism) and a world of ideal meanings conveyed by language, 
between words and things (les mots et les choses). The next chapter will 
carry out a similar move with respect to the empirical and the transcen-
dental subject.
The chapter is full of terminological invention and layers of distinc-
tions, and for this reason requires some patience to unpack. It takes 
as its focus the fi rst of the hypotheses raised in the previous chapter; 
namely that the unity of a discourse may be derived from the various 
versions of that discourse that refer to the same object. The analysis of 
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this possibility calls for an account of the formation of such an object 
that takes into account Foucault’s problematisation of its unity, which 
involved shifting attention from the object to the rules of its forma-
tion, and then to the rules of its transformation. The example Foucault 
selects to illustrate his proposal is the discourse of psychopathology 
from the nineteenth century, which he chooses in part because its 
objects were new, and underwent rapid change (for example, halluci-
nations, speech disorders, sexual aberrations, and so on). Many related 
objects appeared, were transformed, and in some cases disappeared, in 
rapid succession, and Foucault asks if it is possible to determine the rule 
to which at least their appearance was subject (AK 45, 56). If it is possi-
ble, it will not be by generalising inductively from empirical experience, 
and there are several reasons for this. First, because there is no series of 
similar cases from which to generalise. Second, any appeal to a history 
of psychopathology would have to assume the existence of objects of 
psychopathology, and therefore the existence of the discipline itself, but 
the conditions of both the objects and the discourse are in question for 
archaeology. Finally, any rule derived in this way would set the condi-
tions for the possible appearance of other objects ‘like’ the one under 
investigation. For the same reason neither will it be a kind of axiomatic 
basis that governs each and every possible appearance. The rule is to be 
the rule of the actual appearance of a group of objects that are related, 
though also characterised by their dispersion. It will therefore be a 
local rule, yet one with suffi cient generality to defi ne the appearance 
of a group of objects within that locality. Precisely how this works will 
become clearer as the text progresses, and will be addressed directly in 
Chapter 5 of Part III, introduces the idea of the historical a priori.
Given that the rule of the formation of objects is not equivalent to a 
restricted generalisation on the basis of an empirical history of psycho-
pathology, Foucault is not asking about what led to the introduction of 
a particular object, and whether the same conditions were reproduced 
elsewhere, so that their explanatory force could be extended beyond 
the single case. Such a perspective operates on two levels: empirical 
conditions account for when and where a particular object will appear 
(and what will happen to it), given the bounds set in advance by tran-
scendental conditions for the existence of all objects of experience. 
What interests Foucault is the setting of these bounds. His question is: 
how is it that a new kind of object could appear? It demands at once 
a break with existing ontological conditions, and the establishment of 
suffi cient consistency for the new kind of object to be repeated across a 
series of variations. The idea of the emergence of a new kind of object, 
rather than simply a new variety of an existing kind, raises ontological 
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questions that go to the heart of the divisions between what Foucault 
identifi ed as the two schools of phenomenology in France: the group 
of thinkers that followed Husserl and Heidegger, and those such as 
Bachelard, Cavaillès, Koyré and Canguilhem who broke with the phi-
losophy of the subject and struck out on a different path, based around 
the concept. The relations between the two groups of thinkers cannot 
be summed up easily, but a desire to secure the possibility of radical 
innovation is a recurrent feature in the work of Bachelard, Cavaillès, 
and others in that group. In the context of mathematics alone, Cavaillès 
regarded the development of science as driven by the thematisation of 
existing objects and concepts, in such a way that its movement, though 
deductive, went beyond the elaboration of existing possibilities. It was 
precisely over the capacity, or otherwise, of formal thought to break 
with its past and allow the emergence of something new that Cavaillès 
took issue with Husserl in his essay ‘On Logic and the Theory of 
Science’. Foucault’s account of the novelty and specifi city of discursive 
objects clearly draws on work in Bachelard, Cavaillès, and the strand 
of phenomenological thought he identifi es as indebted to mathematics 
and the philosophy of science.
The account Foucault sets out in this chapter is based on three ele-
ments, which he introduces in turn: surfaces of emergence, authorities 
of delimitation, and grids of specifi cation. His fi rst step is to identify 
where the objects of discourse appear such that they can then be desig-
nated and analysed; that is, to ‘map the fi rst surfaces of their emergence’ 
(AK 45, 56). To map a surface is to gather information on a terrain, to 
trace its contours and to identify what lies on its surface. At fi rst, this 
seems quite straightforward. Surfaces of emergence might include the 
family, social groups and religious communities, but also art, sexual-
ity and penality. They will not be the same for each society, since the 
objects of psychopathology may form and manifest themselves in dif-
ferent ways. Yet Foucault also describes these surfaces as ‘fi elds of dif-
ferentiation’, in which distances, discontinuities and thresholds appear. 
This is a reminder that the space to which he refers here is multiple (the 
plural ‘surfaces’ is used), and as such it is a non-totalisable locality that 
cannot be situated within a more general uniform space as if it were 
a modifi ed version of what is found around it. Bearing this in mind, 
it would be more accurate to say that to map a surface is not only to 
trace its contours and identify the objects on it, but also to determine its 
metric; that is, to establish the scale of proximity and distance between 
its points, to determine what form a ‘straight line’ will take and, ulti-
mately, to arrive at a (mathematical) function describing its form. In 
this context, a surface such as ‘the family’ will not only manifest differ-
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ent psychopathological objects to a surface such as ‘art’, but the rela-
tion between two objects as they appear on the surface of the family 
and two nominally equivalent objects as they appear on the surface of 
art will not necessarily be the same, since the surfaces themselves may 
be (metrically) different. Comparing or relating two objects appearing 
on different surfaces may be more problematic still. In short, the rela-
tions supported by the surfaces of emergence are local, with this locality 
giving rise to a complex space when viewed across a larger scale.
Of course, simply appearing does not mean that an object receives 
attention and begins to produce signifi cant effects. For this to happen, 
it must be taken seriously enough as an object for mechanisms to deal 
with it to be put in place, which occurs when ‘authorities of delimita-
tion’ identify and name an object, establishing its existence as an object 
of study. In the context of nineteenth-century psychopathology, medi-
cine is the most prominent authority of delimitation, but other exam-
ples include religious authority and literary criticism. The qualifi cation 
for any authority to do so is simply that it can, and that its doing so is 
accepted and taken up by others.
The last of the three elements on which the account of the formation 
of objects is based is that of grids of specifi cation, which are the systems 
by which ‘different “kinds of madness” are divided, contrasted, related, 
regrouped, classifi ed, derived from one another as objects of psychiatric 
discourse’ (AK 46, 58).
Foucault loses no time in pointing out that the account provided so 
far in this chapter is fl awed; fi rst, because the three elements identi-
fi ed do not by themselves provide objects ‘fully formed and armed’; 
and second, because it has not yet taken into consideration the rela-
tion between the three elements. The two fl aws turn out to be linked, 
as Foucault concludes provisionally that the formation of discursive 
objects is made possible ‘by a group of relations established between 
authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specifi cation’ (AK 49, 60) 
(which is an almost precise fi t with the three elements outlined earlier in 
the chapter). However, his analysis is not directed towards conditions 
of possibility, and so there remains more to be said. Drawing on ideas 
outlined in the previous chapter, Foucault proposes that a discursive 
foundation can be said to have been defi ned if one can specify an actual 
group of relations between emergence, delimitation and specifi cation, 
show that the rules of the emergence of a particular discursive object 
are found there, and in addition show how the group of relations 
exceeds specifi city suffi ciently to give rise to objects of different kinds. 
This sounds like quite a tall order, but it comes down to being able 
to defi ne a set of conditions for the existence of an object that, while 
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not general (for all the reasons already described), extend beyond the 
singular object in enough ways to allow other related but not formally 
identical objects to exist in relation to the fi rst, thereby providing the 
objects required to populate a theory. Once again, there is a balance to 
be struck between specifi city and a degree of generality from which the 
account can draw explanatory force. Finding that balance will open 
up a route between the historical reconstruction of a discourse and 
an appeal to the formal or transcendental conditions that underlie it, 
and this will depend on showing that discourses are governed by rules 
understood as regularities.
Given the complexity of the conditions required for the appearance 
of a discursive object, the constraints on what it is possible to speak 
of at any given time are quite tight: it is not even in principle possible 
to speak of anything whatsoever at any time. For it to be possible to 
speak of a thing, it must fi rst emerge, and this means that the group 
of relations between its surface of emergence, its delimitation and its 
grid of specifi cation must have achieved at least a threshold degree of 
clarity. Before this is the case, the thing will be vague and ill-defi ned, its 
separation from other things incomplete, and the terms in which it can 
be addressed uncertain and perhaps underdetermined. This is why not 
everything can be seen and understood at any time just given the right 
effort and conditions, and not, as Foucault explains, because there is 
‘some obstacle whose power appears . . . to blind, to hinder, to prevent 
discovery’ (AK 49, 61). The reference here may be to the familiar idea 
that science discovers what has been true all along, where what is real 
has simply been concealed by prejudice, ideology, the absence of correct 
instruments, or some manifestation of ignorance. But Foucault may 
also be referring specifi cally to Bachelard and his idea of an epistemo-
logical obstacle, the grain of intellectual habit derived from everyday 
language and culture against which the scientifi c mind has to struggle to 
achieve a fresh conception of phenomena. Foucault did not accept this 
aspect of Bachelard’s account of science (see p. 12 above and pp. 147–8 
below), but he was more amenable to the idea that objects appear as 
the outcome of a process of construction. The object, he writes, ‘does 
not pre-exist itself, held back by some obstacle at the fi rst edges of light. 
It exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations’ 
(AK 49, 61). There are several points worth underlining with respect to 
this idea. First, as we have noted before, the conditions in question here 
are conditions of the actual existence of an object, and not conditions of 
possibility. Second, in so far as the existence of the object is conditioned 
by a group of relations, it appears that the object could be described 
as ‘constructed’. This is not mistaken, but it may be misleading, to the 
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extent that it implies that the object is in some respect not fully real, 
perhaps that it is unnecessary, and that it can be made to disappear by 
some discursive sleight of hand. In its more extreme forms, this view 
conceals a belief in the existence of a real world beneath the fabric of 
our theorising, and denounces those occasions when what we say about 
the world has departed too far from the way the world really is, and 
the effects of the world as spoken present themselves in an unwelcome 
manner. In a more sympathetic form, the view locates the conditions 
of the existence of an object in relations that occur at a discursive 
level, while acknowledging that as a ‘social construct’ the object has 
real effects. In both cases, Foucault’s determination to drive a wedge 
between words and things, and to bring to light a complex dimension 
of relations, clearly moves beyond the reach of such criticism.
However, to understand what Foucault is proposing here it is helpful 
to go back to Cavaillès again, and to his account of the relation between 
mathematics and physics. First of all, for Cavaillès, the objects of 
mathematics were neither ‘found’ nor ‘invented’, but constructed via 
operations performed on the concepts and objects of earlier stages of 
mathematics. The conditions are therefore at once specifi c (conditions 
of the actual existence of a given object), local and historical, just as the 
conditions described by Foucault must be. And as formal, they are also 
independent of both transcendental conditions and empirical experi-
ence. In all these respects they are precursors to the conditions sought 
by Foucault. Moreover, Cavaillès follows Bachelard in describing the 
relation of mathematics to physics not as one of application, which 
would leave open the idea of a physical reality over which a theoretical 
grid has been thrown in the hope that it will fi t, but as the ‘incorpora-
tion of the world in the scientifi c universe’ (OC 38) such that there is no 
separation between them. As noted a little earlier, the discursive object 
is both constructed and real in the highest degree.
There are two fi nal observations to be made in relation to this 
point. First, that the relations characterising the discursive formation 
are complex. Since the text was written before complexity theory was 
established, it would be wrong to read too much into this. However, 
Foucault would have been familiar with the work of Serres, who had 
been writing about the mathematical conditions of non-linear dynam-
ics since the early 1960s. With three elements (surfaces of emergence, 
authorities of delimitation and grids of specifi cation), each involving 
relations or groups of relations that enter into relations with each other, 
and with any new discursive object formed likely to have an effect on 
the groups of relations that conditioned its emergence, an examination 
in terms of complexity as it is understood today would not be out of 
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place. The second observation is that as a set of conditions the three 
elements are ‘positive’, suggesting that they are open to clear and direct 
examination – if one knows how to look. This is a corollary of the fact 
that the relations are not internal to the object, defi ning its ‘internal 
constitution’, but are rather the conditions of its existence alongside 
other objects, in relation to them. One is reminded again here of 
Bachelard’s remarks on the ‘microphysics of the noumenal’, in which 
he notes that the objects of physics are neither things familiar from 
empirical experience, nor substances to which an independent existence 
is attributed, but rather things that exist only in relation to other things 
(NM 76). The conditions of their emergence locate them in a group of 
relations to other things, each of which in turn exists only in relation to 
the phenomena with which they are placed. This is what Foucault calls 
being placed ‘in a fi eld of exteriority’ (AK 50, 62), and it is essential to 
his conception of discourse.
Having considered discursive relations, Foucault now introduces two 
further sets of relations, which run parallel to the opposition between 
words and things: primary relations are those that actually exist 
between institutional and social forms, ‘independently of all discourse’ 
(AK 50, 62), and secondary relations are what can be said about the 
primary relations from within existing discourses. Foucault’s innova-
tion is in the elaboration of discursive relations, but he acknowledges 
that it is important to specify their ‘interplay’ with primary and second-
ary relations.
When Foucault writes that discursive relations are neither internal 
to discourse in the sense that they connect concepts or words, nor 
exterior to discourse in the sense that they might limit it in some way, 
he is negotiating the tendency to make the division between words and 
things fundamental and exhaustive. Discourse falls between the two, as 
what might be called, by analogy with Kant, a synthetic practice that 
produces objects for study. The unity of a given discourse lies in the 
rules immanent to this practice – and much will hang on the nature of 
these rules. One consequence of this is that, as Foucault suspected, the 
unity that emerges from this analysis is not congruent with the disci-
pline initially taken as an example; that is, if the origins of psychopa-
thology were traced, and light shed on the forms of analysis to which it 
can be applied, one would fi nd that the unity determined on the basis 
of the discursive formation ‘did not appear to have the same dates, or 
the same surface, or the same articulations’ as psychopathology, which 
appears rather to be the name for a collection of secondary relations, 
simply what practitioners at a given time can say about primary rela-
tions of a particular kind (AK 51, 64).
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The remainder of the chapter is mostly concerned to reinforce the 
barriers blocking any retreat to a concern with things or language. 
Discourse, Foucault writes, does not provide a history of the referent; 
that is, the point is not to determine whether an identifi cation of an 
individual or group of individuals as ‘mad’ at a given time was correct, 
or a misrecognition of other conditions or forms of experience. But 
in refusing this option, discourse is not driven back to an analysis of 
meaning, to an attempt to determine the difference between ‘psycho-
sis’ and ‘neurosis’ in a given context. Again, the fi eld of inquiry is not 
exhausted by this alternative. Discourse is not ‘a mere intersection of 
things and words’ (AK 53, 66). It is what is revealed when the grip 
of words and things on one another is loosened. It forms the things of 
which it speaks, and does so according to regularities that are histori-
cal without being binding. They leave the future to be written, as the 
relations constituting a discourse settle into a pattern, and this pattern 
interacts with others around it.
4 .  T H E  F O R M A T I O N  O F  E N U N C I A T I V E 
M O D A L I T I E S
Countering the view that his work sought to do away with the subject, 
Foucault stated that he had from the beginning been interested in the 
relation between the subject and truth, and the modes of subjectifi ca-
tion that this relation promotes. Even a cursory survey reveals that he 
was concerned with the subject across the entire span of his research, 
but did not believe that a philosophy of the subject, in the style of 
phenomenology, was adequate to reveal the actual conditions of its 
existence. Dispensing with the fi gure of ‘man’ as he proposes in The 
Order of Things, does not mean that one must cease taking an interest 
in the way individuals become subjects, and in the form and texture of 
the experience ‘given’ to a subject. Having described in the last chapter 
how the dimension of discourse opens up between words and things, in 
this chapter Foucault will carry out a similar operation with the subject, 
showing that discourse occupies a space between transcendental and 
empirical forms of subjectivity (AK 61, 74).
The chapter begins with a list of different kinds of statement related 
to medical discourse. Foucault’s question is ‘What necessity binds them 
together?’ (AK 55, 68). His use of the term ‘necessity’ here implies a 
logic or structure of a kind usually sought either in reason itself or in the 
inevitability of a chain of events. The fi rst alternative is not a genuine 
candidate here, as no one could claim that medical discourse was neces-
sary in an absolute sense. This leaves the option that it is necessary in 
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the sense that the descriptions, biographical accounts, locations, experi-
mental verifi cations and so on to which Foucault refers were all caught 
up in a series of events that made them somehow inevitable. Yet this, 
too, is out of the question: archaeology does not trace relations of cause 
and effect between empirical events. Foucault refuses each of these 
alternatives in order to avoid referring back to either transcendental or 
empirical conditions. Instead, the necessity pertains to the relation of 
the statements to one another, not to the occurrence of any particular 
statement or any particular kind of statement. In some sense, they form 
a structure in which each plays a part, and if a statement is to belong to 
the discourse of medicine, then it must fi nd a place within this structure. 
As such, the necessity does not place a limit on the object of statements, 
or the form that those statements must take, but only on the position 
they occupy in relation to other statements. It is the law governing this 
positioning that Foucault aims to bring to light in this chapter.
The determination proceeds via three questions. Who is speaking? 
From what institutional site is the discourse pronounced? What is the 
subject’s position in relation to the objects of the discourse?
The fi rst question – Who is speaking? – comes down to the issue of 
status and rights. Staying with the example of medicine, Foucault notes 
that ‘Medical statements cannot come from anybody’ (AK 56, 69), 
and that their authority cannot be dissociated from the person who 
makes them. It is, therefore, the doctor’s position in a network of insti-
tutional and social relations, including legal conditions and criteria of 
knowledge and competence, that makes the difference between a casual 
observation and a diagnosis. This, of course, will vary from place to 
place and from time to time, though with a degree of internal consist-
ency that means doctors in a variety of cultural and historical settings 
will have a great deal in common, even if their methods and theoretical 
background are quite different.
The second question concerns the institutional site from which the 
discourse emanates. In simple terms, there is a difference between 
a report written by a doctor on a notepad, and a report written by 
the same doctor on headed paper with the hospital stamp and issued 
through offi cial channels. Moreover, the authority of medical dis-
course is associated with different institutional sites (hospitals, private 
practices, laboratories, and so on), each with a different role or profi le 
and relation to medical discourse as a whole. The role and profi le of a 
site in relation to medical discourse can change over time, as different 
institutions and forms of practice gain or lose prominence, appear or 
disappear.
Finally, the subject is defi ned also by its situation in relation to certain 
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domains or objects of discourse. It may be a ‘questioning subject’, a 
‘listening subject’, a ‘seeing subject’ and so on. The subject may use 
instruments, or not, may take up one perspective or another in relation 
to the object. In addition, it may have different roles in the exchange of 
information about the object, preparing or receiving a variety of docu-
ments, and disseminating information and knowledge in a variety of 
ways to a variety of other parties. Again, the boundaries defi ning what 
is accepted as medical practice in this respect change over time as new 
methods or instruments are introduced, new systems of classifi cation 
are adopted, and new kinds of relation to other theoretical domains or 
institutions are established (AK 58, 71–2).
In pursuit of a law that gives unity to the variety of statements rec-
ognised as belonging to medical discourse, Foucault has identifi ed three 
ways in which the subject is positioned with respect to that discourse, 
each of which comprises a further range of different positions. Any 
particular statement may be characterised by one or more of these, and 
all of them are subject to change. As we fi nd repeatedly in Foucault’s 
analyses, each successive layer reveals at least an equal measure of com-
plexity, and sometimes more. It may seem that he is a long way from 
discovering ‘the law’ that gives unity and thereby necessity to the body 
of statements belonging to medical discourse (and there is no guarantee 
that an examination of legal discourse or scientifi c discourse will yield 
the same criteria and parameters). However, to say that his account is 
losing sight of the intended destination refl ects a misplaced expectation.
Foucault notes that he has not tried to reduce the ‘disparity’ revealed 
by uncovering an underlying formal structure of any kind. He did not 
aim, he writes, to reveal an organising principle that gives statements 
like those of medicine ‘their element of intrinsic necessity’ (AK 59, 73). 
Which is to say that their necessity does not come from within, or from 
their adherence to a prescribed form, but from their relations to other 
statements, groups of statements and non-discursive events. To the 
extent that there is an appeal to form, it is directed at the form of the 
discourse as a whole, and not at the form of judgements or statements 
that make it up. Although a discourse that has crossed the threshold 
to become a science may well require all propositions belonging to it 
to conform to certain conditions, these conditions themselves are not 
what makes the discipline a science. In this sense there is no equivalent 
here to the idea of a formal apophantics as it occurs in Husserlian phe-
nomenology, in which a science is defi ned by its unity, and that unity 
by the formal structure that judgements must take if they are to qualify 
as scientifi c. Foucault’s move towards the law determining the neces-
sity associated with the discourse is not a move towards simplicity, 
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and the ‘system’ of relations that defi nes the discourse ‘is not “really” 
given or constituted a priori’ (AK 59, 73). If Foucault is prevaricating 
here, it is because he is waiting until later before addressing this issue 
directly (cf. AK Part III, Chapter 5). Nonetheless, there are three points 
worth making now. First, that the defi ning features of the system are 
not ‘really’ given a priori indicates what is at this stage still a rather 
vague proposal; namely that, like discourse itself, they occupy a posi-
tion between the transcendental and the empirical. This will have to 
be made more precise as the reading continues. Second, the fact that 
Foucault steers his analysis away from any expectation that discourse 
be placed on a formal basis does not mean that formalism is irrelevant 
to what he is doing. As noted already, the model here is mathematics, 
which for Cavaillès was a formal discourse distinguished not only from 
empiricism, but above all from any transcendental or axiomatic base. 
Its necessity derived from its unity, and its unity from its autonomous 
historical development. Foucault’s analysis of medical discourse shares 
this sense of separation, unity and historical change. Finally, what kind 
of unity is this? What kind of ‘law’ has Foucault revealed? It is not, and 
cannot be, a law that governs the medical discourse and its develop-
ment from outside, or even as a formal basis within it that remains fi xed 
as the discourse itself changes. If the unity of the discourse comes from 
its historical development, then the law will be the law of this develop-
ment. As such, it must give consistency, but also allow for signifi cant 
variation in the boundaries of medical discourse and the rules govern-
ing the practice at any time. The consistency, therefore, will permeate 
not just the production of statements (who can speak, from what site, 
and from what position in relation to the object of discourse), but also 
the way the system changes. It will be synchronic and diachronic. The 
term for such a consistency is ‘regularity’. One can therefore say that 
medical discourse is characterised by a regularity in the production of 
statements, and in the way that the system, as a practice, changes over 
time. In one way or another, the same can be said of other discourses, 
and the idea of regularity comes to play a central role in the account of 
archaeology.
5 .  T H E  F O R M A T I O N  O F  C O N C E P T S
A series of questions similar to those already presented in relation to 
the objects and subjects of discourse will now be posed in relation to 
concepts. At fi rst glance, the theme of this chapter seems to sit along-
side those of the previous two chapters. However, problems that have 
emerged regarding the conditions of systematicity and the way in which 
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unity is sustained across historical change are carried over and begin to 
be addressed.
The chapter opens with Foucault refl ecting that while it may be pos-
sible to discern the ‘deductive architecture’ of a discourse that is quite 
narrowly specifi ed, extending it in breadth to the scale of economics, 
grammar or biology introduces a complexity bordering on disorder and 
the task becomes impossible. The concepts no longer appear to conform 
to a well-defi ned set of conditions, and it becomes hard to see anything 
that defi nes the unity of the science in question. Rather than concede 
that the task is impossible, however, Foucault raises the prospect that 
the requirement for order might be met in different ways: by a succes-
sion of conceptual systems linked by a continuity in the problems they 
address; by a law that might account for the ‘emergence of disparate 
concepts’; by a system that was not strictly logical. Summing up these 
various possibilities, he concludes that ‘one would have to describe the 
organization of the fi eld of statements where they appeared and circu-
lated’ (AK 62, 75). Two themes that have already emerged come to the 
fore again here; fi rst, that the rule giving a discourse unity lies in the 
discourse itself, in its thematic and historical variations; and second, 
that it is possible to describe this, without the description itself invit-
ing a further set of considerations relating to the unity of the discourse 
deployed (and constituted) in the description. In this way, Foucault 
engages in a kind of positivism at the level of the rules organising a dis-
course, rather than at the level of the contents of the discourse.
The description of the fi eld of statements is divided into three parts, 
which deal in turn with orderings of enunciative series, forms of 
 coexistence – themselves divided into fi elds of presence, concomitance 
and memory – and procedures of intervention.
The fi rst concerns forms of succession and dependence, and the 
‘rhetorical schemata’ according to which groups of statements are com-
bined in a single discourse. In turn, these include inferences, implica-
tions, appropriate orders of description, the use of rhetorical or stylistic 
patterns, and the distribution of events in the succession of statements. 
Not for the fi rst or last time, one fi nds that the closer the attention 
given, the more detail is revealed, and the more remote any possible 
claim to have discovered a unifying principle among the distribution 
of statements becomes. However, this is not a problem for Foucault, as 
long as the idea of ‘dispersion’ can be put to use as a form of organisa-
tion. Foucault’s example here makes the point. Natural history in the 
seventeenth century did not use the same concepts as natural history in 
the sixteenth century, but what was decisive was the way statements 
were arranged regardless of the specifi c concepts used. The illustrative 
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   73 29/10/2012   08:47
74 Foucault’s Archaeology
list that follows presents discourse as the construction of the relation 
between what can be seen and what can be said, between things and 
words. Above all, Foucault concludes, discourse was a ‘set of rules for 
arranging statements in a series’ (AK 63, 76–7).
Next, Foucault describes three forms in which concepts coexist. The 
fi rst, called a ‘fi eld of presence’, includes those statements that are taken 
up from elsewhere and become part of the discourse in question, having 
been accepted subject to a wide variety of procedures of verifi cation, 
presupposition and justifi cation (and more besides). Then comes a ‘fi eld 
of concomitance’, which is made up statements from other discourses 
that are used analogically, as models or in some legitimising function 
(Foucault’s example is that of natural history in the period of Linnaeus, 
which was defi ned in relation to cosmology, philosophy, theology, 
mathematics and other sciences). And last in line is what Foucault calls 
a ‘fi eld of memory’, which includes statements that are no longer part of 
a fi eld of presence, but to which signifi cant relations continue to exist.
The last of the three ways that statements are ordered is according 
to procedures of intervention that are applied to statements, such as 
techniques of transcription, translation, approximation and the means 
by which the validity of a statement is established.
In something of an understatement, Foucault concedes that the ele-
ments he has proposed here ‘are of rather different kinds’ (AK 66, 79). 
However, what appears to deepen the problem in fact provides a way 
to resolve it. A discursive formation, he writes, is characterised by ‘the 
way in which these different elements are related to one another’ (AK 
66, 80). The term ‘elements’ refers here not to the statements them-
selves, but to the forms of relation between them. In this instance, then, 
a discursive formation is characterised by a consistency in the relation 
between the forms of relation between statements; for example, the way 
the ordering of descriptions is related to techniques of re-writing, or, to 
take an example from an earlier chapter, the way surfaces of emergence 
are related to grids of specifi cation. It is, writes Foucault, such a group 
of relations that constitutes a system of conceptual formation.
These relations are not empirical, in so far as they are responsible for 
the organisation of what appears at the empirical level (the things of 
which discourse ultimately speaks), but neither are they generalisations 
from the empirical. Generalisations drawn by induction are universal at 
least within a restricted domain, but as such they do not enter into the 
kind of historical relations described by Foucault. They are generally 
modifi ed or replaced as a consequence of further empirical research, or 
in order to achieve greater consistency with other theoretical construc-
tions. Where it is the former, the changes are prompted by the discov-
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ery of counterfactual evidence, and as such they are driven by contact 
with the level of experience from which they were fi rst drawn. Where 
greater theoretical consistency is the motive, there may not have been a 
direct reference back to the empirical level, but the changes are aimed 
at achieving a theory that is more universal (it is made compatible 
with others to achieve greater range), or has a better balance between 
simplicity and explanatory or predictive power. In each case, the new 
version is presented as an approximation to an ideal, as the best avail-
able hypothesis for a universal theory. As such, they are essentially 
ahistorical and the record of theoretical change is one of revisions to 
a ‘fi xed’ view. What generalisations from empirical experience lack is 
an intrinsically historical character. By contrast, the relations between 
statements in discourse follow patterns of regularity that have their 
own history.
Taking all this into account, it may nonetheless seem as though 
the architecture of Foucault’s analysis is creaking beneath the weight 
of innumerable extensions, demarcations and additional strata. Yet 
viewed rightly it retains a surprising simplicity. Discourses are formed 
from groups of statements that are related in what is admittedly a rich 
variety of ways. First of all, there are relations pertaining to the discur-
sive object, then those pertaining to the subject, and those pertaining 
to the concepts deployed. These forms of relatedness are consistent 
enough to be identifi ed, and to remain relatively stable over time. 
However, none of these forms of relatedness are enough to constitute 
a discourse by themselves (for example, no discourse is defi ned exclu-
sively by the relations between its concepts, regardless of its object). 
To be a discourse requires all forms of relation to be in play at once, 
and when viewed in this way regularities emerge between the forms of 
relation that exist between statements directly. These regularities are 
the rules to which Foucault refers. But a regularity is not a binding law, 
and the relations between statements change; and as they change, so too 
do the regularities that exist between these forms of relation. Foucault’s 
proposal here is that the unity of a discourse is constituted by the linked 
transformations in the regularities. This can be described as a histori-
cal change in the forms of relation that give order to the direct rela-
tions between statements, as long as one understands that the ‘history’ 
in question is pitched at the level of discourse and is not a history of 
things, empirical events, propositions or concepts.
To say that the sense of history introduced here is not a history of 
concepts (for example, of their common features of classifi cation) means 
that concepts cannot themselves be the currency of historical descrip-
tion. The analysis concerns what Foucault calls the preconceptual level 
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of ‘the fi eld in which concepts can coexist and the rules to which this 
fi eld is subjected’ (AK 67, 81). In truth, the fi eld is nothing besides the 
rules that give it structure, which is to say that there is not fi rst a fi eld in 
which concepts can occur and then rules that determine how they may 
be related. Accordingly, the level of analysis is ‘preconceptual’ because 
the relations between concepts establish regularities that function as 
rules shaping what further concepts can exist and in what relation they 
can stand to previous concepts; and no concept occurs in isolation from 
an already established pattern of regularities in the fi eld. The fi eld in 
which concepts can coexist is therefore preconceptual in a historical 
sense. Foucault describes the archaeological analysis here as trying to 
determine the ‘schemata’ by which statements are linked to one another, 
which will include the way that concepts are formed and exist in rela-
tion to one other. Reference to schemata and concepts inevitably draws 
the discussion into the province of Kant. However, where the schemata 
that in Kant’s view served as the basis for the synthesis of concepts and 
intuitions were situated in the mind (playing a transcendental role), the 
schemata to which Foucault refers here are found in text books, and 
oeuvres, which are precisely the unities that archaeology breaks down 
in order to reveal the fi eld to which its ‘preconceptual’ analyses are 
addressed. The analyses of this fi eld and the rules that determine how 
concepts can coexist within it are ‘preconceptual’ because they deal 
with the historical conditions of the formation of concepts and of their 
transformation into new concepts (AK 67, 81).
So here, as in the previous two chapters, the dimension of discourse 
that Foucault opens up for analysis lies between the transcendental 
and the empirical, not as an independent domain, but as the medium 
of their relation to one another. If Foucault takes from Heidegger the 
idea that the operation of synthesis in the transcendental imagination 
had to be given a full temporal interpretation in the form of the origi-
nal temporality of Dasein, he articulates this in terms of the historical 
character of discourse. What for Kant is the operation of transcendental 
synthesis, and for Heidegger is the temporalisation of temporality out 
of which the ontological structure of Dasein’s existence emerges, is for 
Foucault a historical process open to inspection by archaeology only 
once the unities to which it gives rise have been suspended. As Foucault 
himself describes the situation here, discourse does not derive its coher-
ence from ‘the ideal structures of the concept’, and there is no ‘silent 
recollection of a meta-historical ideality’ still further back as the found-
ing condition of such coherence (AK 69, 83). Instead, archaeology 
analyses discourse on the basis of its intrinsic regularities, beginning 
with ‘a complex network of compatibility and incompatibility’ from 
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which emerge regularities that can be described in terms of concepts, 
their relations and transformations.7 In this way, thinking is not com-
mitted to tracing the origin of meaning back to an ideal point beyond 
language and thought, and is not caught up in what in The Order of 
Things Foucault calls the ‘retreat and return of the origin’ (OT 328–35, 
339–46). Thinking, like the themes to which it is addressed, is intrinsi-
cally historical, in so far as it has no resources to bring to bear on dis-
course other than those drawn from discourse itself. Moreover, there 
is nothing mysterious or concealed in discourse that cannot be tracked 
down, given time and enough care. Although archaeology is faced with 
‘a very considerable set of concepts and a very large number of trans-
formations that affect both these concepts and their relations’, they are 
‘perfectly describable’ (AK 69, 83).
Contrary to how it may appear then, the historical analysis that 
Foucault proposes is not abstract; if anything, its diffi culty stems from 
a determination to stay as close as possible to the discursive practice it 
describes. The pursuit of the unity of discursive forms does not trans-
late into the pursuit of universal rules, and the rules uncovered remain 
local, specifi c to a discursive formation (and in most cases to a specifi c 
aspect of one). This applies to the regularities that describe the chang-
ing relation between groups of rules as much as to the direct regularities 
between statements considered from a particular perspective. A useful 
point of comparison here would be the work of Michel Serres, and in 
particular his reading of Lucretius in The Birth of Physics where atoms 
combine according to regularities that codify the process from which 
they emerge. The laws governing the combinations of atoms only exist 
after a settled pattern has emerged, prior to which there is only a tur-
bulent motion gradually acquiring form. As Serres writes, ‘The law 
repeats the fact itself’ (BP 123).
In the fi nal lines of the chapter, Foucault repeats the principle that 
the rules for the formation of concepts lie in discourse itself, and one 
should refer neither to a ‘horizon of ideality, nor to the empirical pro-
gress of ideas’ (AK 70, 84). The analysis of concepts is thereby lined up 
alongside that of the formation of enunciative types (referred neither 
to a formal account of the knowing subject, nor to a psychological 
individual) and of the formation of objects (referred neither to words 
nor things).
6 .  T H E  F O R M A T I O N  O F  S T R A T E G I E S
This chapter sees Foucault turn his attention to forms of regularity that 
establish lateral or diagonal relations between different discourses. For 
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example, two discourses that are unrelated in any direct sense may both 
derive multiplicity from a single beginning, or may both deploy an evo-
lutionary principle. Considering how this occurs, Foucault rejects the 
idea that chance encounters between different ideas and discoveries are 
given order by some creative controlling intelligence, and puts to work 
the same explanatory principle as in previous chapters. Regularities will 
be sought, so that discourses such as those of grammar, philology and 
economics might all be seen to share a ‘common system of formation’ 
(AK 72, 86). Setting out what an analysis of such formations might 
involve, Foucault refl ects on the studies that he undertook into madness 
(History of Madness), medical discourse (The Birth of the Clinic) and 
the formation of concepts in general grammar, natural history and the 
analysis of wealth (The Order of Things). He notes that each study 
called for a description of the rules for the formation of objects, modali-
ties of statement, concepts and theoretical choices, but that in each case 
one or more of these aspects took priority over the others. What he is 
pointing to here is less clear-cut than a common structure. It is more 
dynamic and variable, yet nonetheless suffi cient to establish patterns of 
consistency between discourses. Moreover, drawing out these patterns 
from beneath the familiar framework of chronology and causal connec-
tions of one kind or another may reveal links and proximities between 
discourses that were unexpected, giving rise to new histories.
Foucault outlines three features of the formation of strategies that 
inform their analysis. First, in tracing the development of a given 
discourse, one can fi nd points of incompatibility where two elements 
(objects, types of enunciation, or concepts) appear ‘without being able 
to enter – under pain of manifest contradiction or inconsequence – the 
same series of statements’ (AK 73, 87). These elements may then serve 
as the starting points for divergent developments leading to distinct 
sub-groups between which lines of relation can nonetheless be drawn 
linking the elements in question. From the perspective of an analysis of 
a given discursive unity, this means that such unities do not spring into 
life fully formed. Within them often lie a ‘dispersion’ of sub-groups that 
are brought together to form the discourse being analysed. However, 
this does not amount to a simple fusion, and any ‘synthesis’ of the sub-
groups is likely to be incomplete. Other outcomes might have emerged, 
and understanding why they did not requires consideration of what 
Foucault calls the ‘economy of the discursive constellation’ (AK 74, 88); 
that is, the discourse studied may be based on a model of some kind, or 
have been developed in opposition to another discourse, or alongside 
another discourse, and these factors will infl uence the formation of the 
discourse studied from the sub-groups it brings together. As Foucault 
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puts it a few lines further on, taken together, these relations permit 
certain statements to appear in a given discourse, or exclude them 
from doing so. In effect, not only is a discourse constrained by others 
around it, such that it will not extend (in terms of its objects, types of 
enunciation, and concepts) as far as it might otherwise have done, but 
more importantly the actual form taken by the discourse is determined 
in part by this constraint: ‘it is essentially incomplete, owing to the 
system of formation of its strategic choices’ (AK 75, 89). This explains 
why a discourse may rediscover a new lease of life when transplanted 
into a different constellation. It is not because implicit content that was 
somehow there all along has found a voice for the fi rst time; rather, 
the discourse itself has been modifi ed due to a change in the exclusions 
and permissions in operation. Finally, the strategy that shapes a given 
discourse will also depend on its function in a fi eld of non-discursive 
practices, the way it is appropriated within society, and whether or 
not it is desirable (and by whom) (AK 75–6, 90). The important thing 
is that these factors are not extrinsic to the unity of the discourse, as 
though they were secondary distortions of its true, real and always pos-
sible form. The discourse only exists in its actual form and these factors 
contribute to making it.
The strategy of a discourse can be described as the way it negotiates 
a future through its relations with neighbouring discourses, bearing 
in mind that its neighbourhood is itself formed by these relations and 
is not dependent on a predetermined space. Because the strategy of a 
given discursive formation is shaped by relations between existing dis-
courses and their sub-groups, it does not have its roots in anything that 
precedes discourse. A strategy is not ‘the expression of a world-view’ 
nor of ‘an interest masquerading under the pretext of a theory’; in this 
way, for example, ‘the Analysis of Wealth is more than the confl ict of 
interest between a bourgeoisie that has become a land-owning class, 
expressing its economic or political demands through the Physiocrats, 
and a commercial bourgeoisie that demands protectionist or liberal 
measures through the Utilitarists’ (AK 77, 92). The strategies of the 
respective groups are not ultimately defi ned by the interests they appear 
to articulate here, meaning that an analysis of wealth that took those 
interests and their expression as ‘fi nal’ would have stopped too soon, 
contenting itself too easily that the terms appropriate to an answer had 
been attained. This is one reason why, for Foucault, historical explana-
tion that traces causal links between empirical events will inevitably be 
shallow and ill-conceived. It is not that there is a more fundamental 
truth waiting to be uncovered, but just that such an account ignores 
layers of complexity that contributed to the events it purports to 
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explain. As in the preceding chapters, Foucault ends by warning against 
a lapse into forms of account that look outside of discourse to explain 
the theoretical choices that shape it. These are to be attributed neither 
to ‘a fundamental project’, nor to ‘a secondary play of opinions’ (AK 
78, 93).
7 .  R E M A R K S  A N D  C O N S E Q U E N C E S
Having set out the conditions for the formation of the key elements of 
discourse over the last four chapters, Foucault now takes stock, and 
fi nds that there appears to be a problem, almost a paradox, in what 
has been achieved so far. At the outset, Foucault suspended the familiar 
forms of historical, theoretical and discursive unity on the grounds that 
they required ‘a theoretical elaboration’ (AK 79, 94). Yet the analyses 
carried out to provide that elaboration have left archaeology facing ‘an 
apparently irreducible multiplicity of objects, statements, concepts, and 
choices’, and behind them ‘a mass of elements’ that render any sign of 
an unproblematic unity still more remote (AK 80, 95). The prolifera-
tion is such that, far from giving critical philosophy a new lease of life, 
archaeology may be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task and 
slow thinking to a standstill. But before expecting some form of unity 
to be restored, it is worth recalling that several of the thinkers from 
whose work lines of relation can be drawn to Foucault’s Archaeology 
do not regard thinking in this way at all. Bachelard deplores the lazi-
ness of mind that allows our attention to rest, when more effort will 
reveal more to see, more events, more instants (and therefore more 
time) (TI 77); Cavaillès complains that to assert that one has reached 
an irreducible intuition is simply to stop thinking (OC 469); and Serres 
captures the irreducibility of complexity in a passage describing how 
the Harlequin sheds one multicoloured embroidered coat after another 
to reveal in the end a striated and iridescent skin that is ‘as complicated 
as all the barriers that protected it’.8 Nietzsche, too, is fond of masks. 
These examples, in all their variety, show that thinking can survive the 
absence of a fi xed point at which to aim, but they also draw attention 
to a lack of clarity over the way thinking ‘sees’ its object; that is, over 
the sense and role of intuition.
The early part of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a sharp 
difference of views over the role of intuition in mathematical thought. 
On the one hand, Brouwer made it absolutely central to the construc-
tive process of mathematical thought, whereas Hilbert and others 
regarded the prominence given to subjective intuition as introducing a 
weakness into the foundation of mathematics. Cavaillès steered a dif-
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ferent course, agreeing with Brouwer and intuitionism that the objects 
of mathematical thought were the result of an ongoing constructive 
process, but arguing that the emphasis placed on intuition concealed 
what was in fact the historical character of this construction. However, 
the move from a philosophy of the subject to a philosophy of the 
concept leaves the function of intuition within mathematical thought 
less clear. Although Cavaillès followed Bolzano in breaking the link 
between intuition and demonstration as a method, intuition continued 
to play an important part. The difference is that it was now involved 
in the construction of new stages of mathematical thought through 
the ongoing problematisation of existing concepts. Intuition, here, is 
constructive; that is, it is not a relation to a ‘given’. It takes place in a 
strictly rule-governed situation. But in addition, for Cavaillès, it carries 
mathematical thought to a new stage that would be impossible within 
the existing rules and conditions. In ‘Transfi ni et continu’, Cavaillès 
develops a sense of ‘complex intuition’ which is linked not just to one 
concept by one schema, but to several concepts by several schema, and 
which is thereby subject to a temporal pluralism (OC 470–1). In this 
way, the existence of mathematical concepts, objects and methods is 
strictly historical, and mathematical thought constructs its future on 
the basis of existing conditions that are historically ‘local’. In a different 
context, though one infl uenced by developments in mathematics and 
against the background of a deep engagement with the philosophy of 
Leibniz, Serres approaches thought as a practice that moves from one 
locality to another with no general map of the terrain as a whole. These 
examples, for all their considerable differences, suggest that in one way 
or another unity is no longer associated with a condition of ideality, or 
indeed any form of fi xedness. Unity takes shape historically, or tempo-
rally, without relying on a law or rule that is itself ideal, fi xed or even 
necessarily stable.
In spite of the proliferation of elements and levels of analysis, then, 
forms of unity do emerge from the account that Foucault has set out 
so far in this book, and initially they may even appear similar to those 
familiar forms suspended in Chapters 1 and 2. But in their detail, their 
construction, and their historical character, they will be quite differ-
ent, and for this reason the paradox to which Foucault refers in the 
opening lines of the chapter may be only an apparent one. Discursive 
unity does not present itself as an object of intuition, and, in Kantian 
terms, the unifying power is not a concept. Instead, for Foucault, the 
unity of a discourse arises from the rules in accordance with which 
its various elements (object, types of enunciation, concept, strategy) 
are formed, and the rules of their relation to one another. As such, a 
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discourse is not ‘made one’ by anything simple, and it is not fi xed in 
a stable form. Rather, it has unity by virtue of the pattern of relations 
that establish how its various elements occur and combine. As Foucault 
explains, these relations form a system that governs the formation of 
the discourse.
Nonetheless, one might still ask: how can there be systems and 
unities when each phase of the analysis seems to expose further sub-
groups, elements and relations? How can there be systems and unities 
in something which is becoming increasingly multiple? Quite how unity 
is composed over time remains unclear at this stage. However, the 
answer to this question seems to depend on what is meant by ‘system’ 
and ‘rule’, and how one understands the relation between a rule and 
what is subject to the rule. Foucault summarises the picture as follows. 
Strategic choices are selected on the basis of points of divergence in a 
group of concepts (though no explanation is given of how these occur). 
In turn, concepts are formed on the basis of forms of coexistence 
between statements.9 This means that the order of infl uence percolates 
up from statements, to concepts, to strategies; and also that concepts, 
as forms of unity, arise as statements occur together, presumably often 
enough to become associated. Accordingly, Foucault writes that choices 
of strategy cannot directly modify the rules governing the formation 
of concepts in a particular discourse. Yet, in an example describing a 
mechanism that proceeds in the opposite direction to the one outlined 
above, he also adds that a strategy ‘can implement some of these rules 
and exclude others and consequently reveal certain concepts’ (AK 82, 
97). This process moves from strategy to concepts to statements. Each 
level does not directly determine the one ‘beneath’, but selects combina-
tions. There is therefore an infl uence moving in each direction. This is 
not an ambiguity or a confusion on Foucault’s part, but follows directly 
from the conception of ‘rule’ operative here.
Describing a system of formation as ‘a complex group of relations 
that function as a rule’, Foucault goes on to write that to defi ne a system 
of formation is to identify a group of statements by a rule understood as 
‘the regularity of a practice’ (AK 82, 98). This is a regularity in the ele-
ments ‘regulated’. Yet Foucault also states that ‘A discursive formation 
. . . determines a regularity’ (AK 83, 98), so once again there appears 
to be an infl uence moving in two directions at once. Of course, this is 
only problematic as long as one assumes that a rule is a formal condi-
tion that limits in advance what is possible in a given sphere, and it has 
already become clear that this is not the kind of ‘condition’ Foucault is 
aiming to establish. The sense of rule at work here describes a regular-
ity that has emerged from the elements to which it applies. A complex 
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group of relations can function as a rule in so far as they establish a 
regularity in the formation of objects (enunciative modalities, concepts 
or strategies) but at the same time they can be regarded precisely as the 
outcome of a regularity in the elements whose relations they describe 
(or determine). In this sense, a system of formation, viewed as a whole, 
is defi ned by a rule. But at the same time it owes its existence entirely to 
the series of interlacing regularities (rules) in the ‘lower’ level orders of 
which it is itself the rule. One consequence of this way of treating rules 
is that they do not precede the order to which they ‘apply’ but rather 
emerge from it.
This way of understanding rules and their relation to what falls under 
them has precedents in both Cavaillès and Serres. In Cavaillès one fi nds 
the idea of a concept as an operation on elements that were themselves 
part of the historical process. Moreover, the concept brings together 
elements that may hitherto have belonged, or simply arisen, in contexts 
that were not directly related to one another. The intuition by which a 
new mathematical object is constructed is complex, determined not by 
a single rule, but by the conjunction of two or more rules, as a result of 
which what Cavaillès calls ‘the zone of intuition’ is transformed (OC 
470). The elements brought together in this way were positioned in 
different historical or temporal series, subject to different rules, and as 
they are drawn together in what Cavaillès calls the ‘thematisation’ of 
the current stage of mathematical thought, so the historical or tempo-
ral series combine to create a new map of mathematics, its concepts, 
objects, problems and possibilities. In this sense, the historical unity on 
which Cavaillès insists is the unity of history, evident in retrospect, and 
in prospect, in the anticipation that the next step will pull everything 
together. However, it is less evident if one takes a synchronic view of 
the present situation, simply because there is no rule or axiomatic base 
governing the production of every possible element over time. It is a 
unity always in the making, accomplished in the overcoming of a per-
petual moment of crisis, whether this be major or relatively localised.
If history as Foucault approaches it does not exhibit the unity 
that Cavaillès sees in mathematics, it is at least in part because he 
is addressing a discursive universe that is at once vaster and more 
diverse. Medicine, anthropology and economics may be related to one 
another in a variety of ways that archaeology can describe, but they 
will tend to communicate less intensively than different branches of 
mathematics. This more generalised fi eld has been described by Serres 
in terms that owe much to ancient atomism, where the order defi ning 
specifi c  localities – temporal, spatial or discursive – consists in regu-
larities emerging from the fl ow of atoms and their combinations (see 
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the Introduction). The open and infi nite universe of atomism is closer 
to Foucault’s vision of the aggregation of discursive formations than 
is Cavaillès’ conception of mathematics as a discipline unifi ed by its 
history, but they share a key element that is reproduced in Foucault’s 
analyses; namely, that the rules governing discursive events are formed 
within the discourses to which they apply, and that they are continually 
susceptible to modifi cation. In Foucault’s terms, they are not terminal 
stages (AK 84, 99). In addition, and this is can be seen clearly in Serres 
but much less so in Cavaillès, the infl uence works in two directions at 
once; from rules to what they regulate, and from what is regulated back 
to the rules.
As Foucault writes, a discursive formation does not freeze time, but 
rather ‘determines a regularity proper to temporal processes’ (AK 83, 
98), determining the temporal articulation between series of discur-
sive events and other series of events and transformations. As such, 
writes Foucault, in a description that seems to take over almost exactly 
Cavaillès’ notion of complex intuition, it is ‘a schema of correspond-
ence between several temporal series’ (AK 83, 99). Yet as a schema, it 
is not a fi xed rule by which these series map on to one another, inter-
sect, support or confl ict with one another. It is rather a discernible and 
evolving regularity between events, series of events and other transfor-
mations, as they occur. The important point is simply that a discursive 
formation does not lie ‘behind’ or ‘beneath’ discourse, and it is ‘prior’ 
only to each individual event, while remaining open to modifi cation by 
the events and series of events it articulates. The ‘prediscursive is still 
discursive’ (AK 85, 101). One might add that the a priori of history 
is still historical, but Foucault will come to this idea in a few chapters 
time.
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Part III: The Statement and the 
Archive
1 .  D E F I N I N G  T H E  S T A T E M E N T
The chapter begins with Foucault making sure that the reader is still 
on board, and that the risks of so being have been accepted. Again, he 
recalls that his aim is to redescribe the traditional unities of historical 
analysis that have been treated as somehow necessary or self-evident, 
and to stop looking for the ground of discourse either in a priori knowl-
edge or in experience. Discourse, then, is not the signifi cation of what 
is, and its rules of formation do not follow the outline of some deeper 
ontological truth. Yet neither is it grounded in the speaking subject. All 
aspects of discourse will instead be regarded as constructions, the rules 
of which are the outcome of a complex historical process that is not 
just found in discourse, but is the very condition of discourse itself. In 
preparing this approach, Foucault has used the statement as the point 
of reference, but now he wonders aloud whether he has ‘not replaced 
his fi rst quest with another’ (AK 90, 106), and whether the groups of 
rules that he outlined in Part II really do defi ne statements. Although 
not made explicit, this appears to be a reference to the way the rules 
are themselves the outcome of the processes whose regularities they 
describe. In this sense, it is statements that defi ne groups of statements 
and the rules that determine their relations to one another; not directly, 
but through their distribution, which either consolidates or disrupts 
existing regularities, and which may contribute to the emergence of 
new ones. Foucault also voices a second reservation: that the term ‘dis-
course’ has been allowed to take on a variety of meanings, according 
to the specifi c needs of the account at the time. By way of explanation, 
however, Foucault writes that ‘discourse’ was to have ‘served as a 
boundary around the term “statement”’, but that its meaning has been 
allowed to vary ‘as the statement itself faded from view’ (AK 90, 106). 
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So while the focus is ultimately on discourse, the idea of the statement 
that Foucault adopted as a means of opening up its analysis has not 
been made clear, and this has led to the vagueness that he now wants 
to resolve. To do this, the present chapter sets out to defi ne the state-
ment, and to assess whether the account of discourse hitherto has been 
consistent in taking the statement in this sense. The answer to the latter 
question is broadly, ‘yes’. Defi ning the statement leads to two different 
ways of thinking about it: as an atom of discourse, and as a function. 
Foucault is sceptical of the former and takes some time to rule it out. 
Yet there are good reasons to continue to think of the statement as an 
atom, even though there are risks associated with doing so that treat-
ing it as a function avoids. Ultimately, the two ways of thinking of 
the statement are not directly compatible, but both identify something 
important about the statement.
Foucault begins by writing that the term ‘statement’ has been used 
both to speak of a ‘population’ of statements and as a point of contrast 
to discourse considered ‘whole’. He then presents the following quali-
fi ed description, which immediately raises the question of the relation 
between the statement and discourse, in other words, of how one state-
ment relates to another to form larger groups:
At fi rst sight, the statement appears as an ultimate, undecomposable element 
that can be isolated and introduced into a set of relations with other similar 
elements. A point without a surface, but a point that can be located in planes 
of division and in specifi c forms of groupings. A seed that appears on the 
surface of a tissue of which it is the constituent element. The atom of dis-
course. (AK 90, 106–7)
The phrase ‘At fi rst sight’ implies that the idea is introduced only to 
ensure its elimination. Foucault immediately lists a series of problems 
to demonstrate that entertaining it would be a mistake, some of which 
he goes on to address directly in the remainder of the chapter. These 
concern the similarity or difference of the statement to other unities to 
which logicians, grammarians and philosophers of language have pre-
viously appealed: propositions, sentences, speech acts. If the statement 
cannot be distinguished from these, then its use in this inquiry is put in 
question, and with it the integrity of the inquiry itself.
However, before dealing with these questions, Foucault poses three 
other questions which are supposed to show that treating statements as 
the elementary unit of discourse will be a mistake. What does it consist 
of? What are its distinctive features? What boundaries must one accord 
to it? (AK 90). The odd thing is that these are questions one would 
normally pose about things, but the association of statements with 
things is explicitly rejected (AK 97, 114). This suggests, as mentioned 
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above, that the questions are intended to set up atomism as an unac-
ceptable alternative, but as such they miss the mark somewhat. The 
diffi culty in posing these questions about atoms in the classical sense 
of either Democritean or Epicurean atomism, is that while there was 
some speculation regarding the properties of atoms (for example their 
shape), it is specifi cally from atoms that things with phenomenal quali-
ties are formed. In his study of atomism, Les Intuitions atomistique, 
Bachelard records that certain forms of atomism were compromised by 
a relatively simplistic ontology of the atom itself.10 If the fundamental 
principles of atomism are those of multiplicity and discontinuity, treat-
ing the atom as a very small thing is a mistake that ties atomism back 
to the principles of unity. Conversely, breaking this link frees atomism 
to disrupt the appeal to fundamental unities (physical or  metaphysical) 
and to open up a philosophy characterised by discontinuity. This is 
beautifully illustrated in Serres’ study of Lucretius, where the princi-
ples of fl ow, multiplicity and contingency shape the whole account. 
However, Bachelard’s account of the particle physics of the early twen-
tieth century appeals to the principles of atomism to describe a similar 
break with substantialist metaphysics. The ‘basic’ particles in physics, 
he notes, have no independent existence (as required of a substance), 
and their properties exist exclusively through the relations into which 
they enter. A particle cannot exist in isolation, but only in relation 
to a confi guration of other particles, and as such, the lone particle 
is a condition of the phenomenal that does not itself appear (see the 
Introduction). From this perspective, understanding the statement as an 
atom is not so far wide of the mark.11 Moreover, the statement is not 
actually composed of anything. If one breaks apart the various elements 
that, when placed in relation, may form a statement, one is left not with 
its constituent parts or elements, but with nothing at all. The statement 
is both elementary and relational, its ‘distinctive features’ depending 
entirely on the combinations it forms with other statements, groups 
of statements, or non-discursive events. In this respect, the statement 
as atom successfully breaks the link that tied early forms of atomism 
back to principles of unity. To make this point explicit, Foucault will 
introduce the second designation for the statement later in this chapter, 
calling it a function.
Thinking of statements as atoms ties in with the recognition on 
Foucault’s part that one cannot simply explain why certain statements 
are made within a given discourse rather than others by appealing to 
higher order discursive regularities (rules of formation) without taking 
into account how these emerge from events at the level of statements 
(and intermediary events at levels between the two). For if statements, 
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like atoms, do not occur in isolation, but only in relation to other state-
ments and groups, then there is no isolated phenomenon to explain. 
The ‘event’ is always already discursive in that it occurs in relation to 
other elements of discourse: as Foucault has said, the prediscursive is 
itself discursive. Depending on whether one is dealing with the forma-
tion of objects, concepts, enunciative modalities, individual statements 
or strategies, the perspective of the inquiry shifts, but not its object. 
One is in effect always explaining the same thing; namely, discourse. 
For the same reason, there can be no reductionism here, since the move 
from ‘higher level’ discursive formations (for example, strategies and 
rules for the formation of objects) to the occurrence of statements 
cannot escape discourse to reach an element beyond which analysis 
cannot proceed. It is worth recalling Bachelard’s astute observation that 
atomism is less a doctrine about things than a question about method.12 
While it may have been prudent of Foucault to avoid associating state-
ments with atoms because of the possible misunderstandings it could 
bring, it was not necessary philosophically. In fact, Foucault’s archaeol-
ogy has a good deal in common with atomism.
Moving on to the analysis of the statement itself, Foucault contrasts 
it in turn to the proposition, the sentence and the speech act. The state-
ment can be distinguished from the proposition easily enough by virtue 
of the fact that there is no direct correspondence between examples of 
each. Moreover, statements are not expressions of meaning or inten-
tion, as are propositions. A single proposition may be expressed in 
ways equivalent to two or more statements that are irreducible to one 
another, and conversely a statement could give rise to two or more dis-
tinct propositions. The same non-coincidence rules out an equivalence 
between statements and sentences. Objecting that some sentences may 
be no more than a single word is not enough, since many statements 
may themselves be as economical. But there are many examples of 
statements that cannot reasonably be construed as sentences (Foucault 
cites verb tables, a genealogical tree and the algebraic formula of the 
law of refraction as examples). The fi nal alternative is the speech act, 
which appears at fi rst to be a more likely candidate by virtue of the 
fact that, like the statement, its identity is tied to the temporal and 
spatial specifi city of the act, whereas a proposition or a sentence can 
be repeated indefi nitely in an endless variety of settings. However, the 
same problem of equivalence arises, since there are some speech acts 
that require several statements to be made in conjunction with one 
another. As Foucault observes, ‘These acts are constituted, therefore, 
by the series or sum of these statements, by their necessary juxtapo-
sition; they cannot be regarded as being present whole and entire in 
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the least of them, and as renewing themselves with each one’ (AK 94, 
111).13
It was important for the demarcation of archaeology from linguistics 
that the statement could be distinguished from the proposition, the 
sentence and the speech act, but showing where the differences lie has 
been little help in defi ning the statement, except negatively, as examples 
of what the statement is not. Moreover, the proposition, the sentence 
and the speech act each have a specifi c structure, and specifi c conditions 
relating to their constitution that must be met if they are to be what 
they are. By contrast, the statement is ‘less strongly structured, more 
omnipresent’, and has ‘fewer features’, all of which makes it harder to 
defi ne (AK 94–5, 111–12). Finally, if one were to remove the structure 
and features that make propositions, sentences and speech acts respec-
tively what they are, there appears in each case to be a kind of material 
base left over (matériau non pertinente). Could this be the statement, 
Foucault wonders? It would mean that there is a statement wherever 
there are signs placed together, which leads to the question of the ontol-
ogy of signs, and indirectly thereby also of statements. Considering this 
question, Foucault observes that a series of letters he writes on a sheet 
of paper are the statement of randomly chosen elements from a rule-
governed series, even though they do not meet the conditions required 
to be a proposition, a sentence or speech act. A different comparison 
reveals that a series of letters as they occur in a typewriting manual 
are the statement of how letters occur on French typewriters. But their 
occurrence on the typewriter itself is not a statement. In this way, 
Foucault underlines once again that the statement is irreducible either 
to words or to things. It is more than a blank material occurrence of 
signs, but less than their codifi cation in language. For a statement to 
exist, it is not enough simply that signs occur together. The ontology 
of the statement must in some way involve its relational structure, and 
moreover its materiality must consist in more than just the physical 
presence of signs (this is a question that returns in Part III, Chapter 3, 
‘The Description of Statements’).
The statement, then, belongs neither with language, nor with the 
things of which language speaks. Yet statements are, writes Foucault, 
essential to deciding whether a proposition is well formed, a sentence 
is correct, or a speech act has been carried out. Rather than consider 
statements as another linguistic category to be determined alongside 
propositions, sentences and speech acts, they are treated as a kind of 
‘vertical’ relation between them and the signs they contain. It is by 
virtue of statements that one can tell whether a proposition, sentence 
or speech act contains a series of signs or not. The name Foucault 
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gives to this vertical relation is ‘function’ (AK 97, 115), and it is the 
second fundamental designation of the statement in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge. In general, the term ‘function’ has a very wide usage, but 
its sense here is quite specifi c and is closely adapted from mathematics, 
where a function defi nes a relation between two or more variables: for 
example the function 2a = b + 1 defi nes the relation between the two 
variables a and b: individually, each may be given any value one likes, 
as long as the other then takes the value specifi ed by this relation (the 
function relating two variables can be mapped as a line on a graph with 
two axes). Thinking of the statement not as an isolated element from 
which discourse is composed but as itself already composite, the idea 
of a function shows how it opens and structures the relation between 
words and things, and the various relations that form the object, the 
concept and the enunciative modalities that Foucault described in Part 
I. This will be explored in the next chapter.
The idea of the function captures the way the statement is a site of 
integration from the very beginning, rather than a simple element from 
which relations are subsequently composed. It reinforces the fact that 
the statement is itself relational, and as such is already discursive. By 
contrast, thinking of the statement as an atom helps one to see how 
relations between statements form discursive regularities that act as 
rules for the formation of objects, concepts, enunciative modalities, 
and other aspects of discourse. It is tempting to say that the idea of 
the function describes the ‘internal’ character of the statement, and 
atomism provides a way to describe its ‘external’ relations, but in fact 
the distinction between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ cannot be drawn. 
The statement can only map a word onto a thing by virtue of relations 
that run right the way through discourse into the structure of the state-
ment in question. There is therefore no clear boundary between the 
‘inside’ of the statement and its relations with other statements, groups 
of statements and non-discursive events.
2 .  T H E  E N U N C I A T I V E  F U N C T I O N
This chapter repeats the pattern of moving towards a defi nition of its 
theme through a meticulous process of exclusion. The theme is still 
the ‘statement’, and the possibilities excluded are those which tie the 
statement back into established elements in language and linguistic 
theory. The aim is once again to situate the statement between words 
and things. There are four stages to this process, each of which in turn 
moves through several steps, and as it unfolds, the profi le of the state-
ment as a function becomes much clearer. There is, however, a consid-
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erable amount of detail to work through and I shall try to do this as 
economically as possible.
The chapter opens with a brief and rather allusive anticipation of 
what it is setting out to achieve. Two points are worth noting. Foucault 
writes that the statement is not a syntagma, a rule of construction, a 
canonical form of construction and permutation, but that it ‘enables 
such groups of signs to exist, and enables these rules or forms to 
become manifest’ (AK 99, 116). It therefore acts as a condition that 
makes it possible for groups of signs to exist in a specifi c way, and with 
a specifi c structure; and it allows the rule that coordinates this structure 
itself to appear. As such, its association with a notion of the a priori 
is beginning to emerge, and this theme is taken up later. In addition, 
Foucault declares that the present chapter will have to examine the 
‘mode of existence’ of signs in so far as they are ‘stated’ (AK 99, 116). 
It is tempting to assume that this means that the mode of existence 
of statements will be examined, but this is not exactly what Foucault 
writes. There is indeed an ontological question here, but whether it is 
the ontology of the statement, or of signs in so far as they enter into 
statements, is unclear.
In section (a) Foucault looks at the statement and its correlate, a term 
chosen as suffi ciently neutral not to prejudice the inquiry. Returning to 
the example discussed near the end of the previous chapter, Foucault 
asks what it is that makes a series of letters written on a sheet of paper 
a statement, when the appearance of the same letters on the keyboard 
of a typewriter is not. It will turn out, he writes, that a statement has 
a specifi c relation that ‘concerns itself (qui la concerne elle même)’, 
rather than its cause or its elements. Although the meaning of this is not 
immediately clear, it does allow Foucault to set up a series of contrasts 
intended to clear the stage for the statement to appear. As one follows 
the account, it is worth recalling that the statement is not an additional 
category of language to place alongside the sentence, the proposition, 
the speech act, or anything else of the kind. Unlike such examples, it 
does not identify a further possible relation between elements pitched 
at the same level, but rather acts as a condition of the composition of 
elements by which such examples acquire their form and identity. It is 
the scene of the synthesis constitutive of discourse.
The fi rst contrast is with the relation between a noun (proper or 
common) and what it designates. What is designated by a noun is 
defi ned by rules of use (relating to objects it can validly designate and 
syntactic structures of which it can form a part), and these make pos-
sible the recurrence of the noun; indeed, the raison d’être of a noun is 
that it can recur in such a way that different appearances or cases are 
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treated as the same (different cars, different appearances of ‘Paris’). But 
even when the same series of words are used according to the same rule 
of construction, it is not necessarily the same statement. Although this 
is not explained further, the key lies in the form of recurrence associ-
ated with a noun, and made possible by the rules governing its use. 
Leaving aside the determination of the syntactic forms into which it 
can enter, a noun is related to an object through rules of use, but these 
rules express a relation that may already have been decided, often in a 
way that leaves open considerable room for variation in the nature of 
the relation. For example, ‘car’ picks out a class of motorised vehicles, 
but the way it is mapped onto an object (or class of objects) will not be 
the same when I point to a car passing in the street, when a spare part 
is allocated to the correct store, or when it is used in an artwork (and 
this is not just because they are different speech acts, as Foucault makes 
clear in the last chapter). The utility of the rules governing the use of 
a noun are supposed to lie in their allowing one to repeat the relation 
in an identical way, but a great deal must already have been settled 
before the rules can do this, or else they will have to be supplemented 
by many new ones. In fact, the use of a noun such as ‘car’ relies on a 
series of supplementary rules, conditions and tacit conventions to plug 
gaps and create maximal continuity between different contexts, specifi c 
referents, and usages. By contrast, the statement is partly responsible 
for the specifi city of these differences, and will therefore itself differ, 
introducing discontinuity and tending away from the ideality of 
meaning. The statement allows words to be mapped onto things, not by 
setting a formal condition, but by taking its place alongside other state-
ments that perform a similar function, and thereby building a ‘genre’ 
of language use that determines how nouns can be linked to objects in 
specifi c ways: for example, the visual identifi cation of passing vehicles; 
the allocation of a part according to the vehicle to which it belongs; the 
provocation of various associations in the viewer (this point is taken 
up again shortly in relation to what Foucault calls ‘fi elds of associa-
tion’ in contrast to ‘contexts’). Introducing statements into the account 
reveals a dimension that conditions the occurrence of specifi c forms 
of linguistic production, that is irreducible to the actual appearance 
of such forms, yet which cannot exist without them. Because state-
ments provide neither a transcendental condition for the possibility of 
discourse nor an external determining condition of any kind, it may be 
tempting to think that the conditions shaping the relation between a 
word and a thing might arise solely by convention, and could therefore 
be treated by an empirical history of linguistic usage, but this would be 
to ignore the ontological dimension of discourse. It would be compara-
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ble to saying that Heidegger’s Being and Time can be read as a treatise 
on pragmatism, the idea of Being-in-the-world indicating no more than 
an assembly of conventional practices and attitudes, whereas it should 
be understood as a way of existing that has a temporal structure invis-
ible to an empirical description.
The relation between a statement and what it states can also be 
distinguished from the relation between a proposition and its referent. 
Foucault asks whether a proposition that has no referent is somehow 
underpinned by a statement that has no correlate. In fact, he writes, it is 
the correlate of the statement that allows one to decide whether or not 
the proposition has a referent at all. To say that the proposition ‘The 
present King of France is bald’ has no referent, one must already have 
assumed that the statement refers to ‘contemporary historical infor-
mation’ (AK 101, 118), as opposed, say, to the actors in a play. The 
same principle distinguishes a statement from a sentence. One can only 
decide that the sentence ‘Colourless green ideas sleep furiously’ is mean-
ingless once ‘certain possibilities have been excluded’; for example, that 
it describes a dream, or is presented as evidence of mental confusion. 
To treat this phrase as a statement is not to attribute meaning to it in 
another way, but to say that it has what Foucault calls possible corre-
lates, some of which determine the resulting sentence as meaningless.14 
The correlate of a statement, Foucault writes, is neither an object (or 
meaning), nor a relation capable of verifying a proposition (since this 
would place the statement as an element of language directly in relation 
with objects and close the dimension of discourse). Instead, he cau-
tiously proposes that the correlate of a statement ‘might be defi ned as 
. . . a group of domains in which such objects may appear and to which 
such relations may be assigned’ (AK 102, 120), giving a series of exam-
ples, such as geographical locations with coordinates and distances. 
In this way, the meaning of the sentence ‘The estate is too small’ will 
change depending on whether the correlate of the statement is a group 
of locations and distances, or sums of money and their proportions. 
The same words will make up different statements in each case, and the 
different statements determine different possibilities of reference and 
meaning. The correlate of a statement can therefore be described as a 
kind of vacant placeholder that defi nes the kind of relations into which 
a proposition or sentence can enter, and by virtue of which they are 
taken to refer to something or to have meaning: different objects may 
occupy that space, but it is nonetheless unique in its embodiment of a 
specifi c relation to the proposition or sentence.
Section (b) outlines a similar role for the statement in relation to the 
subject. As in the case of the object, the subject of a statement is not 
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   93 29/10/2012   08:47
94 Foucault’s Archaeology
equivalent to the subject of the same series of signs taken as a proposi-
tion or a sentence. This is to say that the subject of a statement is not 
simply the one who speaks, since an actor reciting a part does not 
appear to be the subject of the statement as it is made. Yet neither is 
the author a viable candidate, as the kinds of description, dialogue and 
narrative voice used within a novel mean that a single person cannot 
be the subject in all cases. Foucault concludes that the statements one 
fi nds in such an example do not imply the same relation between the 
enunciating subject and what is being stated (AK 105, 123). One might 
object that literature is a special case from which one cannot generalise, 
but Foucault denies that this is the case. The subject of a statement is 
essentially ‘an empty function’ that can in most cases be fi lled by differ-
ent individuals (AK 105, 123). The example of mathematics provides 
a clear demonstration of this. As Foucault notes, any individual what-
soever can be the subject of the proposition: ‘Two quantities equal to 
a third quantity are equal to each other’ (AK 106, 124). Other cases 
exhibit a more complex set of possibilities. So where a sentence that 
begins ‘We have already shown that...’ occurs, the statement is placed 
in a well-defi ned series of events that it must follow, and which the 
subject of the statement must have performed in turn. However, the 
individual reading the treatise need not have actually have performed 
each statement. While the series of statements that ‘rightfully belong’ to 
the enunciating subject are at the disposal of the reader, the reader is at 
liberty to choose the degree to which he follows in those footsteps: he 
may think through each stage of the proof, or he may dip in and out, 
making himself the subject only of selected statements (or he may place 
himself in the position of subject for each of the statements, but without 
conviction and without understanding).
The subject of a mathematical statement of this kind is not neces-
sarily someone who has actually carried out these operations, who has 
interiorised them, retaining them in ‘the living present of his thought’ 
(AK 106, 124). This is essentially the Seventh Rule in Descartes’ Rules 
for the Direction of the Mind, but the use of the phrase ‘living present’ 
is clearly a reference to Husserl, and Foucault distances himself from 
the phenomenological view. The key issue is the relation of the subject 
of a statement to time. For Husserl, the necessity of a mathematical 
demonstration depends on evidence revealed in an experience of cer-
tainty belonging to the subject, and it is therefore essential that at some 
point the potential for an individual to become the subject of each of the 
statements forming the demonstration is actualised. But when Foucault 
writes that ‘The subject of such a statement . . . will not be described as 
an individual who has really carried out certain operations, who lives 
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in an unbroken, never forgotten time...’ (AK 106, 124), it is clear that 
one does not become the subject of such statements by grounding them 
in a temporal unity. In contrast to Husserl, Foucault is closer here to 
Cavaillès, for whom the necessity of mathematics was founded on the 
rules for mathematical thought operative in a given domain at a given 
time, which in their turn depend on the history to which they belong. 
Mathematical thought is not rooted in a fulfi lled intuition, but rather in 
demonstration, and the individual subject can move in and out of the 
position that defi nes her as the subject of a given mathematical dem-
onstration without compromising the integrity of the demonstration 
itself.15 Although the subject plays an important role here too, it does 
not hold the steps of a demonstration together in a ‘living present’, but 
rather enters into a history that can be followed, and ‘lived through’ 
precisely because it is temporally dispersed.
Having set out analogues of the object and the subject of the state-
ment, in section (c) Foucault deals with what he calls its ‘associated 
domain’.16 Again, the contrast is with propositions and sentences. It is 
generally accepted that in order to be well formed, they need only to 
follow certain rules of construction, which are thus presupposed by the 
proposition and the sentence, and on the basis of which one can tell 
whether the series of words in question amount to a sentence or not. 
As such, these ‘axioms’ are already distinct from what is intended by 
an ‘associated domain’. This becomes clear if one considers that on the 
basis of these rules (or axioms), a proposition or sentence can be rec-
ognised as such without any requirement for a context of propositions 
and sentences around it. A context may be indispensable for telling 
whether the proposition or sentence is true, or what it means, but that is 
a different issue. By contrast, the enunciative function ‘cannot operate 
on a sentence or proposition in isolation’, which means that statements 
cannot exist in isolation (AK 109, 128). For a statement to link a sen-
tence or proposition to a particular object or kind of object, and to a 
particular subject position, ‘it must be related to a whole adjacent fi eld’ 
of other statements (AK 109, 128). This is the ‘associated domain’. 
Having distinguished the associated domain from the context, Foucault 
then considers the relation between them. Where ‘context’ establishes 
truth and meaning at the level of propositions and sentences, the associ-
ated domain makes a context possible and determines it. As he notes, 
the difference between a conversation and a laboratory report can be 
explained in terms of context, but context itself cannot be explained 
simply in terms of the experience of the speaker, and the precedents 
of which they are conscious. Its conditions extend further than that, 
since the way that statements present themselves to the subject and are 
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arranged, remembered or forgotten will itself depend on pre-existing 
demarcations between contexts (for example, conversation, science, 
literature), which are themselves determined discursively; that is, on 
the basis of rules of formation arising from the relations between state-
ments. It is the associated fi eld that ‘turns a sentence or a series of signs 
into a statement, and which provides them with a particular context, a 
specifi c representative content’ (AK 110, 129).
There is, arguably, a degree of ambiguity here, and although it may 
be easy to resolve, it is worth highlighting because it draws attention 
to an important issue. An associated fi eld makes a context possible 
by providing a background on the basis of which formal rules can be 
established (for example, to determine what counts as a sentence or a 
proposition). The background is one in which regularities are already 
evident that demarcate the sum of all statements into fi elds. One might 
therefore say that a context is the formalisation of an associated fi eld. 
But to put it this way assumes the existence of a process within which 
an enunciative fi eld, defi ned by regularities, is merely an intermediary 
stage on the way towards the complete formalisation of conditions that 
defi nes the context. This would place the whole archaeological account 
back into the framework of a teleological theory. Alternatively, we can 
regard defi nition by regularity and defi nition by formal rules as two 
distinct and even competing models. In this way, the determination of 
formal rules on the basis of regularities in the associated fi eld is a tem-
porary, and local, specifi cation which will give way to modifi cations in 
the associated fi eld as and when they occur. The crucial difference here 
lies in the kind of condition that is an associated fi eld. Foucault writes 
that ‘there is no statement that is not surrounded by a fi eld of coexist-
ences, effects of series and succession, a distribution of functions and 
roles’, and that this allows statements ‘to follow one another, order one 
another, and play roles with respect to one another’ (AK 112, 131). It 
is, then, the relations a statement bears to other statements in an associ-
ated fi eld that condition the relations it can bear to other statements in 
the fi eld. These relations are not fi xed, as they would be in a context 
determined by formal rules of construction and use. Instead, the state-
ment ties a sentence or proposition back into ‘a space in which they 
breed and multiply’ (AK 112, 131). The associated fi eld is a condition 
of transformation, not identity, and this is its most decisive difference 
from the notion of a context.17
The same concern with transformation runs through the fi nal section 
in this chapter, which addresses the materiality of the statement, once 
again through a contrast with propositions and sentences. There is a 
sense of materiality that arises from the simple fact of a form of words 
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   96 29/10/2012   08:47
 Commentary 97
appearing at given time and place. That such an event is necessarily 
located in this way by virtue of sound, ink on paper, or the illumina-
tion of a screen means that it is unrepeatable. Each time a sentence is 
uttered, a book printed, or a line or scene from a fi lm screened, the 
inevitable difference in its materiality appears to entail a difference in 
the event itself. While acknowledging that the ‘coordinates and material 
status of a statement are part of its intrinsic characteristics’ (AK 113, 
132), Foucault nonetheless sets about distinguishing the materiality of 
the statement from this way of thinking about it. First, such a concep-
tion treats materiality as accidental, a principle of individualisation 
that nonetheless does not contribute to what something actually is. In 
this respect, it follows classical philosophy in binding essence to form, 
and treating materiality as extrinsic to both. By contrast, materiality 
is said here to be ‘constitutive of the statement itself’ (AK 113, 133). 
Moreover, the consideration of a series of examples suggests that the 
statement is in fact repeatable in ways that the simple enunciation of 
a sentence cannot be, for the reasons outlined. But if the statement 
is contrasted to the simple enunciation of a sentence by virtue of its 
repeatability, this does not mean that it can be lined up alongside 
the formal characteristics that give to the sentence an ‘underlying’ or 
 essential sameness to which one can always revert, once the accident 
of its enunciation has been taken into account. The materiality of the 
statement, then, cuts across the categories of form and matter as tradi-
tionally understood. Instead, the materiality of the statement is defi ned 
by its status as a thing (AK 115, 135).
Foucault’s example (helpfully returning our thoughts to the unities 
discussed in Part I, Chapter 1) is that of a book, such as Baudelaire’s 
Les Fleurs du mal. Different copies do not count as different statements, 
since the contingencies of ink and paper are ‘neutralized in the general 
element’ of the book, which is ‘material, of course, but also institu-
tional and economic’ (AK 115, 135). Even new editions that reproduce 
previous editions without any alteration can be treated as equivalent. 
However, when the line ‘Le sommeil est plein de miracles!’ appears 
in the 1868 edition of Les Fleurs du mal, it is a new statement when 
compared to the same line in the 1861 edition, since Baudelaire died in 
1867, making the later edition posthumous and placing it in a differ-
ent institutional and economic set of relations. It is these relations that 
defi ne the materiality of the statement, not its spatio-temporal location. 
But whereas the spatio-temporal location of a statement would mark 
it as unique and unrepeatable, the institutional relations in which it is 
embedded defi ne its possible reinscription and transcription (AK 116, 
136). The variability of these relations bears on the materiality of the 
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statement, which is thereby the condition both for the individualisation 
of the statement and for its transformation.
As Foucault’s book progresses, the same themes recur over and over 
again, receiving further elaboration each time. Having been rethought 
through the discussion of materiality, the statement is now described 
as irreducible to an empirical reality (fact or event), yet not an ideal. It 
is, writes Foucault, ‘Too repeatable to be entirely identifi able with the 
spatio-temporal coordinates of its birth . . . too bound up with what 
surrounds it to be as free as a pure form’ (AK 117, 138). Neither one 
nor the other, the statement forges a third alternative that empiricism 
and idealism both exclude, existing as a material fi gure with its own 
history.
3 .  T H E  D E S C R I P T I O N  O F  S T A T E M E N T S
This chapter might be viewed as another pause during which Foucault 
takes stock of what he has done so far and where it has brought the 
inquiry, above all in view of the fact that the account of the state-
ment has undergone a certain semantic drift, allowing a vagueness or 
ambiguity to enter that he now intends to resolve. Yet it turns out that 
this drift is for good reason, and indicates a movement drawing the 
account towards the point where it can best accomplish its aim. Several 
questions need to be addressed, however. First, the defi nition of the 
statement itself has to be reviewed. Foucault concedes that he initially 
expected the statement to be a kind of unity for which he need only 
‘describe its possibilities and laws of combination’ (although in fact it is 
diffi cult to see that he ever actually proposed such a view in this book) 
(AK 119, 139). The subsequent account revealed an enunciative func-
tion that involved ‘various units’ (sentences, propositions, series, signs, 
fragments), and related them to objects, subject positions and domains 
of coexistence in which they could be used and repeated. As Foucault 
remarks here, ‘what has been discovered is not the atomic statement’ 
(AK 119, 139). Certainly not; at least, not if one takes ‘atomic state-
ment’ to refer to a single, isolated unit that subsequently combines with 
others. As I outlined earlier, however, this is not how the atom is best 
understood, it was not how Foucault defi ned the statement in Part III, 
Chapter 1, and it does not appear to have been the idea of the statement 
at play even before that. This needs to be borne in mind as one follows 
Foucault’s appraisal of the shift from the statement as ‘unit’ (or atom) 
to the statement as ‘function’.
The fi rst task Foucault sets himself is simply to give precision to the 
terms he has used; above all, that of ‘discourse’. So far, he notes, it 
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has been used as ‘what is produced by a group of signs’, as ‘a group of 
sentences or propositions’, and as ‘a group of statements’ (AK 120–1, 
141). Each successive usage has more precision than the last, refl ecting 
Foucault’s increasing awareness of what is required to deal with the 
question he has chosen to address. The defi nition of discourse pre-
sented here is that it is constituted by a group of statements that allow 
‘modalities of existence’ to be given to sequences of signs (AK 121, 
141). Discourse, then, concerns the ontology of language, as long as 
what is meant by ‘language’ is kept open, and assumptions regarding 
propositions, meaning and expression are suspended. In fact, there is a 
parallel between the sense of ontology intended here and Heidegger’s 
approach to ontological questions in the light of the ontological differ-
ence. What is sought is not literally what something is, but the way that 
it – in this case language – exists. In Being and Time, discourse (Rede) 
is the ontological foundation of language and its structure is modelled 
on the Being-in-the-world of Dasein.18 Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Being-in-the-world in terms of ecstatic temporality then provides the 
fundamental ontological structure for the disclosure of Being. Later, 
in the ‘Letter on Humanism’ and the essays on poetry, Dasein plays a 
less central role and language comes to the fore. What is common to 
Heidegger’s approach throughout, however, is that language is studied 
as a structured event of disclosure. It is easy enough to see that archae-
ology opens up the fi eld of discourse as language in act, in itself, and 
not as something to be understood in terms of that which produced it 
(the subject), or which it produces (meaning). Discourse is the sum of 
statements, and archaeology addresses ‘the fact of language’; which is 
to say that it analyses language ‘itself’ and the conditions on the basis 
of which meaning can be embodied in language, thereby becoming a 
theme for interpretation, with all the scope for ambiguity, concealment 
and its reversal that this involves. For archaeology, there is nothing 
behind discourse. Perhaps the most decisive difference between archae-
ology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic ontology follows from this, namely 
that Foucault treats language in terms of construction, not disclosure. 
Therefore the question concerns not what speaks through language, 
but what language itself says. And what it says is constructed from the 
rules of discursive formations that emerge from discourse itself. There 
is nothing anterior to discourse, because discourse itself is the making, 
unmaking and re-making of worlds (like Penelope, a favourite of 
Serres’, weaving by day and unweaving by night).19 So while Foucault 
can describe discourse, as did Heidegger, as the ontological condition 
of language, this is because it is the site not of the disclosure of Being, 
but of the construction of what is. As Foucault intimated in the fi rst 
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two chapters of the book – and as will become increasingly clear as it 
proceeds, above all in the chapter ‘Change and Transformation’ – an 
understanding of discourse in terms of construction will involve time in 
the form of temporal dispersion.20
The following paragraphs continue to invite comparisons with 
Heidegger. There is something paradoxical, Foucault notes, in the way 
the description of statements does not try to discover what lies beneath 
the surface of language, even though the statement itself is ‘not imme-
diately visible’ (AK 122, 143). In fact, it is not that the statement is 
hidden, so much as that it requires a change of perspective to be seen. 
What Foucault means by this is that it is not separable from the linguis-
tic act it constitutes as a proposition or a sentence, and therefore cannot 
be concealed by it. Rather, as ‘invested in unities of this kind’ the state-
ment characterises ‘the very fact that they are given, and the way in 
which they are given’ (AK 124, 145). As speakers, listeners, writers and 
readers, our attention is drawn to what is being said, to meaning, and 
perhaps to the style of presentation. But as our attention is drawn, the 
simple fact that language exists is passed over. The parallel with the 
way, for Heidegger, the ontological difference is concealed by one’s 
involvement with things is striking, and the impression is strengthened 
when Foucault writes that the statement shares the ‘quasi-invisibility’ 
of the ‘there is’ (il y a) in the expression ‘there is this or that thing’ (AK 
124, 145). What is missed is the structure of the presentation of the 
thing; precisely what phenomenology sought to elucidate, and what 
structural linguistics examined in a wholly different way. Also missed is 
the role played by language in the fact that a thing is; that is, the onto-
logical role of language. And if attention is shifted one step further from 
the presentation of the thing in language to the event of presentation 
itself, then the ontological focus falls squarely on language, on the fact 
that ‘there is language’ (AK 125, 146). However, this does not refl ect 
the practice of archaeology, and is at best something that comes along 
with the analysis of discourse without becoming its focus. The attention 
to language itself was an important part of French literary modernism, 
and of the work of Maurice Blanchot in particular. Arguably, Blanchot 
took the analysis further still, exposing language in its materiality, 
separated from its signifying function altogether. In its blank infi nity, 
this is language ‘prior’ to its taking on the form by which meaning, 
reference and expression are articulated. The aspiration to let language 
‘itself’ appear, apart from the use to which it is put, is very close to what 
Foucault is proposing with the idea of discourse and the statement, 
but actually goes further still. Further, because for Foucault discourse 
carries out the ordering of word and thing, and situates the subject 
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in relation to what is said about them, and as such discourse cannot 
escape its function. Language apart from this ordering would not be 
discourse. It is in modern literature, Foucault writes (in ‘The Thought 
of the Outside’), that language ‘escapes the mode of Being of dis-
course’.21 There, in the work of Stephane Mallarmé, Georges Bataille, 
Georges Klossowski, and above all Blanchot, language achieves what, 
in view of the account developed in The Archaeology of Knowledge, is 
a remarkable state: it develops to form ‘a network in which each point 
is distinct, distant from even its closest neighbours, and has a position 
in relation to every other point in a space that simultaneously holds 
and separates them all’.22 This, Foucault adds, is language in its ‘pure 
dispersion’; as if statements really were atoms in the void, and had been 
pressed back to a point before their discursive function of mapping the 
elements of language on to one another in the order of signifi cation. 
Yet the term ‘before’ is perhaps inappropriate here, implying a real pos-
sibility of tracing back from discourse to such a state. However, such 
a move is impossible, since the antecedent stage to every confi guration 
of discourse, every constellation of statements, is another confi gura-
tion, another constellation. As Foucault has observed several times, 
a statement cannot exist in isolation from all others. The infi nity of 
language beyond discourse in its pure dispersion is therefore something 
that, for Foucault, remains permanently within language, without ever 
being possible (that is, conditioned by discourse). In the language of 
atomism, the ‘fi rst model’, in which atoms rain down in parallel lines 
through the infi nite universe before any collisions, is not a state that 
can ever return, or which somehow persists beneath the order and the 
chaos that came after it. Because the laws governing the combination 
of atoms only emerge later (and moreover are spatially and temporally 
local), to account for a given condition one has to trace its antecedents. 
Similarly, the analysis of discourse accounts for a discursive formation 
by fi nding the rules that defi ne it, which are themselves formed histori-
cally. The historical analysis of discourse therefore traces both series of 
events and the way such series are formed. This means that what for 
phenomenology is the ontological task of determining the structure of 
the event of disclosure has its archaeological analogue in the historical 
analysis of construction. One could say that the event of presentation, 
and the ontological character of discourse, have to be addressed in and 
through the history of discourse itself.
A further reason for the invisibility of the statement is that it is 
implied by every other analysis of language without being made 
explicit (AK 125, 146). What a series of brief examples shows is that, 
in Foucault’s view, other forms of analysis take their point of departure 
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from their identifi cation of language as fi nite, without delving further 
into how that fi nitude arises. For such analyses, the ‘enunciative fi eld’ 
has already been determined, but it is just this event that the analysis 
of discourse aims to bring to light. The comparisons with Heidegger 
are therefore still relevant, since his analyses are always concerned not 
just with the fi nitude of Dasein and of Being, but with tracing the very 
mark of fi nitude in the disclosure of Being, whether this be in terms of 
the fi nite temporality of Dasein, the strife between world and earth, or 
in the event of Ereignis and the history of Being. The difference, again, 
is that the condition of the fi nitude of a linguistic production is, for 
Foucault, itself a local and temporary confi guration in the history of the 
relations between statements. To account for the fi nitude of disclosure, 
archaeology simply continues to analyse discourse, searching out points 
of divergence and discontinuity, and the patterns of regularity that pro-
duced them. This is how archaeology is intended to repeat, differently 
(and more successfully), the analytic of fi nitude that Foucault describes 
in The Order of Things, which failed to secure the foundation it sought 
for knowledge in the fi gure of man as a fi nite being. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, the objection to what Foucault is proposing here is simply 
that by insisting that the fact of discourse can be analysed historically, 
without engaging the question of the possibility of discourse as such, 
he fails to address the question of the ontological condition of his own 
inquiry, because he has not engaged with the question of Being. The 
criticism assumes that any inquiry that limits itself to determining the 
Being of a given kind of thing will be regional, and as such in the grip 
of ontological assumptions that close off the true ontological ground of 
its own practice. To an extent, Foucault can defl ect this criticism simply 
by insisting that archaeology addresses the discursive conditions for the 
practice of ontology, since without a certain precise history of relations 
between statements, involving objects, concepts, enunciative functions, 
and all the elements of discourse, the question of ontology could not be 
posed. Archaeology, then, has its own priority over ontology. Foucault’s 
confi dence in this approach is clear when he writes that the analysis of 
the enunciative fi eld will remove ‘the transcendental obstacle that a 
certain form of philosophical discourse opposes to all analyses of lan-
guage in the name of the being of that language and of the ground from 
which it should derive its origin’ (AK 127, 148). Although Heidegger 
is not mentioned by name, the allusion is unmistakable. However, 
the issue is not settled so easily. One could object that archaeology 
addresses the ‘regional’ question of what makes the elements within a 
given discursive formation what they are (objects, concepts, enunciative 
modalities), but neglects the ‘fundamental’ question of what it is to be 
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an element of discourse in general. The question is a stubborn one that 
can nag away at Foucault’s analysis, in part because it is not addressed 
head on. Yet this is not really an oversight on Foucault’s part, as he 
has a reason for not dealing with the problem directly. A full response 
will involve the status of archaeology itself, and the impossibility of 
conducting an analysis of the conditions of one’s own time, considered 
in the round; an issue Foucault will discuss in terms of the archive later, 
in the chapter ‘The Historical A Priori and the Archive’. Briefl y, to be 
an element of discourse is to be defi ned according to rules that emerge 
as regularities within the history of discourse. Because of the recursive 
mechanism by virtue of which what is conditioned bears on the condi-
tions that preceded it, there is no ‘fi nal’ answer to the question of what 
it is to be an element of discourse; that is, no answer that escapes the 
historical process and is immune to transformation. This is why onto-
logical questions are transformed into historical questions, and why 
there is no place for a distinct ‘fundamental’ analysis to underpin the 
‘regional’ analyses that Foucault presents. The shift from ontology to 
history hinges on the introduction of temporal dispersion, which opens 
up the possibility of reconfi guring the temporal conditions of disclosure 
as the historical conditions of construction. However, it is not that 
ontology gives way to history entirely. If anything, ontology has to take 
history into itself, just as mathematics did before it.
In Section II of this chapter, Foucault considers whether the descrip-
tion of statements he has given is compatible with the earlier account 
of discursive formations.23 As he often does, Foucault catalogues the 
approaches that he is not taking. He is not presenting a theory or model 
applicable to empirical descriptions (as this would enter the account 
too late, once discourse had already worked to assign possible objects 
to signs, and in addition it would insulate each locality of discourse 
from the feedback coming from the actual relations it maps). He is 
neither inferring a description of discursive formations on the basis of 
a defi nition of statements, nor vice versa (as this would mean either 
one or the other aspect was simply ‘given’, but this can only be the case 
once discourse has assigned objects to signs). And he is not proceeding 
by linear deduction. Rather, he intends to ‘reveal . . . a regularity’ that 
made it possible to say what he said. This brings sharply into focus the 
question of whether Foucault risks reproducing the doubling between 
condition and conditioned that he identifi ed as a problem in the con-
fi guration of thought in modernity (a question that has been circulating 
in the shadows for some time). But the key lies in the relation between 
the condition and what it conditions. In classical metaphysics, Kantian 
philosophy and phenomenology (to mention just three of many possi-
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ble examples) there is a separation between conditions and conditioned 
that is most usually presented as parallel to the transcendental-empir-
ical divide (or a meta-level to the level it orders). In this case, whether 
it be Platonic forms, the transcendental a priori, or the formal basis 
of nomological science, the condition precedes the conditioned and 
remains insulated from it. This is not the case with regularity, since 
it involves a coincidence of condition and conditioned. But whereas 
traditional metaphysics fi nds the coming together of condition and con-
ditioned only in a necessary being that is causa sui, in archaeology the 
‘conditioning’ regularity falls together with the ‘conditioned’ regularity 
because a regularity as formulated in a law or rule is merely descriptive 
of the regularity that has emerged. As Foucault explains, ‘the discursive 
formation is characterized not by principles of construction but by a 
dispersion of fact, since for statements it is not a condition of possibility 
but a law of co-existence’ (AK 131, 153). For this reason, any disconti-
nuity or deviation in the regularity as it occurs will have an immediate 
impact on the law (or the principle of construction): there is no separa-
tion between them, or no separation that is not bridged by events. The 
step from empirical to transcendental, or from the physical world to 
its metaphysical ground, is transformed into a step within a historical 
process, and with that step philosophy becomes essentially histori-
cal.24 This can only happen because there is a two-way communication 
between conditions and conditioned. Discursive formations are groups 
of statements linked at the level of statements themselves, and by virtue 
of these links it becomes possible to defi ne rules for the formation of 
their objects, their modes of enunciation and subject positions, their 
associated domains, forms of succession and simultaneity, the way they 
are institutionalised, used and combined together, and fi nally the way 
that they become instruments for desire or interest, and elements for 
a strategy. From one perspective, the possibility of defi ning each area 
and level of regularity arises fi rst of all at the level of statements. Yet 
each statement already coordinates all of these elements, and it can only 
do so effectively when grouped with others to form a coherent discur-
sive formation marked by clear patterns of regularity. From a second 
perspective, therefore, discursive formations reveal the level of the 
statement: ‘The two approaches are equally justifi able and  reversible’ 
(AK 130, 152). The two approaches are in fact only methodologically 
distinct, and can be seen as abstractions from a single process.
Because the conditions of any discourse are caught up in the 
structures and transformations they describe, Foucault can draw the 
 conclusion (repeated here) that discourse is ‘not an ideal, timeless form 
that also possesses a history’ (AK 131, 153), a view that could be attrib-
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uted to phenomenology (above all in its Husserlian form). Discourse is 
intrinsically historical, with its own specifi c limits, transformations and 
modes of temporality. This is a point to which he will return later.
4 .  R A R I T Y ,  E X T E R I O R I T Y ,  A C C U M U L A T I O N
At the close of the last chapter, Foucault wrote that he would move on 
next to consider what is involved in the analysis of the enunciative fi eld, 
what it requires and what it excludes. Various themes are presented 
and discussed in this chapter, including a kind of economy of state-
ments, and the question of power in relation to discourse. It unfolds 
via another series of contrasts between the analysis of discourse and 
other forms of inquiry and interpretation organised around the spatial 
categories of interiority and exteriority, but it is not an accident that the 
theme of time moves increasingly to the fore as Foucault considers how 
discourse acquires its structure, its movement, and even the direction of 
that movement.
Foucault describes an orthodox approach to the analysis of discourse 
as one that searches out the meaning of texts (and sub-textual group-
ings, institutions and practices extending beyond texts and between 
them) and charts the relation between these meanings, with a view to 
building up larger confi gurations. Ultimately, such an approach aims at 
a determination of the totality of possible meanings to which a given 
text or proposition belongs. However, this is achieved by setting the 
conditions within which the interpretation of the text can legitimately 
unfold. The space for interpretation is therefore bounded, but it is also 
continuous, and as such it can always be divided in such a way as to 
reveal ‘new’ meanings within the limits set. Still from this point of view, 
to choose one meaning is to deny existence to a second, or even to many 
others, which remain hidden as the unsaid – propositions defi ned as 
possible by the boundary conditions of the discourse, but never actu-
alised, like the possibilities for the world passed over by a Leibnizian 
God. In contrast to this view, Foucault’s conception of discourse does 
not defi ne a totality of possibilities, but rather a certain number of 
actually existing statements, each in turn coordinating propositions 
and sentences. With no internal dimension, discourse is ‘identical with 
its own surface’ (AK 135, 157), and the surface itself is anything but a 
seamless web in which each position is, or could be, occupied. Rather 
than a continuous space of potentially infi nite interpretation, discourse 
is said to be ‘a distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, divisions’ 
(AK 134, 157). This is a discontinuous, atomistic, space. Keeping the 
contrast with a continuous space in mind, one can see that what is not 
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stated in such an arrangement is not suppressed, simply because its not 
being stated is not the frustration of a potentiality in its drive towards 
actualisation, or the denial of a possibility that exists waiting to be 
realised. In the space of discourse, what actually occurs is bordered not 
by unactualised possibilities, but by a distribution of actual statements, 
broken up by the discursive void.
If there are no unactualised possibilities, it might be asked how dis-
course can change at all. However, variation comes not from a round-
ing out of what is made actual within existing bounds, but rather by a 
change in the prevailing rule or regularity produced either through its 
disruption by another rule, or by its imperfect reproduction. Summing 
up, one can describe the difference between discursive formations in 
Foucault’s analysis and their more orthodox counterparts in terms of 
the structure of the space characteristic of each. In the ‘continuous’ 
space of interpretation there is always room for variations and alterna-
tives alongside what already exists, whereas in the discontinuous space 
of the analysis of discourse what actually occurs is all that the condi-
tions at the time permit. This is why the relations between statements, 
especially when looking at large-scale discursive formations, have to be 
established not just by fi nding a rule that unites them, but by tracing the 
relations between the rules or regularities by virtue of which they exist.
Because the statements that occur are not taken from a lake of pos-
sibilities, any number of which may be actualised, they are said by 
Foucault to be rare. This rarity gives them a certain value and leads to 
their collection, as the meanings in them are repeated, multiplied and 
ultimately transformed. As Foucault puts it, ‘To interpret is a way of 
reacting against enunciative poverty’ (AK 135, 158). In a kind of ironic 
twist, then, discourse as archaeology understands it promotes an inter-
pretive practice that does not even recognise its existence. Moreover, as 
Foucault explains, in failing to recognise discourse for what it is, inter-
pretation also misses a signifi cant consequence of the rarity of state-
ments. For this makes them desirable assets in a discursive economy, 
and as such they can become the focus for struggle and confl ict. In this 
way, Foucault’s conception of discourse ‘poses the question of power’ 
in a way that a theory of interpretation could not (AK 136, 158).
It is perhaps no coincidence that having raised, albeit almost in 
passing, the question of power, Foucault moves towards a considera-
tion of the practice of analysis in the absence of an authority that sets 
the bounds of its legitimacy. Historical description, writes Foucault, 
has usually been motivated by a desire to leave behind exteriority, 
characterised by ‘contingency or mere material necessity’, in favour of 
a more essential domain of interiority, thereby reversing the work of 
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expression to rediscover the deeper intentions behind it. The move is 
refl ected in the division between history and philosophy, as it is usually 
drawn, where philosophy may take the form of the recollection of the 
Logos, the teleology of reason, or the problematic of the trace; appar-
ently thinking of Heidegger, perhaps of Derrida, Foucault refers here to 
the pursuit of ‘a point prior to all speech . . . the gap of deferred time’. 
Ultimately, it almost doesn’t matter to Foucault which form prevails, 
as ‘it is always the historico-transcendental theme that is reinvested’ 
(AK 137, 159). Avoiding this move is therefore crucial to Foucault’s 
response to the closure of the history of thought brought about by the 
division between transcendental philosophy and the human sciences 
as he describes it in The Order of Things. The task of analysis is not 
therefore to explain the fi eld of statements by ‘translating’ operations 
or processes that have already taken place ‘in men’s thought, in their 
consciousness or unconscious, in the sphere of transcendental consti-
tutions’ (AK 137, 160). Foucault’s point here is not simply that the 
material elements of signifi cation are impossible to eliminate, and that 
a pure interiority is a dream. Such a view, which could be attributed 
to Derrida, willingly or otherwise concedes too much to the ‘historico-
transcendental theme’ Foucault criticises. Instead, Foucault chooses to 
situate thinking entirely in the realm of exteriority, in the discursive 
practices that are shaped by the history of their own construction. This 
in no way means that the subject is excluded. If to think is to engage in 
discursive practices, in order to think, the subject has to leave the space 
of interiority and engage in what lies outside. In fact, that the identifi ca-
tion of thinking with rule-governed discursive practices (and of course 
their analysis) is not at all as dry and dusty as it sounds, and above 
all that it is not a foreign territory for the subject, can be seen in what 
appears to be an allusion Foucault makes here to Blanchot. Mentioning 
a term closely associated with Blanchot, he wonders aloud whether it 
would have been right to speak of ‘neutrality’ rather than ‘exteriority’ 
(AK 137, 159–60), but decides that it would not. In view of Foucault’s 
admiration for Blanchot’s work, the fact that he elects not to use the 
term may be taken to say more about his own aspirations than to imply 
any criticism of Blanchot. The word, he writes, too easily implies a 
‘suspension of belief’ and an ‘effacement . . . of all position of exist-
ence’, actions that both lie too close to the phenomenological theme of 
the époche, and that promote a practice of thinking whose fi rst move, 
indeed whose condition, is to disengage from the world with which it 
deals. Refusing this, Foucault throws his vision of thinking into relief as 
a practice utterly embedded in the world, not by virtue of a decision to 
be engagé, but simply because there is nowhere else, and no other way, 
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for thinking to take place at all. Once again, Cavaillès is relevant here 
because of the way he displaced the subject from its sovereign position 
in mathematical thought, which he understood purely as demonstra-
tion: the unfolding of a train of thought according to certain rules, 
but also the transformation of the space, and the terms, in which that 
thought is carried out. Without assuming that they work in precisely 
the same way, the description of thinking as an operation carried out 
in a concrete situation determined by rules which are themselves his-
torical could easily be applied both to mathematics and to discourse as 
Foucault understands it.
Three points are then made in quick succession, which are almost 
reminders of what should by now have already become clear about the 
relation between discourse and the subject. First, Foucault recalls that 
discourse is autonomous, though dependent (because it requires speak-
ers, and the material reality of language, but also institutional forms); 
second, that the various forms adopted by the speaking subject are 
‘effects’ of discourse; fi nally, if discourse is not the expression of events 
in consciousness, then the time of discourse is not modelled on the time 
of consciousness. This last point is very important, and should be read 
for what it means for the subject as well as for what it means for dis-
course: turning the declaration around shows that to think is to engage 
with temporal structures in discourse that are different to the settled 
rhythms one takes for one’s own. This appears to be what Foucault 
meant by welcoming the Other into the time of our own thought (AK 
13, 21).25
The theme of time also runs through the following three paragraphs, 
which appear to fi ll in the gaps in a picture that has already become 
fairly clear. It is no surprise that the analysis of statements oper-
ates ‘without reference to a cogito’ (AK 138, 161), and Foucault has 
already stated that it is not concerned with language as expression or 
representation from the position of a subject. Rather, the analysis of 
statements looks not only for relations and regularities within what is 
said, but also for the transformations to be found there. This doesn’t 
explain the mechanism of transformation, but it is a reminder that 
revealing transformation is an important part of archaeology. It is 
worth noting here that explanation itself deploys a form of continu-
ity, as reason fi lls in gaps to establish, if it can, a seamless progression 
from cause to effect, from origin to end. Foucault’s rejection of this 
sense of continuity undermines the prejudice against archaeology for 
not being able to explain the transformations it describes. Discourses 
are frequently attributed a kind of inertia, as though they were a dead 
weight that had to be animated by the interest we take in them: perhaps 
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they will be read, and the now distant events to which they refer will 
be brought back momentarily; maybe their signs will be interpreted to 
reveal a life now forgotten (AK 139, 161–2). Yet such a view assumes 
that discourse itself has no life, no time or history, of its own. As long 
as such a view prevails, it is hard to see how the analysis of discourse 
can effectively reveal change and transformation, for which the cause 
must always lie elsewhere. In this way, the criticism that archaeology 
has nothing to say about change and transformation looks circular, as 
it assumes in advance that discourse has to be animated by memory, 
intention and the life of the subject. By contrast, the existence Foucault 
envisages for discourse is dynamic and capable of generating transfor-
mations without appeal to an external cause.
Following a few brief remarks on the institutional conditions for the 
existence of statements across time, and the need to consider the spe-
cifi c ways in which statements are grouped and accumulate, Foucault 
refl ects on the ‘recurrence’ of discourse. This term is used in mathemat-
ics to describe the recursive defi nition of a sequence by a function. 
However, it is also a term that Bachelard and Serres use to describe a 
form of history in which the present reconfi gures its own past, and it 
is to this usage that Foucault refers here.26 Statements, Serres writes, 
redistribute antecedent fi elds of elements to which they are related. 
In this way, a statement ‘constitutes its own past, defi nes, in what 
precedes it, its own fi liation, redefi nes what makes it possible or neces-
sary, excludes what cannot be compatible with it’ (AK 140, 163). This 
repeats Serres’ description of recurrence in the history of mathematics 
as ‘a movement belonging to the temporality of mathematics as such, 
by virtue of which it presents itself as a continual systematic restructur-
ation’. As Serres goes on to say, it is as if ‘what is constituted last puts 
back in question the whole of constitution’ (HI 99). This view of the 
history of mathematics was shared by Cavaillès, for whom the future 
of mathematics was literally impossible on the basis of the conditions 
defi ning its present. As a consequence, each new stage reconfi gured its 
own past in such a way that it took on the appearance of a necessary 
step. Mathematics progressed not by an accumulation of results, but by 
what he described as ‘erasure and deepening’ (OC 560).27
With this emerges a theme central to Serres’ work, namely temporal 
pluralism. The fl ow of time is not linear, but complex, disordered and 
sometimes chaotic. We have, says Serres, too often confused time with 
the measure of time, assuming that it conforms to the single scale we 
apply to it.28 This, he writes, refl ects the mathematical knowledge of 
its day; namely geometry. But there is no reason for this still to deter-
mine our thinking of time now that mathematics provides other means 
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for doing so, such as topology. In fact, events that are remote from 
one another on one scale may be close on another, depending on the 
pattern of regularities in which they occur and to which they contrib-
ute. Relations between conditions and conditioned can fold and take 
on unexpected forms, and in this way the past may be reconfi gured 
by the present. This is also the case in Foucault’s account of discourse, 
which incorporates a form of feedback, as what is produced becomes in 
turn a condition, modifying, disturbing or even destroying the patterns 
of statements in which they occur (AK 141, 164). For as a statement 
occurs following a regularity established by other antecedent state-
ments, it is most likely to reinforce the regularity. But with the appear-
ance of each new statement, the fi eld of statements to which it is related 
will be confi gured a little differently, and at some point this difference 
may be decisive enough to destabilise the old regularity and give rise to 
a new one. The fi eld of statements to which the new statement belongs 
will then exhibit different aetiological pathways, different conditions of 
coexistence and exclusion.
Foucault takes up this theme again in Part IV, Chapter 6, in a discus-
sion of different forms of history. The fi rst of these, called recurrential 
analysis, is said to be characteristic of a discipline such as mathemat-
ics that is continually reviewing ‘the process of its own development’, 
which it transcribes into ‘the vocabulary of vicinities, dependencies, 
subordinations, progressive formalisations, and self-enveloping gener-
alities’. This is a history ‘that is constituted by mathematics itself and 
which mathematics recounts about itself’ (AK 209, 247). In this later 
chapter, however, Foucault goes on to identify two further forms of 
history, the last of which, archaeological history, appears to be that 
closest to the analysis of statements and discursive formations. This 
seems to be at odds with the chapter ‘Rarity, Exteriority, Accumulation’ 
where recurrence is presented as a general feature of discourse, and the 
capacity of statements to revise their own past appears to characterise 
all of discourse. There may be an ambiguity here, or it may simply be 
that the three forms of history Foucault identifi es later overlap, at least 
sometimes, or to some extent.
The closing lines of the chapter reiterate that archaeology has no 
impulse to return to a condition prior to history, to escape its material-
ity, or to place itself in the ‘non-determined dimension of the opening’ 
(surely a reference to Heidegger) (AK 141, 164). Not for the fi rst time, 
the option of securing the transcendental conditions of the phenomena 
archaeology analyses is explicitly refused. However, as Foucault has 
made clear on several occasions, this does not mean that the analysis 
falls by default into empiricism. It is important to bear this in mind 
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when Foucault acknowledges that the analysis of statements exhibits a 
form of positivity, in view of which he is happy to be called a positivist 
(AK 141, 164–5).
5 .  T H E  H I S T O R I C A L  A  P R I O R I  A N D  T H E 
A R C H I V E
This is one of the best-known chapters in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, and certainly one of the most discussed. Everything signifi -
cant in the idea of archaeological analysis passes through it. But if the 
chapter encapsulates the originality of Foucault’s approach, it is also 
the point where its problematic and sometimes puzzling character is 
most on view. There is some repetition of themes from earlier chapters, 
but the dense concentration of issues raised, and its central position 
in the book, mean that it is useful to work carefully through what is 
presented here.
Picking up where the last chapter left off, Foucault states that the 
unity of a discourse is characterised by its positivity. This unity ‘defi nes 
a limited space of communication’ in which it becomes possible to 
say whether or not different texts or authors have addressed the same 
object, occupied the same subject position, and used the same concepts 
(AK 142, 166). The relations defi ning that space are discursive and can 
be traced regardless of who knew what about whom and when. In this 
way, authors engage with one another in and through discourses they 
can neither master nor survey as a whole. As they do so, the ‘infl uence’ 
of argument, logic and the exchange of ideas is supplemented by the 
form of the positivity that defi nes the thematic continuities, the transla-
tion of concepts, and even the space within which such disputes and 
engagements can take place. This, writes Foucault, is ‘what might be 
called a historical a priori’ (AK 143, 167).
Of all Foucault’s many terminological innovations in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, the idea of the historical a priori is the most unusual 
and the most contentious. The designation ‘a priori’ implies ‘transcen-
dental’, and as such stands opposed to history understood as a train 
of empirical events. So all encompassing has this opposition been in 
philosophical thought that the idea of a priori conditions that are them-
selves historical sounds like the worst form of confusion. Yet Foucault’s 
diagnosis in The Order of Things of the impasse into which thinking 
entered in modernity foresaw the need to break down this opposition.29 
The coherence of the idea of the historical a priori is therefore crucial to 
the effectiveness of his response to this situation. As Foucault described 
it in The Order of Things, the impasse arose as a consequence of the 
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   111 29/10/2012   08:47
112 Foucault’s Archaeology
doubling of the fi gure of man such that he became at once the condi-
tion of knowledge and conditioned by it. This doubling was raised as 
a concern in the commentary to Part III, Chapter 3, ‘The Description 
of Statements’, and was at least provisionally settled by the description 
of rules as regularities, and by the two-way relation this made pos-
sible between the conditions and the conditioned. Now the question is 
whether the explanation continues to stand up when Foucault intro-
duces the historical a priori. In short, does the idea of the historical a 
priori do enough to avoid repeating the doubling in a different form.
First, Foucault reminds the reader that the historical a priori serves 
as a condition of the existence of statements, and more specifi cally of 
their coexistence, but does not underpin the legitimacy of any particu-
lar assertion. Moreover, while the historical a priori accounts for the 
simultaneity of statements, it cannot account for their unity, and when 
describing the pattern in a series of statements, it does not provide a law 
that makes the future deducible (AK 143, 167). The reason for this is 
primarily that, as has already become clear, the rules in the historical a 
priori do not stand above the processes they describe as though in what 
Foucault calls here an ‘unmoving heaven’ (AK 144, 168). Neither tran-
scendental nor purely formal, they are not even formal rules ‘endowed 
with a history’, which would simply make them like a series of conjec-
tures each of which asserts a universality at odds with its claim to be 
historical. Instead, the rules refl ect regularities that emerge from the 
processes to which they apply, and as such they are ‘caught up in the 
very things that they connect’ (AK 144, 167). The rules embedded in the 
historical a priori are therefore modifi ed by the very processes to which 
they apply, making both their own future and that of discourse fun-
damentally unpredictable. It is for this reason that they are  historical. 
But if they have their own historicity, what is it that distinguishes this 
from an empirical history? The rules cannot be determined empirically 
because they do not themselves have the status of things, or of phe-
nomena, and they cannot be abstracted from experience because they 
are responsible for the construction of that experience. Where patterns 
of knowledge and forms of speech and conduct build into traditions, 
or are formalised as a science, the empirical history that unfolds in this 
way begins with experience, and with the elements of that experience. 
As such, it neglects the formation of that experience, and the formation 
even of its elements: enunciative modalities, objects and concepts, but 
also the further conditions that Foucault describes which lend these a 
consistent pattern and make meaning possible, such as associated fi elds. 
An empirical history has to presuppose the confi guration of these things 
in order to begin the account it gives of events, yet it is in the changes 
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to this confi guration that the historical a priori lies. One might object 
that there is nothing to prevent old habits of thought and analysis from 
being shaken up to form new perspectives, with new objects in view, 
and that what Foucault presents as an invisible condition of experience 
might become visible (for example, patterns of regularity that only 
appear when one looks across several disciplines at once). In this way, 
what at one stage occupied a position in the a priori could fall back into 
the empirical. In fact, there may not be any reason to deny this from an 
archaeological perspective. If conditions that currently elude experience 
because of their role in constructing that experience (that is, their role in 
the production of statements) were themselves to become objects within 
experience, then this shift in the discursive formation can be made into 
a theme of archaeological analysis in its turn. The important point is 
that not all things can be objects of experience at all times, with the 
same being true of enunciative modalities (subject positions), concepts 
and the other elements of discourse; this is why archaeology deals with 
the conditions of the actual existence of statements.
To say that the conditions presented by Foucault as a priori were in 
fact simply empirical conditions that had not been brought to light by 
the appropriate analysis would therefore be to assume that the elements 
of discourse lay in some neglected spot until such time as they were 
noticed, spoken about, adopted as concepts, or donned as a new guise 
for the subject. In turn, this would be to treat discourse as a unifi ed fi eld 
of possible experience that contains within it what are for archaeology 
the historical a priori conditions of discursive formations. This would 
clearly reproduce a conception of experience to which Foucault is 
deliberately providing at least the promise of an alternative. Of course, 
wanting to get out of jail does not mean that one has, or that one can, 
and so the alternative that Foucault provides to the notion of empirical 
experience has to be convincing.
One aspect of such an alternative would be an account of experience 
that was not grounded in the unity of a subject; or, to put it another 
way, an account of the subject that is not itself anchored in a profound 
psychological or transcendental unity. In fact, Cavaillès, having denied 
the subject a foundational role in mathematical thought, went on to 
consider the experience of mathematics in light of the subject’s involve-
ment in demonstration and the intuition of new objects using multiple 
schemas, where the objects and concepts of one stage in its history were 
excluded as possibilities by the conditions defi ning earlier stages. This 
goes part of the way towards showing that experience is not necessar-
ily a unifi ed fi eld, but can undergo radical transformations in the form 
of what can be seen, done, thought and spoken. Foucault’s notion of 
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enunciative modalities provides a similar account of the subject as 
belonging within discourse, where it is defi ned by the specifi city of its 
relations to a discursive formation in all its aspects, including its institu-
tional form. Disrupting the assumed unity of experience lends support 
to the idea that historical a priori conditions are not simply empirical 
conditions to which analysis has yet to turn its attention.
As noted earlier, it is important that the relation within discourse 
between conditions and what is conditioned does not reproduce the 
fi gure of man as both the condition and the object of knowledge that 
in Foucault’s view has characterised modernity. In a sense, this can be 
settled easily, since the relation as Foucault described it in The Order of 
Things spanned the distinction between transcendental and empirical. 
With the transcendental level out of consideration, a direct reproduc-
tion of the problematic structure is already impossible. But the diffi culty 
may prove to be a more stubborn obstacle and on closer examination it 
resolves into a new problem concerning the relation between conditions 
and conditioned. This brings time back to centre stage, in the form of 
the temporal relation between conditions and conditioned as Foucault 
presents them in the idea of the historical a priori. To establish the 
nature of this relation, one can begin by considering both the relation 
between the empirical and the transcendental, and the alternative case 
of simple empirical determination. The latter is more straightforward 
and can be explained without too much diffi culty: the relation between 
condition and conditioned within a train of empirical events presup-
poses, as a minimum, that in any given process the condition come 
before the conditioned according to a temporal scale established in 
advance. It assumes, that is, both the temporal priority of condition 
over conditioned, and the irreversibility of their relation. Turning to 
the relation between the transcendental and the empirical, the problem 
with the structure of thought in modernity is that man appears on both 
sides of the divide. Since the transcendental and the empirical have fun-
damentally different temporal characteristics, this is either impossible, 
or else leaves man irreparably divided. However, the factors of priority 
and irreversibility found in the case of simple empirical conditions can 
be seen here too, albeit in a different sense by virtue of the absence of 
a single common temporal dimension: a transcendental condition will 
always precede the empirical reality it conditions, and it will remain 
unaffected by empirical events.
One view of the analytic of fi nitude that Foucault saw as a response to 
the division of man is that it confronts just this problem. If Heidegger’s 
existential analytic plays a part here, it is precisely in so far as it devel-
ops an account of the temporal fi nitude of existence without taking the 
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distinction between time and the eternal (or timelessness) as a point of 
departure. As such, it promises a determination of human fi nitude on 
which the account of knowledge could be based without lapsing into 
the diffi culties described. In order for this to be possible, the structure of 
transcendental philosophy had to be called into question, and a way of 
understanding the conditions of concrete existence set out that did not 
repeat the separation of the transcendental. Heidegger’s notion of the 
ontological difference between Being and beings appears to offer just 
this possibility. According to the ontological difference, Being cannot 
be treated as a thing, and as a consequence the ontological foundation 
that philosophy has traditionally sought cannot be defi ned in terms 
drawn from the interpretation of things. Rather, Heidegger argues, the 
Being of a thing lies in the manner in which it is disclosed. Similarly, 
Being as such cannot be treated as if it existed somehow independently, 
either literally in a realm apart, or in the sense that its meaning could be 
determined independently of the relations into which it enters. Being is 
nothing apart from beings, and nothing apart from their disclosure in 
and through our engagement with them. As a consequence, the onto-
logical difference does not refer to a new level of existence so much as 
propose a new perspective on what exists.
There is a case to be made that Foucault takes up the idea of the 
ontological difference from Heidegger as a way of making sense of the 
way discourse and its analysis operate in a dimension that is neither 
transcendental nor empirical. Statements map words onto things, and 
as such are the conditions for being able to say that an object exists. 
But in what sense do statements themselves exist? If they were to exist 
as objects, then archaeology would be reduced to an empirical science, 
and the question of the ontological conditions of statements would 
remain in the air (this is essentially the impasse that Foucault described 
in OT). Yet statements do exist, as Foucault made clear much earlier in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge. Faced with the diffi culty of account-
ing for the existence of statements without treating them as empiri-
cal objects, one option is to consider the existence of mathematical 
objects that are constructed from the operations of mathematics itself. 
However, the ontological difference also seems to offer an alternative. 
The relation between discursive objects (or subjects) and discourse itself 
can be thought of as analogous to the difference between beings and 
Being. On this basis, discourse exists in a similar sense to the way Being 
exists (cf. The Description of Statements). The task of archaeology is 
then to describe the manner of its occurrence, how it presents itself. 
One does not experience discourse or the statement ‘as such’, but only 
as the mapping of word onto thing, the allocation of a subject position, 
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and the appearance of an associated fi eld. Just as the statement does 
not exist alongside the proposition and the sentence, so, for Heidegger, 
Being is disclosed in and through beings, without itself being like them. 
But to think ontologically requires maintaining the separation of Being 
and beings, the ontological difference, as well as their relation. Making 
the translation to the analysis of discourse, critics have argued that 
Foucault fails to do this, allowing his terms to slide from one side to 
another: fi rst regulating discourse, then part of it. There may indeed 
be some terminological inconsistency in this respect, in fact the sheer 
quantity of terms Foucault introduces makes this hard to avoid, but this 
is not the point here.
Although Heidegger has opened up a possibility for Foucault, it is 
also the case that Foucault is adopting a mode of thought quite dif-
ferent to Heidegger’s and that there is a limit to his appropriation of 
the ontological difference. A brief outline of a criticism that Foucault 
appears to direct against Heidegger will show why, and lead back to the 
problem of the doubling between the transcendental and the empirical 
that Foucault identifi ed.
Because Being cannot be treated as a being, Heidegger had to cul-
tivate a new idiom, since ontological language could no longer be 
representational. This might be considered enough in itself to avoid 
the doubling between condition and conditioning in question here. 
However, there is some ambiguity over the extent to which Heidegger’s 
account does in fact manage this. Many of his analyses rely on an 
ontological appropriation of terms familiar from ontic, or empirical, 
description; for example, conscience, guilt and resoluteness all feature 
prominently in the analysis of Dasein, though Heidegger insists that 
they must be separated from their usual everyday meaning. Above all, 
the ontological structure of Dasein as a whole is named ‘care’ and given 
a temporal interpretation. In this way, not only is care ‘rediscovered’ 
as a fundamental determination of Dasein’s fi nitude, but time itself 
appears twice, in two distinct guises: as everyday ‘clock’ time and as 
the original temporality constitutive of Dasein’s Being. Their very clear 
demarcation from one another excludes any simple translation from 
the empirical, but there is some scope for the kind of suspicion that 
Foucault raises. What is certain is that for Heidegger the ontological 
has priority over the ontic and that, as with formal or transcendental 
grounds, this priority insulates the ontological from any effects leaking 
back from the ontic level of beings; that is, what it means to be cannot 
be altered by beings themselves and the events that occur to them. So 
while the specifi c question of whether the ontological difference in 
Heidegger gives rise to a problematic doubling or not may remain open, 
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the priority and the irreversibility associated with the doubling clearly 
are present, and it is these which are the chief sources of concern for 
Foucault.
The issue of priority and irreversibility is far less clear-cut in the case 
of discourse. Although there is a priority in so far as what appear to 
be ‘higher order’ regularities in discourse condition the actual coexist-
ence of individual statements, such conditions are not prior in the sense 
either of existing in advance or of being situated at another level than 
that of statements and the relations between them. This is refl ected in 
the fact that they are not conditions for the possibility of what is regu-
lated. Moreover, as Foucault writes, the discursive rules are ‘caught up 
in the very things that they connect . . . and are transformed with them’ 
(AK 144, 168). Discourse thereby avoids both the priority of conditions 
over conditioned and the irreversibility of their relation; the two factors 
primarily responsible for the problems that Foucault identifi ed for 
thinking in modernity as a consequence of the distinction between the 
transcendental and the empirical having such complete dominance. To 
sum up, the risks associated with the doubling of conditions and condi-
tioned stem from their separation across different levels (e.g., transcen-
dental and empirical), but Foucault’s account of discourse avoids this 
separation while also blocking the reduction of discursive conditions to 
the level of empirical events. The reading given in Part III, Chapter 3 
still holds good, and history, understood in the terms Foucault sets out 
here, takes over the role previously played by the analysis of experience; 
that is, it serves as a quasi-analytic based on the mathematical a priori, 
which is revealed here as fundamentally historical.
Foucault now introduces another key term in the book. The domain 
of statements, he writes, no longer appears to be a surface, but has 
become a ‘complex volume’ occupied by different regions with incom-
patible rules and practices. All the systems of statements at a given time 
taken together form what Foucault calls the ‘archive’ (AK 145, 169). 
Contrasted, as usual, to anything empirical, such as the sum of all the 
texts and documents of a culture, the archive is situated between lan-
guage (the system for constructing possible sentences) and the corpus 
(the collection of all words spoken), acting as ‘the general system of the 
formation and transformation of statements’ (AK 146, 170). It is ‘the 
fi rst law of what can be said’, and governs ‘the appearance of state-
ments as unique events’ (AK 145, 169). As it does so, it gives discourse 
structure, differentiating discursive formations from one another. If 
the historical a priori is the formal designation of the conditions of 
discourse, the archive is the specifi c set of conditions for a given dis-
course, and as such it is what an archaeological analysis actually aims 
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to describe. However, Foucault concedes that such a description cannot 
be exhaustive, for reasons that are, he writes, ‘obvious’ (AK 146, 171). 
Unlike formal or transcendental conditions of possibility, an archive 
cannot impose boundaries at which a conditioned discourse must break 
off. The space and time defi ned by an archive is open, in the sense that 
its borders are thresholds of communication with other discourses. 
Across the discontinuities that separate discourses from one another, 
the regularities defi ning the rules of one may be disrupted by events 
formed elsewhere, giving rise to transformation. Such is the complex-
ity of the space and time in which regularities form that its description 
cannot be a once and for all affair.
The impossibility of describing the archive as a totality leads to a 
refl ection on the impossibility of describing our own particular archive. 
Foucault is quite clear that this cannot be done, since ‘it is from within 
these rules that we speak’ and they determine the modes of appearance 
and of accumulation of what we can say, its forms of existence and 
its historicity (AK 146–7, 171). In a quite traditional way, Foucault 
initially concedes that these rules can only become clear to us as we 
acquire a distance from them, but then raises the question of whether 
or not it should be possible for analysis to ‘map out the place where it 
speaks’ and to set out its own conditions (AK 147, 172). This sugges-
tion, and the doubt that follows immediately after it, appear to rehearse 
two recognisable positions within philosophy. The fi rst, that one can 
only understand one’s own time as it recedes into the past; the second, 
that a rational inquiry can successfully trace its own limits and the con-
dition of its own fi nitude. It is tempting to associate these positions with 
Hegel and Kant respectively. Yet the second position cannot be directly 
attributed to Kant, since the possibilities for which it seeks conditions 
can be defi ned ‘only in the moment of their realization’. They are condi-
tions of actual existence, not of possibility. This prompts the question: 
if it is conditions of actual existence that are sought, then should not the 
analysis ‘approach as close as possible to the positivity that governs it 
and the archive that governs it today to speak of the archive in general?’ 
(AK 147, 172). If the analysis cannot illuminate what makes it possible 
to speak of the conditions of the time it is analysing, then it has a blind 
spot and remains planted in a fi nitude it cannot describe. However, 
Foucault turns what could have been seen as a weakness into a positive 
feature of archaeological analysis. What such analysis can illuminate 
lies close to us, he writes, but it cannot bring to light ‘the enunciative 
fi eld of which it is itself a part’. This region, close to us, but not ours, 
acquires a certain privilege in so far as it borders, and thereby delimits, 
our own archive. As such, ‘its threshold of existence is established by 
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the discontinuity of what separates us from what we can no longer say, 
and from that which lies outside our own discursive practice’ (AK 147, 
172). It seems that we can learn something of our own archive after all, 
by attending to the borders marked by what lies around it. But there is 
only so much that we can learn from this, since these borders can tell 
us little about what lies within them, except that it is different to what 
lies further afi eld. If there are limits to what we can know about the 
content of our archive by demonstrating what has now become other 
to us, the analysis of the archive also ‘dissipates that temporal identity 
in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish to exor-
cise the discontinuities of history’ (AK 147, 172). In this way, we are 
thrown into a present that is fractured, complex, and about which we 
can know something, but not everything. In the end we can be certain 
only that it is not determined by the rules of discourse that shaped even 
its near past (or the various forms that its past may take according to 
the discursive formations in question); and if this means our identity is 
dispersed, it also encourages an analysis of the archive that contributes 
to the transformation of the discursive formations in which we exist. 
In this, one can see the outline of a practice of freedom that Foucault 
would elaborate some years later.
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Part IV: Archaeological 
Description
1 .  A R C H A E O L O G Y  A N D  T H E  H I S T O R Y  O F  I D E A S
Foucault writes that his aim has been to develop a method that is 
‘neither formalizing nor interpretative’ (AK 151, 177). In steering a 
path between structuralism and hermeneutics, he is implicitly following 
the programme for historical analysis that Serres proposed in 1961.30 
But he is gripped by the doubt that the weighty apparatus he has put in 
place has served only to conceal that the form of analysis he proposes 
in fact remains within the framework of the history of ideas. Having set 
out the archaeological method, its terms and structures, Foucault there-
fore turns to consider what it means for the way historical analysis is 
actually conducted. In doing so, his overriding concern is to distinguish 
archaeology from the history of ideas.
A history of ideas can take several forms and for this reason it is 
not easy to pin down. Foucault identifi es two principal characteristics. 
First, it hands over the history of the developed sciences to specialist 
studies and takes as its focus the margins that have either contributed in 
one way or another to science, or else which never gained the authority 
of other branches of study and faded from view: the history of alchemy, 
of phrenology, or of newspapers, the history ‘of opinions rather than 
of knowledge’ (AK 153, 179). Second, it charts the boundaries between 
existing disciplines and the exchanges that have taken place across 
them, and it records the rise and fall of disciplines, the emergence 
and disappearance of themes. Putting these characteristics together, 
the history of ideas describes the transition to philosophy, science, or 
literature (or whatever it may be) from what is then presented as a 
primitive stage to be left behind. However, rather than treating this as 
a sharp (epistemological) break, in a manner reminiscent of Bachelard, 
the history of ideas analyses the ‘silent births, [and] distant correspond-
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ences’ that contribute to the emergence of the discipline in question 
(AK 154, 181). Although there appear to be certain guiding principles 
that archaeology shares with the history of ideas, the general orienta-
tion of such a history is, writes Foucault, towards genesis, continuity 
and totalisation. It is a form of description for which Foucault declares 
our own time no longer suited. He then proposes to identify four key 
‘points of divergence’ between archaeology and the history of ideas: the 
attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradictions, comparative 
descriptions, and the mapping of transformations (AK 155, 181). These 
are the themes of the following four chapters. First, in the remainder 
of this chapter, Foucault outlines four principles that characterise the 
archaeological method.
First, archaeology does not look for what discourse reveals or con-
ceals, but simply examines discourse itself. This amounts to a repetition 
of the already familiar point that archaeology is not concerned with 
hidden meanings, and is not a hermeneutic practice of any kind. This 
sets archaeology apart from what is known as the ‘hermeneutics of sus-
picion’ associated broadly with the modes of analysis found in Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud. There is no truth concealed behind the surface of 
discourse, and archaeology ‘refuses to be “allegorical”’ (AK 155, 182).
The second feature of archaeology mentioned by Foucault is also 
familiar, but is raised here in a way that draws to the fore an issue that 
will have to be addressed in relation to a later chapter. Foucault writes 
that archaeology does not trace the transition between discourses as a 
continuous series of ‘insensible’ steps on a ‘gentle slope’ (AK 155, 182), 
which is a way of saying that archaeology does not treat change as con-
tinuous. Accordingly, it also sets aside the idea that discourses can be 
seen to develop a potential, reach a stage of fulfi lment and then decline. 
Instead, it defi nes discourses ‘in their specifi city’, showing how the rules 
by which they operate are ‘irreducible’ to those of any other (AK 155, 
182), effectively meaning that transformation is discontinuous, taking 
place in step changes. It is in this sense a ‘differential analysis of the 
modalities of discourse’ (AK 156, 182). Yet if the effort of archaeol-
ogy is bent on marking discourse off from what lies close to it, and on 
demonstrating the irreducibility of each formation to anything else, it 
appears to deny itself the language in which to speak of change. If each 
discourse is differentiated from every other by its very specifi city, then 
there is a risk that history may be reduced to a collection of frozen tab-
leaux (this issue will be addressed directly in the chapter ‘Change and 
Transformations’)
In contrast to the history of ideas, as Foucault describes it, archae-
ology does not regard creativity as the expression of the spontaneous 
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freedom of the subject, and therefore does not aim to identify the point 
at which the creativity of an individual gives rise to a new cultural 
form. The rules for discursive practices that it traces may characterise 
only part of the larger cultural forms that the history of philosophy 
describes, but they may also run through more than one such form and 
thereby establish larger-scale patterns of regularity in the discursive 
universe.
Finally, archaeology does not try to recover an origin, and especially 
not the origin of a cultural form at the point at which it passes from 
the spontaneous but inner freedom of an individual to the wider social 
sphere. It is, writes Foucault, ‘nothing more than a rewriting; that 
is, in the preserved form of exteriority a regulated transformation of 
what has already been written’ (AK 156, 183). These lines may appear 
enigmatic at fi rst, and it is not clear in what sense archaeology is a 
‘re-writing’ of what has already been written. Perhaps the fi rst thing 
to remember is that archaeology does not aim to recover something 
concealed within discourse, thereby making discourse say something 
that it had refrained from saying before. In so far as discourse is a 
network of relations between statements and groups of statements, 
archaeology simply describes what it fi nds. However, if archaeology is 
a ‘re- writing’, this means that it is not an objective analysis that leaves 
its topic untouched. Archaeology describes regularities in the relations 
between statements and groups of statements, and this description is 
already a translation from one code into another, and as such already a 
transformation. Moreover, as Foucault has made clear before, archaeo-
logical analysis is itself subject to forms of regularity and its description 
of discourse is not therefore a detached observation. Even in its fi delity 
to discourse, an archaeological analysis is a new event that may inter-
fere with the patterns of regularity shaping the discourse it describes.
2 .  T H E  O R I G I N A L  A N D  T H E  R E G U L A R
Foucault deals here with the fi rst of the four ‘points of divergence’ 
between archaeology and the history of ideas that he mentioned in the 
previous chapter. At stake is the way that historical analysis deals with 
the emergence of what is new, which then leads to a consideration of 
what counts as ‘new’ and how it is recognised. The history of ideas, 
writes Foucault, operates with two basic schemas. The fi rst identifi es 
what is rare and without precedent, while the second builds blocks, 
groups and traditions that tie discourses into the past. In practice, the 
two schemas overlay one another as the history of ideas traces both the 
inertia of the old discourse and the conditions under which the new 
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was able to emerge. However, Foucault’s point is that this approach 
understands the emergence of new forms in terms of originality, and 
this in turn presents two basic problems. The fi rst is that it presup-
poses a smooth continuity with which what is ‘original’ effects a break. 
Closer examination of such a continuity will, however, reveal discrep-
ancies, discontinuities and relations that might otherwise have been 
passed over. The second problem is that this way of viewing events fi rst 
places them in relation to one another according to time, and then asks 
whether they represent a continuation of what came before or a break. 
As such, the history of ideas assumes that discourse takes its place, 
and changes, within a temporal dimension that is continuous, and that 
underlies discourse as its condition of possibility. By contrast, time 
features in archaeology as an immanent property of a discourse, arising 
from the forms of relation by virtue of which it coheres internally, and 
by which it is linked to its own iterations, and ultimately to events at its 
borders and beyond. As such, archaeology is characterised by temporal 
pluralism.
A familiar epistemological problem arises here. As the resemblance 
between the works of one author and another, or between different 
vocabularies, is ‘an effect of the discursive fi eld in which it is mapped’ 
(AK 160, 187), continuity can only be established by working from 
within a discourse, and not from a discourse-independent position. 
This threatens to make it impossible for archaeology to do what it 
sets out to do, because it cannot establish a ‘discourse neutral’ posi-
tion from which to chart the contours and discontinuities of discur-
sive formations. As mentioned earlier, this is essentially the diffi culty 
encountered in the philosophy of science by those, such as Kuhn, who 
regard theories as grounded in a set of practices that are specifi c to 
each, and which therefore do not provide the basis for a comparison 
between theories. There is then no currency for evaluating one against 
another. As for Foucault, so for Kuhn, discontinuity appears to deprive 
the historian of the category of progress. However, whereas Kuhn’s 
descriptions of theories are elaborated from within, leaving the periods 
of revolution between paradigms beyond the reach of a description that 
could be identifi ed as ‘rational’ in any privileged sense, Foucault seems 
to grant archaeology the ability to see both a given discursive forma-
tion and the discontinuities that distinguish it from other formations. 
The charge here would be that archaeology is attributed a view from on 
high at odds with its insistence on discontinuity and dispersion.
Clearly, there is no option of moving to a meta-level discourse to 
achieve this view (at least not defi nitively). With this ruled out, there 
seem to be two alternatives. The fi rst is to concede that all  archaeological 
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analyses are provisional and relative; in which case their value is hard 
to establish on strict epistemological grounds, and one is likely to fall 
back on criteria of interest and utility. For each analysis or descrip-
tion, one would then have to ask: why is this useful or interesting and 
what other analyses and descriptions can be given? There is, however, 
a serious weakness to this ‘pragmatic’ alternative, in so far as evalua-
tions based on interest and utility come down to the subject, which is 
thereby reintroduced as a fundamental category for historical analysis. 
This cannot be what Foucault intended, and, more importantly, would 
make the not inconsiderable weight of critical apparatus that he has 
assembled so far in this book all but redundant.
The alternative is, at least initially, unproblematic. The diffi culty for 
the history of ideas arises because it is committed to a form of history 
that can be called ‘empirical’ in so far as it deals with unities as exist-
ing things, and aims to trace when a new object has arisen, or when 
a new concept with which to present reality has appeared, and so on. 
In each case, however, it practises a form of history that is in one way 
or another divided into the thematic material that is addressed, and 
some other element that is necessary for the historical account, but 
with which it cannot deal. This may happen in a variety of ways. For 
example, empirical history may rely on formal or even transcendental 
conditions for the possibility of experience, where such conditions nec-
essarily lie beyond the reach of historical discourse itself; if the condi-
tions are made historical, then there may be still be laws determining 
the shape of historical development that do not themselves become the 
objects of historical description. In a quite different sense, the recon-
struction of the history of science as a tale of the reason homing in on 
the truth, or even simply increasing the predictive power of theories, 
will often hand over to sociology or psychology those episodes for 
which it cannot compose an account of continuous rational debate. 
In each case, the history of ideas is pushed into giving an incomplete 
account by virtue of the demarcation it draws between the rational 
and the historical. But this is precisely the kind of demarcation that 
archaeology breaks down to reveal networks of overlapping relations. 
Its focus on regularities, not things, means that the order described by 
archaeology is not that of empirical events and the forms of unity on 
which the history of ideas relies. The regularities in question are, as 
has been well established by now, those between statements, groups 
of statements, and non-discursive events, and their analysis works on 
a case-by-case basis to determine where new statements arise on the 
basis of transformations in the regularities that serve as the condition 
of their existence. For the most part, breaks are not emphatic; even 
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where a break is deemed suffi cient to warrant speaking of a discontinu-
ity between discursive formations, there will be several regularities at 
play in any example, and some of them will meet with more disrup-
tion than others, as Foucault will observe at the end of this chapter. 
Moreover, some of the regularities will extend beyond the borders of a 
given discursive formation, tying it in partial and often hidden ways to 
other discourses, either contemporary or historically remote. The sig-
nifi cance of this here is that it gives archaeology more to describe and 
new relations to map. In this sense, discontinuity between discursive 
formations does not mean that archaeology is reduced to silence about 
the relations between them. In fact, the ‘gaps’ between the borders of 
discursive formations, along with the borders of the discursive forma-
tions themselves, are the richest materials for archaeological analysis. 
‘Discontinuity’ here does not entail a kind of void, where analysis 
must cease and which it cannot cross. Instead, closer analysis is gener-
ally rewarded with more material on which to bring the analysis to 
bear.
One can see here the extent to which history is an intrinsic 
part of Foucault’s thought, and not merely a topic he addresses. 
Incommensurability is a problem that arises for a philosophy in so far 
as it is committed to providing a purely rational account, or discover-
ing purely rational grounds. For such a philosophy, history will always 
be an unwelcome companion, and often a profoundly obstructive one. 
By contrast, Foucault willingly supplements description with further 
description, increasing the dimensions in which regularities may form 
from the line to the table and beyond without this undermining the 
accomplishment of his basic aim. Because archaeological description 
does not aim to establish originality, the initial appearance of a sen-
tence is not ranked higher than its repetition years, or centuries, later. 
Instead, their proximity refl ects a similarity in the rule of their forma-
tion, which may be the same rule; that is, the regularity that gives rise 
to the existence of each may be the same regularity. The fact that it 
is constituted over a scale quite distinct from the usual chronological 
order may simply mean that their discursive proximity is not broken 
down by time and the intervention of other events. However, it also 
throws light on the fact that events which initially appear to interrupt 
or stand outside the prevailing order are not necessarily by that token 
‘irregular’. They may be part of a regularity that spans a different scale 
or different variables. But even where this is hard to establish, one is 
dealing with different kinds and degrees of regularity, not with ‘irregu-
larity’, as this would imply that certain events were ‘rule based’ and 
others somehow not (AK 161, 189). For archaeology there cannot be 
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any one regularity that takes precedence as of right over others and no 
regularity is absolute.
Foucault sees this form of analysis opening up in directions that have 
yet to be properly explored. The fi rst concerns what might be called 
lateral or diagonal relations between different discursive regularities. 
Taking linguistic analogy, logical identity and enunciative homogeneity 
as three possible forms of relation between discursive groups, Foucault 
pits the third (which characterises archaeology) against the fi rst and 
second, suggesting that what appears unrelated according to linguistic 
analogy and logical identity may in fact be differentiated in terms of 
enunciative homogeneity; conversely, what appears to be translatable 
or equivalent according to linguistic analogy and logical identity may in 
fact display remarkable enunciative homogeneity. In a situation where 
‘Enunciative homogeneities (and heterogeneities) intersect with linguis-
tic continuities (and changes), with logical identities (and differences), 
without any of them proceeding at the same pace or necessarily affect-
ing one another’ (AK 163, 191), the fi eld of archaeological analysis is 
complex and may reveal surprising affi liations and hybrids.
The second direction of research opened up by this conception of 
archaeology concerns what Foucault calls ‘interior hierarchies within 
enunciative regularities’ (AK 163, 191). That it bears a certain similar-
ity to phenomenological description means that what differentiates 
it stands out all the more clearly. First of all, Foucault notes that no 
statement is ever the simple reproduction of an original; not because 
statements conform to the logic of the simulacrum, but rather because, 
as Foucault puts it, the enunciative fi eld ‘never sleeps’: each statement 
puts into operation a set of rules that run through different formula-
tions, and which therefore cannot be presented synthetically in a single 
formulation or extrapolated from a single statement. As a consequence, 
each statement actively contributes to the formation of the rules that 
set up the space of coexistence in which they themselves occur. This 
basis in the rule as regularity needs to be borne in mind when Foucault 
acknowledges that certain groups of statements deploy the rules in their 
‘most general and widely applicable form’ (AK 163, 192). This makes 
it possible to see how other less general objects, concepts, enunciative 
modalities and strategies are formed. The idea that objects and concepts 
can be described as specifi c kinds of more general objects and concepts, 
culminating in the ‘most general’, recalls other forms of classifi catory 
discourses, and perhaps especially the phenomenological conception 
of formal ontology and formal apophantics (though this pertains to 
judgements rather than concepts directly). The connection appears to 
be strengthened by Foucault’s suggestion that archaeology will identify 
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the governing statements that concern the most general possibilities 
of characterisation and that defi ne ‘observable structures and the fi eld 
of possible objects’ (AK 164, 192). However, the description of rules 
as regularities means that this can only be a limited similarity. If the 
rules that run across different formulations cannot themselves be given 
in a single formulation, then archaeology cannot in principle achieve 
the fundamental status that Husserl attributed to formal ontology 
and formal logic; and if each statement contributes to the rule that 
governs its own existence, then the rules are themselves neither fi xed, 
nor stages on the way to a fi nal destination. Indeed, as archaeology 
follows the ‘derivation’ of each successive degree of specifi city, it leads 
to new discoveries, conceptual transformations, and the emergence 
of new ideas. Archaeology is oriented to open-ended transformation. 
Furthermore, the stages of this transformation ‘must not be confused 
with a deduction that is made on the basis of axioms’, nor understood 
as the unfolding of a general idea, or as a movement that has its genesis 
in the psychology of the subject (AK 164, 193). In short, the fi eld that 
archaeology analyses is not defi ned in its possibilities by the initial point 
from which it is derived; an observation that follows directly from the 
fact that statements contribute to the regularities that they put into 
operation, which means that even the ‘most general’ rules to which 
an archaeological derivation can return must itself have antecedent 
conditions and there can literally be no ‘fi rst principle’ or necessary 
point of departure. Where, as may happen, it appears that archaeology 
reproduces other forms of analysis, Foucault would have us remember 
that the orders and homogeneities it uncovers are only ever partial, 
 provisional, and already, if imperceptibly, in transformation.
The chapter closes with Foucault refl ecting back on a common 
 criticism that had been levelled at The Order of Things; namely, that its 
division of history into periods was too crude and encouraged a selec-
tive reading of events. As noted above, in what Foucault refers to here 
as the ‘confused unities’ we call historical periods, there will be differ-
ent stages and paces of development associated with elements such as 
concepts, theories, levels of formalisation and linguistic development, 
each with their own ‘temporal articulation’ (AK 165, 194). Whether 
Foucault is correcting a misunderstanding of The Order of Things 
or correcting a misleading tendency in his own analyses is a question 
for another time. What is clear is that for archaeology as Foucault 
understands it in this text neat historical divisions are a consequence of 
taking up a viewpoint at a distance, where closer inspection will reveal 
threads of continuity and frayed ends that turn the borders of such 
periods into complex spaces.
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3 .  C O N T R A D I C T I O N S
In the previous chapter, Foucault wrote that departures from regularity 
do not lapse into simple irregularity, but rather enter into variations 
of regularity. This theme is taken up again in the present chapter, as 
Foucault considers the way the rationality of a critical or analytical 
method is revealed by its approach to contradiction, the kind of con-
tradiction it recognises, and its response. The answer to these questions 
says a good deal about what archaeology takes to be ‘rational’ and how 
it embodies this sense of rationality. Given that Foucault has taken such 
trouble to suspend credence in the forms of unity around which the 
coherence of a method is organised, there appears to be a risk that its 
relentless pursuit of difference and divergence within discursive forma-
tions may deprive archaeology itself of sense, even as it unmasks the 
careless assumptions of other forms of historical discourse.
Given that unity has always been the hallmark of reason, contradiction 
and opposition challenge the state of rationality at a given time: either 
the conception of rationality is mistaken, or there is an error or illusion 
that has to be overcome in order to heal the rift and recover unity. But 
if, as in archaeology, unity is neither a fi rst principle nor an aim, if con-
tradiction is treated as an intrinsic characteristic of discourse and not 
as a ‘fall’ or error, then does its toleration put the coherence of archae-
ology at risk? Is archaeology itself a rational form of analysis? These 
questions bear not only on the basis of archaeological analysis, but also 
on what it hopes to achieve in and through that practice. Responding to 
them thus opens onto the question of the ‘value’ of archaeology as such, 
and how such a consideration can be addressed. In other words, why 
should one prefer archaeology over other forms of analysis? One might 
think here of genealogy, in both its Nietzschean and (later) Foucaultian 
forms, for which differences are pursued back to points of emergence 
without resolving into a single origin. Such an approach leaves open the 
genealogical challenge of discriminating between ‘active’ and ‘reactive’ 
tendencies. For Nietzsche, the ‘value’ of genealogy can, for argument’s 
sake, be estimated according to its contribution to an ideal of health, 
and the form of life that its practice encourages. But there is no easy 
way to tie Foucault’s critical practice into any similar basis for evalu-
ation. This makes it all the more important to make the connection 
between archaeology and the new sense of critique that he proposes in 
The Order of Things – one based on the ‘mathematical a priori’ and on 
the idea of temporal dispersion.31 If there is a prevailing value here, it 
is that of experimentation, and the possibility of transforming the con-
ditions of existence. Another way of putting this is to say that history 
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always has the last word for Foucault, and that any philosophical 
truth will always be submitted both to the work of history, carried out 
through the very relations that establish even those truths that appear to 
lend form and structure to the work itself, and which in this sense may 
include the kind of archaeological analyses that Foucault proposes. Yet 
it must be a modifi ed sense of history in so far as it begins to take over 
roles that were once those of philosophy. Neither practice will remain 
unchanged by the developments Foucault sees, and which he then 
promotes.
As in earlier chapters, Foucault marks out the profi le of archaeology 
through a series of contrasts. The history of ideas tends to attribute to 
the discourse it analyses a basic coherence, thereby implying that any 
irregularities it discovers are merely provisional and can be resolved, 
usually by detecting a deeper or more extensive principle of cohesion 
that sustains the unity of the discourse in spite of the now superfi cial 
irregularity (AK 166, 195). The heuristic principle is therefore bound 
within a circular practice that aims to restore a cohesion that it assumes 
was there at the beginning. To achieve this, it may characterise the 
source of the contradiction as ‘external’, rather as political dissent is 
often blamed on foreign agitators; in this case the foreign agents may 
be psychological weakness on the part of practitioners of the discourse, 
or the social conditions in which it occurs. It may be attributed to the 
incursion of the unconscious, or the interruption of ideal meaning by 
the material sign. Another common gesture is to disqualify a recal-
citrant text by identifying it as part of an author’s juvenilia, or as a 
careless expression that detracts from a deeper intention. While moves 
of this kind may appear to be simple and rather reductive, the rich 
variety of forms that coherence can take is such that the history of 
ideas is never short of subject matter. At the end of such an analysis, 
the contradiction will have been made to disappear. Alternatively, it 
may be revealed as itself the principle on which the unity of a discourse 
is based, as in psychoanalysis and Marxism. In the fi rst case, discourse 
is the ‘ideal fi gure’ that rises above the empirical source of contradic-
tion; in the second, discourse is the ‘empirical fi gure’ whose apparent 
cohesion has to be exposed to reveal a fundamental contradiction that 
discourse has concealed. Although proceeding in opposite directions, 
what these approaches share, notes Foucault, is their occupation of a 
space defi ned by concealing and revealing contradiction, by its appear-
ance and disappearance. By contrast, archaeology does not try to do 
anything with contradictions, which are treated simply as ‘objects to 
be described for themselves’ (AK 169, 198). Referring to the example 
of Linnaeus’s ‘fi xist principle’, Foucault notes that it was opposed 
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by a series of evolutionist proposals in the works of Bufon, Diderot, 
Bordeu, Maillet and others, but that archaeology does not try reveal 
a more fundamental set of shared theses underlying the opposition, or 
to characterise the opposition as the mark of a more general confl ict 
running through ‘all eighteenth century knowledge and thought’ (AK 
169, 198–9). The archaeological strategy is to show that the two theses 
share a common locus in a description of species and genera organised 
around the visible structure of organs. This move does not resolve the 
contradiction, but neither does it ‘transfer it to a more fundamental 
level’ (AK 170, 199). It simply identifi es the point at which the contra-
diction occurs and describes the structure and extent of the  separation 
between the two theses in terms of the elements of archaeological 
 analysis that Foucault has set out.
As elsewhere, one can see Foucault describing the elements of 
 discourse simply as they occur, or as they present themselves, and 
therefore not taking an element as an example of a general kind; here, 
it is contradiction that is in each case to be described ‘in its own terms’ 
and not as a particular instance of the general category. To this end, 
Foucault breaks down the general category of contradiction into con-
tradictions of type, level and function (a division that must itself be 
provisional). Archaeology takes little interest in contradictions between 
different propositions that arise from the same discursive formation, 
according to the same conditions, or those that enter into opposition 
with one another while arising from distinct discursive formations (e.g., 
Linnaeus’s fi xism and Darwin’s evolutionism, which belong to natural 
history and biology respectively). Contradictions of these kinds are 
visible to more orthodox forms of history. By contrast, archaeology 
looks for contradictions that arise within a discursive formation and 
that, on closer inspection, reveal divisions that had not been evident pre-
viously. These, Foucault explains, will not refl ect different views of the 
same object, or different usages of the same concept. The archaeological 
focus is on the way statements are formed, which means that attention 
falls on the patterns of regularity that order the enunciative function 
and strategy, the relation of concepts to objects, and all the relations 
into which statements enter in giving consistency to discursive forma-
tions. Such contradictions will be complex and ‘distributed over differ-
ent levels of the discursive formation’ (AK 171, 201), thereby providing 
archaeology with a starting point for further analysis. To illustrate this, 
Foucault describes the contradiction in the eighteenth century between 
systematic natural history and methodical natural history, which turn 
out to have involved different objects, enunciative modalities and con-
cepts and to have pursued different theoretical options. Taking a longer 
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view, these contradictions can be seen to have had different functions 
in a discursive practice: in some cases, they will have been obstacles to 
overcome, in others a starting point from which to proceed, while in 
other cases again they may have prompted a new development, or the 
reorganisation of the discursive fi eld. As Foucault writes, their effects 
are too various to describe simply in terms of the acceleration or decel-
eration of history. Time, he adds, ‘is not introduced into the truth and 
ideality of discourse on the basis of the empty, general form of opposi-
tion’ (AK 172, 202). This is to say, discourse is not essentially timeless, 
its historical character representing a modifi cation that, viewed in the 
proper way, reveals a moving image of its true timelessness. Moreover, 
the temporality of discourse is not derived from a general and all-
encompassing structure to which events must conform. Just as the regu-
larities constitutive of the rules shaping discursive formations emerge 
from the relations between the elements of discourse themselves, so too 
do the patterns of difference on the basis of which temporal discrimi-
nations are made; that is, the category of ‘opposition’ or ‘contradic-
tion’ emerges from more specifi c forms of relation which archaeology 
aims to bring to light. The variety of forms of contradiction therefore 
support different temporal forms, which may overlie one another and 
intersect, or just run parallel, and which together make up the temporal 
pluralism of discourse. This way of viewing time is directly related to 
the idea of temporal dispersion that Foucault drew from his reading 
of Kant’s Anthropology, where synthetic activity is ongoing, local and 
provisional.
Finally, it is important to see that if Foucault identifi es several forms 
of contradiction, operating at different levels and exercising different 
functions, closer attention to any one of these may reveal further dis-
continuity. Archaeology must allow that this is possible, and that the 
forms Foucault discusses here are simply those which his analyses have 
revealed so far; there is no assurance that they exhaust the fi eld of all 
possible forms of contradiction, or that they may not be eclipsed by 
other forms of contradiction that have remained out of sight so far. The 
refl exivity by which the form and elements identifi ed by Foucault may 
themselves be transformed by the processes to which they give order is 
fundamental to the coherence of archaeology as a method. The impetus 
of archaeology is to push past apparent unities and points of origin to 
reveal disparity and dispersal, and this applies equally to the eventual 
problematisation of its own terms.
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4 .  T H E  C O M P A R A T I V E  F A C T S
This is the last of the chapters in which Foucault deals with how 
archaeology differs from existing approaches to history. However, as in 
the previous cases, it is more than just an exercise in mopping up misun-
derstandings, and archaeology is brought into sharper focus, especially 
in its relation to epistemology, Marxism and structuralism.
Unlike orthodox epistemology, archaeology is concerned not with 
the internal structure of a theory per se, but with the differences 
between the various elements a theory deploys and those deployed 
by other theories and to other ends. As Foucault underlines here, its 
aim is not to determine the meaning of basic terms within a theory, 
to defi ne its objects, to set out the forms of inference appropriate to 
it, or to establish the conditions of epistemic justifi cation associated 
with a given theory or science. Although closer to the ‘historical epis-
temology’ of Brunschvicg, Bachelard and Canguilhem, archaeology is 
distinguished by its emphasis on dispersion, and by its incorporation 
of dispersion into the historicity of knowledge at each level. In this 
respect, it is closer to the methodology developed by Serres in the series 
of Hermes books that takes as its model the way mathematics incorpo-
rated epistemology into its own practice, its development as a discipline 
being driven by the problematisation of its own practice (a principle 
central to Cavaillès’ conception of mathematics), and the translation of 
this methodology into philosophy and other discourses. Archaeology 
follows suit in recognising that the rules which govern a discourse, 
and the changes that shape it, are formed within the discourse itself. A 
further and perhaps more far-reaching difference between Foucault’s 
archaeology and epistemology is that archaeology is concerned not just 
with a given discourse in its strict sense, but also with ‘a set of events, 
practices, and political decisions, a sequence of economic processes 
that also include demographic fl uctuations’ and many other ‘non-
discursive’ elements that feed into discourse in its wider sense (AK 
174, 205). In this way, knowledge is not simply embedded in practices 
that represent its historical conditions or possible applications. Rather, 
knowledge and the events, practices, decisions and processes associated 
with it have a signifi cant degree of formal equivalence and make up a 
single network, albeit one that is internally differentiated and without 
well-defi ned boundaries. It is easy to see how archaeology thereby has 
something in common with pragmatism, and indeed with other forms 
of ‘naturalised’ epistemology that in one way or another break with 
the idea that knowledge is regulated by well-defi ned rational principles. 
However, to place knowledge on the same plane as social events and 
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the communication through which it is decided what ‘counts’ is not the 
same as developing a conception of discourse in which they are thor-
oughly integrated. For its part, in so far as it draws legitimacy from the 
unity of a particular discipline, the naturalisation of epistemology on 
the basis of psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, or indeed 
any other region of discourse, might be the starting point for an archae-
ological enquiry, but cannot be the basis on which such an enquiry 
rests. For this to be possible, a region of discourse would have to serve 
as a general principle for the intelligibility of the rest, which would rein-
troduce the continuity that Foucault set out to remove from the analysis 
of discourse in the fi rst place. The remainder of this chapter is a review 
of, and a warning against, the ways in which this might happen.
Foucault begins by claiming that the comparison in The Order of 
Things of General Grammar, the Analysis of Wealth and Natural 
History in the Classical period was not aimed at recovering forms of 
rationality that extended throughout the period. For archaeology, there 
is no easy passage between the particular and the general, the local and 
the global, and such an extension would probably have been unwar-
ranted. So the characterisation given of the Classical period was never 
intended to be exhaustive, and by implication the same could also be 
said for the other periods studied. Although the relations between dis-
cursive formations, such as General Grammar, the Analysis of Wealth 
and Natural History in the Classical period, do not ‘spill over into adja-
cent domains’, the fact that they are not a total description of the period 
inevitably means that other discursive formations may not conform 
to the same pattern and may therefore not begin and end at the same 
borders. As noted before, these borders will look more like the result 
of messy negotiations rather than clean incisions. This is refl ected in 
Foucault’s response to the imagined criticism that in place of General 
Grammar, Natural History and the Analysis of Wealth he might have 
discussed cosmology, physiology or biblical exegesis, as though he 
had privileged certain discourses above others, covertly or for no good 
reason. Foucault not only concedes that his analysis is limited in this 
respect, but insists that he made it so quite deliberately (AK 176, 208). 
Had it been otherwise, he points out, he would merely have added to 
the already long line of attempts to characterise the ‘spirit’ of a given 
time. Any omission or imprecision would then throw his whole account 
into question. Instead, archaeology is presented as a method, in much 
the same way as phenomenology is a method, its possibility higher than 
its actual form at any moment, with scope always remaining for further 
analyses and greater refi nement.
Taking as its subject matter ‘a tangle of interpositivities whose limits 
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and points of intersection cannot be fi xed in a single operation’ (AK 
177, 208–9), archaeology commits itself to a series of comparative 
analyses with no expectation of arriving at a fi nal ‘correct’ version. 
Indeed, its aim is to have a ‘diversifying’ effect. Ultimately, this empha-
sis on the transformability of the subject area will circle back to take 
in the methodology itself, so that its terms and perhaps even the key 
distinctions that provide a framework for it may themselves mutate. 
The fact that archaeology may be caught up in the processes it analyses 
inevitably prompts the doubt that it is not fundamental, and that it 
must rest on some more permanent basis or set of principles. But such 
criticism assumes that a credible methodology will necessarily be both 
fi xed and independent of the processes or events with which it deals; 
in other words, it assumes an ideal of objectivity to which archaeology 
does not subscribe, and whose construction would be just the kind of 
event for which it sought to provide a historical analysis. Moreover, it 
is not alone in being a methodology that is responsive to the domain 
in which it is applied, as the same could be said of phenomenology, 
hermeneutics and even pragmatism. The cases are not all equivalent, 
however. Phenomenology has been adapted and refi ned at least in part 
as a result of the analyses it has undertaken, but the changes have aimed 
at securing fuller and more adequate access to the phenomena it has 
been studying. In this sense, it has been refi ned in response to them, 
but it has not been directly affected by them. Hermeneutics is a slightly 
different case As Gianni Vattimo describes it, hermeneutics is histori-
cally situated in modernity as the best interpretation of the history that 
has led to the point at which the interpretation is made. It is therefore 
planted in a two-way relation, interpreting the meaning of the condi-
tions that led to its own emergence. This means that hermeneutics is 
itself an interpretation, and not a basic truth about interpretation. 
Something similar is the case for archaeology, except that its relation 
to its own conditions is closer to a material process than to an inter-
pretative process. For Foucault, discourse is a complex confi guration of 
relations in which events feed back into their conditions and it is ulti-
mately impossible to insulate a level of analysis from what it describes. 
In short, the principles of archaeology are be implicated in the history 
it analyses and archaeology must therefore be prepared to problematise 
its own appearance, structure and development. Pragmatism may be 
said to do something similar by virtue of its refusal to anchor its own 
legitimacy in a meta level of any kind, but only in so far as it is prepared 
to let criteria such as utility and consensus themselves be called into 
question.
Foucault writes that, in analysing General Grammar, Natural History 
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and the Analysis of Wealth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
he could have looked for the implicit postulates they shared in spite of 
their differences, and could have speculated on the lines of communi-
cation between them. However, this would have involved tracing the 
translation of general principles from one domain to another (e.g., from 
botany to the analysis of the origin of languages); but such an analysis 
would, he writes, have relied on the idea of infl uence, which takes for 
granted the existence of some kind of unifi ed form as its currency. By 
contrast, archaeology proposes to uncover the conditions that make 
such exchanges possible, which ultimately lie in the laws of their com-
munication and exchange (AK 177, 209). Setting out in detail what 
this might involve, Foucault identifi es fi ve distinct tasks. Interestingly, 
these involve analyses whose aims cannot be resolved into a single clear 
point of view: different discursive elements may be based on similar 
rules, which may or may not be applied in the same way; different con-
cepts may occupy a similar position in their respective positivities, even 
though they be quite different in their domains of application, degrees 
of formalisation, and historical genesis; a single notion may cover two 
quite distinct elements; and fi nally hierarchical relations between dis-
courses may be established (AK 178–9, 209–11). Where a step towards 
simplifi cation occurs, it is countered by a move towards dispersal, 
thereby ensuring that unities are not allowed to consolidate to the point 
where they begin to appear immune to change.
The two most commonly cited points of contrast between Foucault’s 
archaeology and his later genealogical method are that genealogy 
widens the perspective of analysis beyond discourse to include non-
discursive events, and that in doing so it allows a more developed sense 
of historical change. In each case, the changes are less clear-cut than 
they may initially appear and may come down to shifts in emphasis 
rather than wholesale changes. The fi rst point has been discussed 
already, but Foucault addresses it directly here and it is worth pausing 
to take in what he is saying. Archaeology, he states explicitly, describes 
relations not just between discourses, but also between discourses and 
institutions, political events and economic practices (AK 179–80, 212). 
In doing so, it does not attribute explanatory force to a causal process 
either moving from the discursive to the non-discursive or vice versa; 
archaeology sanctions neither the dominance of discursive formations 
over empirical and cultural history, nor the power of empirical events 
alone to determine the structure and development of thought. Foucault’s 
refusal to treat discourse as separate from the reality it constructs, either 
in principle or in practice, means that it is inextricably bound up with 
non-discursive events. The example he gives is of the relation between 
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medical discourse and political practice, which is more complex than 
a relation of cause and effect pointing in either direction (AK 181, 
213). Although Foucault modifi ed his methodology, and in fact did so 
repeatedly, the idea that taking such events into consideration required 
a radical shift from archaeology to genealogy is misplaced. However, 
one can perhaps see here an ambiguity that prompted a revision. It was 
already clear back in Chapter 1 that the relations between discourse 
and non-discursive events played a signifi cant role in the formation of 
regularities (AK 32, 41), and discourse is presented here as so closely 
bound up with non-discursive events that the relations seem to be a part 
of discourse itself. At the end of this chapter, Foucault encapsulates the 
diffi culty when he writes that the autonomy of discourse does not entail 
its ideality or its historical independence. But how can a discourse be 
autonomous without being historically independent? What Foucault 
has in view here is any notion of historical independence that follows 
from the ideality of discourse, leaving open the possibility of a form 
of autonomy compatible with history and the complexity of historical 
relations. Once again, Cavaillès is a signifi cant precursor here, thanks 
to his account of mathematics as an autonomous formal discipline that 
is essentially historical. However, given the implication of discourse 
with non-discursive events (and their institutional form), it is still not 
clear how one could draw a line between discourse and non-discourse 
without straying dangerously close to making precisely the kind of 
distinction between formal conditions and empirical events that archae-
ology tries to avoid. Allowing this already blurred distinction to fade 
away altogether is a factor in the shift from archaeology to genealogy.
The second point, that archaeology cannot account adequately for 
historical change, is related to the fi rst, in that one will look for the 
account of such change to emerge from the constructive processes 
through which discourse and non-discursive together take on the form 
that they do. It is a question, then, of the extent to which the account 
of discursive formations and their temporal dispersion in fact provide a 
convincing story of the transformations that belong to them, or allow 
such a story to be told.
5 .  C H A N G E  A N D  T R A N S F O R M A T I O N S
In Part IV, Chapter 3, Foucault showed how the general categories of 
contradiction, opposition and negation conceal patterns of complex 
relations that lie within them, and in this chapter he sets out to make 
a similar point with respect to the category of change. In place of ‘the 
empty abstract notion’ of change, archaeology aims to reveal a plural-
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ity of transformations involving different elements of discourse. His 
point is essentially that discourse is complex, and the transformations 
that occur cannot be encompassed in a single form without conceal-
ing their true variety. Given that Foucault’s book aims to promote a 
new methodology for historical analysis, this is clearly an important 
question. However, The Archaeology of Knowledge is also part of 
Foucault’s alternative to what he regarded as the failed strategy of an 
analytic of fi nitude, which sought to ground knowledge in philosophi-
cal anthropology centred on human fi nitude. In his Introduction to 
Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault alludes to an approach based on tem-
poral dispersion, rather than the original unity of temporality proposed 
by Heidegger, but this sketch is given more detail in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, and nowhere more so than in this chapter. The  replacement 
of a single category of change with multiple senses of transformation 
is therefore especially important, as it lies at the heart of Foucault’s 
response to the phenomenological, and above all Heideggerian, empha-
sis on the fundamental unity of time as the mark of human fi nitude 
and as the condition for ontology. However, the move Foucault makes 
here has its problems. First, simply to call all the events in question 
‘transformations’ appears in itself to assume an identity or form that 
they have in common; if so, is this not a candidate to replace the ‘empty 
category of change’? By discarding the idea of change as such, does 
archaeology not then foreclose an engagement with its own conditions, 
much as regional ontologies fail, in Heidegger’s view, to ask the more 
fundamental question of Being? Yet if Foucault is right and there is no 
such general category of change, will the sense of transformation itself 
not splinter into confusion? Whether the general concept of change is 
deliberately ignored, or simply does not exist, there is a risk that archae-
ology may be unable to account adequately for the transformations it 
describes. Of course, much will depend on the sense one attaches to the 
idea of an ‘adequate’ account, but I’ll come back to this shortly.
If the questions I have just outlined all hang in the air in this chapter, 
Foucault’s declared purpose is to counter the perception that archaeol-
ogy freezes history into a series of tableau, immobilising the thought 
whose movement it aims to release from the constraints of a conception 
of history based on continuity. From this perspective, discourse would 
be separated from any law of development and ‘established in a discon-
tinuous atemporality’ (AK 184, 217); that is, time would disappear and 
the analysis of discourse would be structural, and therefore primarily 
spatial. For all its apparent neutrality, there are at least two accusa-
tions implicit in this criticism. First, the phenomenological response to 
Kant that passes from Husserl through Heidegger made time absolutely 
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central to its interpretation. Above all, time was seen as crucial for 
re-awakening philosophy to ontological questions. Failing to accom-
modate time places the possibility of providing an ontology in doubt, 
and if one understands epistemology as essentially a founded discourse, 
then this amounts to leaving the job half done. In addition, it seemed 
odd, or worse, that Foucault should construct a method for historical 
analysis in which time played little or no part. The idea that time is 
sacrifi ced and archaeology is a spatial form of analysis is a familiar one, 
but, as this chapter shows, it is not accurate. All that is sacrifi ced here 
has in fact already been sacrifi ced much earlier in the book; namely, the 
idea of continuity as an underlying condition of ontology, and of dis-
course. For one of the things we learn from this chapter is that continu-
ity as such is less the issue than certain ontological assumptions that are 
made when continuity becomes a guiding principle. So, although the 
opposition to continuity in Part II Chapter 1, and the emphasis given 
to the idea of discontinuity more or less throughout, may encourage 
an expectation that continuity will be resisted in all its forms, this is 
not actually the case. In this chapter, Foucault sets out a view of plural 
transformations in which continuity and discontinuity both feature.
The chapter begins with Foucault acknowledging the objection that 
archaeology appears to ignore temporal relations within discursive for-
mations in order to focus attention on the transitions between them, yet 
these transitions paradoxically have the character of blank atemporal 
jumps as ‘one sudden formulation replaces another’ (AK 184, 217). 
To this extent, it appears as though archaeology deliberately neglects 
change within discourses in order to focus on changes between them, 
only then to fi nd these changes themselves hidden from view. However, 
Foucault clearly thinks the objection is misconceived, in so far as it 
treats archaeology’s attention to limits as the expression of a desire to 
establish clear demarcations between discourses, whereas in fact the 
analyses Foucault offers repeatedly take what appears to be a simple 
limit and reveal it to be made up of a series of displacements that do 
not exactly coincide. Moreover, the objection takes the archaeological 
commitment to discontinuity seriously enough not to situate distinct 
discourses within the same temporal dimension, and then takes this 
separation as proof that there can be no temporal relation between 
them – but this simply assumes that temporal relations can only occur 
within a pre-established continuous dimension. In short, the objection 
assumes that a transformation can only appear when its beginning and 
its end are marked in a single dimension, and when the path from one 
to the other passes through a (potentially infi nite) series of intermedi-
ary points. Of course, Foucault does not accept this view. Yet, as he 
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points out, the alternative need not entail trying to establish a different 
rule in every single statement, as discourse would then be hopelessly 
fragmented and an account of transformation would again be impos-
sible. Pitching his account somewhere between these two extremes 
suggests that continuity will remain important for archaeology, though 
its role cannot be that of a fundamental condition underlying a single 
dimension of change and time. In this way, Foucault moves away from 
the idea of a single dimension of change that lends itself to a universal 
history, and – more importantly – would allow the issue of the ground 
of knowledge to be raised all over again. More specifi cally, he is explor-
ing an alternative to Heidegger’s proposal that Kant’s anthropology 
could only be redeemed by placing it on the basis of a fundamental 
account of temporality as the condition of the fi nitude of Dasein. But 
for this to work, Foucault needs at least to hold open the possibility 
of an account of change and time that is not grounded in the unifying 
condition of continuity. Such an account can be found in Bachelard’s 
temporal atomism, though Foucault does not follow him precisely. So 
while Foucault has gestured in this direction before with the idea of 
temporal dispersion (see the Introduction), this chapter presents an 
opportunity to fl esh out the idea.
After some preliminary remarks concerning the variety of ways in 
which statements may be related to events, Foucault notes that archae-
ology recognises rules of formation with different levels of generality; 
that is, the range of a discourse, or its extension, is determined not by 
the number of examples matching the defi ning form, but rather by the 
more ambiguous notion of a territory whose borders are less evident. 
Every discourse is local, in the sense that it constitutes a number of 
cases, statements and events within a neighbourhood that is discur-
sive but also historical. Some discourses stretch to include more than 
others, but none has any claim to universality. This leads to a situation 
in which the extension of a discourse has two dimensions, reaching 
out across a range of events and relations that are synchronic, or ‘tem-
porally neutral’, and across time to include events and relations ‘that 
imply a particular temporal direction’ (AK 186, 219). The archive is 
made up of a mixture of logical and chronological relations, as some 
that are necessarily successive intersect with others that are not. In this 
way, Foucault refuses to allow discourse to be divided into the simply 
logical (or formal) and the simply historical, which is to say that the 
formal conditions of discourse are themselves historical. As a conse-
quence, one does not have to decide whether priority lies with atempo-
ral formal conditions or with the contingent events of empirical history 
carried along by temporal succession.
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This ties in directly with the fact that the events archaeology 
describes are not what we usually recognise as empirical events, but 
rather shifts in the pattern of relations between the various elements 
within discourses; for example, between statements, between objects, 
types of enunciation and concepts, and ultimately between the rules 
of formation that arise from regularities emerging between these ele-
ments. These regularities establish rules of formation that ramify into 
branches with different temporal characteristics. But as regularities they 
all necessarily extend beyond individual statements, objects, enuncia-
tive functions or concepts. They can be found ‘in statements or groups 
of statements in widely separated periods’ (AK 184, 217), meaning that 
archaeology does not group events together according to their proxim-
ity on a predetermined historical or temporal scale; rather, it destroys 
the ‘synchrony of breaks’ between discourses, which means that where 
there are several transformations underway contemporaneously, each 
‘may have its own particular index of temporal “viscosity”’ (AK 193, 
229) and one cannot assume that they will coincide. The events that 
archaeology describes do not fall into a neat temporal order and are 
not, as Foucault puts it, lined up ‘immediately below one another’ (AK 
189, 223).
By describing complex patterns of relations both within certain 
levels of discourse and between them, archaeology tries to tear away 
the surface of change as such to reveal the ‘system of transformations’ 
that constitute it (AK 191, 225). As Foucault notes, this is only possible 
once archaeology breaks with two models that have dominated thought 
for a long time. First, the linear model according to which events are 
arranged in a strict order of succession, a model that Foucault asso-
ciates with patterns of speech and writing, but which also belongs 
together with cause and effect; and second, the model of a stream of 
consciousness whose openness to the future and retention of the past 
mean that it can never coincide with itself in the present. As Foucault 
writes, discourse is neither a consciousness externalised in language, 
nor language endowed with a speaking subject (AK 187, 220–1). 
Treating discourse in this way, Foucault takes up Cavaillès’ call for a 
turn away from the philosophy of the subject to a philosophy of the 
concept, and repeats in a different setting his approach to the historicity 
of mathematics as distinct and autonomous, independent of conscious-
ness and of any other historical discipline, including logic and natural 
science. For Cavaillès, the history of mathematics was the ground of its 
own scientifi c status. For Foucault, the laws governing discourse are 
formed along the path of its own development. They are immanent to 
discourse as a practice ‘with its own forms of sequence and succession’ 
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(AK 187, 221). The discourses in question are both autonomous, but 
the signifi cance of this is very different in the two cases. For Cavaillès, 
the autonomy of mathematics is the condition of its necessity. By con-
trast, Foucault regards the autonomy of a discourse as an invitation to 
explore its relations to other discourses, other layers of discourse, and 
other non-discursive formations, such as institutions, social and politi-
cal relations and so forth.32
At this point, the objection that Foucault’s archaeology sacrifi ces 
time for space, and therefore cannot account for historical change, 
slips into sharper focus. It runs like this. To account for the transfor-
mation between two discursive formations one needs to demonstrate 
its necessity, and to do this one must arrive at a point where it is self-
evident. One could appeal to an external principle of some kind, and 
explain the transformation as caused by economic conditions, or social 
policy, but this would assume the causal effi cacy of events external to 
the system in question, and Foucault refuses to explain things in this 
way. Alternatively, one could simply present the steps that lead from 
one pattern of regularity to another, but this would only constitute an 
explanation if the steps themselves were in some sense self-evident; as 
one does not know in advance which events can linked by cause and 
effect, and as there is no underlying ‘logic of change’, this is impossible. 
Therefore simply increasing the level of detail in the description will 
not in and of itself explain the necessity of moving from one step to the 
next. Even if there are confi gurations that appear to occupy intermedi-
ary positions, they will be at the margins of any single pattern of regu-
larity, and therefore will not themselves carry the force of a rule. One is 
left, then, with a proliferating number of snapshots of a transformation, 
but no way of presenting the transition from one to another.33
This objection suggests that however much Foucault banks on 
describing in ever greater detail the emergence of categories commonly 
taken to be the currency of historical interpretation, he nonetheless 
has to assume the occurrence of some kind of process from which the 
regularities described by archaeology fi rst emerge. In other words, 
when Foucault sets out to describe the historical specifi city of a given 
discursive formation (its unique temporal vector), in so far as this his-
torical specifi city emerges with the regularities the discursive formation 
in question displays, there must already have been some still unnamed 
process unfolding such that any change at all could occur and fall into 
the pattern which then constitutes the historical specifi city that archae-
ology describes. In short, so the objection goes, Foucault simply cannot 
ignore the general category of change, which must underlie his account 
of transformation whether he chooses to engage with it or not.
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However, it is not hard to see that this misunderstands what Foucault 
is proposing with the idea of archaeology. Above all, the objection 
assumes that ‘to account’ for a transformation means to demonstrate 
its necessity in some way. In fact, archaeological description can never 
reach a point where the step that follows is revealed as ‘self-evident’, 
mainly because it can never reach the point where descriptive possibili-
ties have been entirely exhausted. As Foucault said elsewhere, the topics 
he studied could be taken up again in a different way. Even the rules 
that shape the existence of a certain discursive practice must themselves 
have emerged from a process, which may in turn be examined more 
closely or in a different way. Archaeological description is in this sense 
infi nite, even as it is bounded by the discourses it elects to study.34
The transformations that archaeology addresses involve reconfi gu-
rations in the rules or regularities embedded in discursive formations. 
How, then, does one regularity become a different regularity? Again, 
there can be no single answer. There are so many ways for a discursive 
formation to be disrupted by another that they are irreducible to a 
single mechanism. Equally, it may be that a discourse undergoes a form 
of internal collapse, as the regularity by which it has been sustained 
breaks down. In whichever way it occurs, the outcome will be the dis-
ruption of one pattern and the emergence of another. Describing how 
this happens, Foucault writes that he has sought to show ‘the very form 
of the passage from one state to another’,35 which means the specifi c 
form taken by each transformation, even though such a demonstration 
could never be exhaustive, and the form itself never absolutely precise. 
But if there is no appeal to continuity as a general principle, neither 
should emphasis be placed too heavily on discontinuity, and transfor-
mations will exhibit both. Given that a statement already comprises a 
set of repeatable relations, this has to be the case. One of the aims of 
archaeology, therefore, is to show that the continuous and the discon-
tinuous are ‘formed in accordance with the same conditions’ (AK 193, 
225), which means that neither is given priority over the other, and 
neither is simply derivative. Instead, they both rely on the formation of 
patterns of regularity.
Serres describes time as a pure multiplicity, as a patchwork or mosaic, 
and as a threshold between disorder and redundancy: in one direction 
lies a chaotic absence of structure, and in the other an absolutely fi xed 
set of relations; but time is a sporadic, local and ultimately variable 
order established between the elements in question.36 Where degrees of 
repetition occur, one has continuity, but this, too, is sporadic, local and 
variable. Discontinuity is found between such patterns of regularity, 
and is the condition of a temporal pluralism. From this perspective, the 
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idea that Foucault has somehow sacrifi ced time in order to elucidate the 
spatial architecture of discourse appears hopelessly wide of the mark, as 
what fascinates him most is precisely this middle ground where order 
can be described, but never grounded, where it undergoes transforma-
tion without conforming to a more fundamental rule than the one that 
has shaped its existence so far. Archaeological analysis describes the 
construction of knowledge and experience that takes place in a histori-
cal process, but does so through a specifi c form of repetition, and not 
by a taking up a viewpoint from which to map the whole. This may 
sound surprising, given the confi dence with which Foucault will some-
times state the essential characteristics of a period, or the characteristics 
that have changed in the transition from one to another. However, his 
descriptions are always local, and always situated. What distinguishes 
them from being a simple repetition of the history they describe is that 
they address the rules by which historical construction takes place, and 
the transformation of these rules. As he writes in the concluding para-
graph of this chapter, to name a period in history, such as the Classical 
age, is not to invoke a principle of unity, but to call up ‘a tangle of 
continuities and discontinuities’ (AK 195, 230–1). To analyse the way 
such a period ends and gives way to another is to trace a complex group 
of relations and events, forming a variety of regularities that do not all 
coincide and may not all be consistent with one another. The operation 
of time within discourse will be brought to light as one conducts this 
archaeological analysis, without itself becoming a theme.
It might be objected that by refusing to deal with time directly, 
Foucault allows time to operate secretly as the transcendental condition 
for the processes that are analysed. But such an objection assumes in 
advance that there is a single form of time that underlies all transforma-
tions, which is a view Foucault explicitly rejects. To speak of local dis-
cursive temporalities is not to accept a watered-down version in which 
variations on a fundamental model are described while the model itself 
is left unanalysed. Instead, time does not precede the formation of regu-
larity in discourse. To analyse such a formation is to reveal the rules by 
which temporal order itself is composed.
6 .  S C I E N C E  A N D  K N O W L E D G E
The fi nal chapter before the conclusion is already involved in a certain 
‘taking stock’, stepping back, as it were, to look over what has been 
accomplished. As in the previous chapter, Foucault is responding to 
misunderstandings of his work, and this time the issue centres on 
what it is that archaeology actually describes. Medicine, psychiatry, 
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 economics and linguistics, the topics he had addressed in his published 
work prior to The Archaeology of Knowledge, do not belong to the so-
called ‘precise sciences’. Yet he also ignored literary, philosophical and 
political texts – all long considered appropriate subjects for careful aca-
demic analysis. His choices appear contrary. If, as seems to be the case, 
Foucault selected his topics at least in part because of their problematic 
relation to orthodox or established science, then the question arises as 
to the precise nature of this relation.
Almost as a preliminary to engaging this question, Foucault clears the 
ground by sidelining two of the more obvious responses. Is it the case, 
he asks, that what archaeology describes are not sciences, but pseudo-
sciences? Unsurprisingly, the answer is no. Using the more neutral term 
‘discipline’ for those ‘groups of statements’ that borrow from science 
without being strictly scientifi c, he clarifi es that disciplines do not coin-
cide with positivities and discursive formations, which are the real topic 
of archaeological analysis. For example, the analysis of psychiatry took 
as its focus a network of relations supporting the production of state-
ments not only in the discipline of psychiatry, but also in legal texts, 
philosophy and literature, and in practices relating to hospitalisation, 
internment and social exclusion. A discursive practice may even operate 
when there is no recognisable discipline at all. In such cases it might 
be thought that the discursive practice defi nes a science in the making, 
but Foucault rejects the implication that archaeology selects its subject 
matter on the basis of a narrative of development. For example, natural 
history was not an anticipation of biology, and contained much that 
was excluded by the later science. Also ruled out by Foucault here is the 
possibility that positivities and science are mutually exclusive, existing 
alongside one another without entering into a meaningful relation.
Under the heading of ‘Knowledge (savoir)’, Foucault once again 
situates archaeology with respect to conceptions of knowledge whose 
understanding of the landscape is defi ned by the distinction between 
the empirical and the transcendental. Archaeology identifi es the rules 
in accordance with which a discursive practice relates objects, enuncia-
tions, concepts and so forth, but this does not yield ‘a defi ned structure 
of ideality’ (AK 200, 237). Accordingly, neither are the elements of a 
discursive practice to be treated as a heterogeneous group linked only 
by the lived experience of the subject, from which ideal structures may 
be distilled. Rather than look for the precondition of ideality in lived 
experience, Foucault proposes that one look for the precondition of 
discourse in what has been said. The axis that runs from consciousness 
through knowledge to science is thereby replaced by another which 
runs from discourse to knowledge to science. As Foucault points out, 
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this is not to exclude the subject from discourse and from archaeologi-
cal analysis, but merely to recognise that it does not play a central role 
‘either as a transcendental activity or as empirical consciousness’ (AK 
202, 239).
Science insists that in order to fall within its domain, what is said 
has to be appropriately constructed. Yet, as Foucault points out, there 
may be affi rmations that have the same meaning and that are equally 
as true, but which are not constructed as science demands. For example 
Diderot’s Le Rêve d’Alembert contains much that is entirely continuous 
with the natural history of its day without itself belonging to science; 
or, as Serres demonstrates, the novels of Émile Zola articulate the 
principles of thermodynamics, yet there is no danger of them being 
lost to literature. However, archaeology imposes no such restriction, 
and would treat the work of Diderot and Zola as part of discursive 
formations that reached across the orthodox disciplinary boundaries 
in their respective periods. The idea that similar patterns may be found 
in discourses that on the surface have little relation beyond being his-
torically contemporaneous, and sometimes not even that, suggests that 
Foucault’s archaeological method is borrowing from structuralism, but 
this may only be true to certain extent. Serres’ early writing expressed a 
great enthusiasm for what structuralism could become, but as his work 
developed into an exploration of the mobility of formal characteristics, 
and the difference that accompanied repeated iterations of a model, so 
he ceased to refer to structuralism and to link his own thinking to it. In 
spite of the admiration Foucault often expressed for Althusser’s work, 
there’s a case for saying that his thinking is more closely aligned to that 
of Serres in this respect.
Having established that the territory of archaeological analysis is 
more extensive than science, Foucault acknowledges that two lines 
of questioning have opened up. First, what is the place science occu-
pies within this territory? Second, by what process or processes does 
a science emerge within the territory of archaeological analysis? 
Responding to the fi rst of these questions, Foucault adheres to the 
principle of avoiding general patterns of explanation, observing that 
sciences will play different roles in different discursive formations. 
However, the conclusion he draws is signifi cant. Knowledge, he writes, 
is not a terrain that science is programmed to colonise; and conversely 
science is not compromised by its proximity to knowledge that remains 
outside its limits. This second point indicates that Foucault is taking 
his distance from Bachelard’s idea of an epistemological break between 
science and the forms of knowledge that preceded it and which may 
continue to exist alongside it, something that is confi rmed later in the 
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chapter.37 In archaeology, discontinuity is deployed to disrupt unities 
and to complicate the apparent simplicity of their limits, rather than to 
establish new unities and new limits. However, this should not be taken 
as a sign of a wholesale departure from Bachelard, for while his analy-
sis of science does not fi nd its way into Foucault’s archaeology, other 
aspects of Bachelard’s work do, most notably his constructivism and his 
account of temporal pluralism.
Having outlined a complex dimension of continuity and discon-
tinuity between science and knowledge, Foucault then situates the 
question of ideology within it. However, in view of the way the func-
tion of ideology is described it is hard to see exactly what purpose its 
introduction plays here besides that of allowing Foucault to clarify his 
relation to Althusser and Marxism. For while several Althusserian ideas 
reappear only slightly modifi ed in Foucault, there is a divergence over 
the conception of truth and the role of science in its construction and 
dissemination. Although Althusser does not treat science and ideology 
as exclusive of one another, he does regard science as the clarifi cation 
of concepts that have a wider currency such that their reapplication at 
least in part eliminates their initial errors and obscurity. Devoting more 
attention to the complex relations between science and knowledge, 
Foucault places less emphasis on the corrective capacity of science. 
Instead, ideology occupies the space between science and knowledge; 
since science and knowledge are not related only at their borders, ideol-
ogy occurs in the dynamic, multiple and reciprocal relations between 
them, or in the wider discursive practice in which science is lodged. 
Although for Foucault, as for Althusser, science constructs truth, 
archaeological analysis tracks the multiple relations, both discon-
tinuous and continuous, that defi ne its connection to other discursive 
practices and its separation from them. If in general (and therefore 
inaccurately) ideology occupies a kind of middle ground between the 
scientifi c and the non-scientifi c, it does not and need not feature in 
Foucault’s work simply because that dimension consumes the attention 
of archaeological analysis almost entirely.
Foucault breaks down the general space of knowledge and science 
into regions separated by four thresholds. First, the threshold of 
positivity, at which a discourse achieves an individuality by virtue of a 
single system for the production of statements. Second, the threshold 
of epistemologisation, beyond which a group of statements claims to 
validate norms of verifi cation and coherence, and begins to exercise 
dominance over other groups. Third, the threshold of scientifi city, at 
which the formation begins to obey formal rules for the production of 
propositions. And fi nally, the threshold of formalisation, at the point 
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where the discourse in question can defi ne its axiomatic base, the ele-
ments it uses, and the transformations it accepts (AK 206, 244). This 
last threshold marks the pinnacle of scientifi c order, and takes the 
mathematical sciences as its model. That mathematics so completely 
defi nes what it means to be scientifi c is at least in part due to the 
degree of formalisation (or the capacity for it) that it exhibited from 
the beginning. By crossing all four thresholds simultaneously, math-
ematics leaped to being a fully accomplished science from a standing 
start, whereas most other sciences change more slowly. For this reason, 
mathematics is atypical and a bad model for the historian of science 
(AK 208, 247). What appear to be almost teleological stages in the 
development of science may instead be treated as different localities 
within the space marked out by the thresholds Foucault describes. As 
Serres writes, such a systematic space in fact makes possible a variety of 
temporal lines of development; human knowledge does not move as a 
single block over each threshold in turn, and different sciences progress 
at different speeds. What Foucault calls the thresholds of positivity 
and epistemologisation may be crossed in quick succession, or even 
simultaneously, by one science, whereas another may cross the fi rst 
stage and then linger for many decades or even centuries before new 
transformations occur that carry it over the second. This possibility is 
refl ected in Foucault’s identifi cation of three historical approaches to 
the dimension as a whole.
The fi rst is pitched at the level of formalisation, and is characterised 
as the kind of history that mathematics tells about itself. Referring 
explicitly to Serres’ account of the way mathematics took over the 
role of its own epistemology by writing and re-writing its own history, 
incorporating and transforming its past as it does so, Foucault describes 
the way mathematics incorporates and transforms its past in a recur-
rential analysis (AK 209, 245–6: see p. 24 and note 26 on Serres and 
Bachelard). The second form of history examines the way knowledge 
crosses the threshold of scientifi city, making regions of experience 
scientifi c; for example, how concepts are purifi ed of metaphor and the 
contents of the imagination. Bachelard is the fi gure most clearly associ-
ated with this form of history, which Foucault describes as trying to 
show how science is established against a ‘pre-scientifi c level’ that both 
prepares the way for science and stands as an obstacle to be overcome. 
The reader is then clearly invited to see archaeology as the third form 
of history, which aims to reveal ‘discursive practices in so far as they 
give rise to a corpus of knowledge, in so far as they assume the status 
and role of a science’ (AK 210, 249). Foucault situates this form of 
history at the threshold of epistemologisation, but its scope seems to 
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be defi ned differently to that of the fi rst two forms. Whereas the fi rst 
history is addressed uniquely to formalised sciences, and the second to 
the transition from knowledge to science understood as an expulsion 
of the non-scientifi c, archaeology is not confi ned to a particular region 
of the map that Foucault defi ned with the four thresholds. In spite of 
being situated at the threshold of epistemologisation, it deals with dis-
cursive practices that become bodies of knowledge, and that become 
science, and even that achieve the transition to formalisation. As such, 
archaeology does not deal with just one stage in the process, but with 
a level that remains operative throughout the various transformations 
that a discourse may undergo, and most especially those which carry 
it across the second, third and fourth thresholds. It fi nds the discur-
sive practice within science, and tracks the modifi cations that such a 
practice undergoes, for example, as a science crosses the threshold of 
formalisation.
But if, as I have argued, archaeology itself is shaped by the work of 
Cavaillès and Serres on mathematics, why is Serres mentioned only in 
relation to the fi rst form of history, and mathematics associated with 
this history alone? In Hermes I: la communication, Serres deals at 
length with the history and epistemology of mathematics, and Foucault 
refers to this material both explicitly and implicitly in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge. The Introduction and Chapter 1 of Hermes I make it 
clear that Serres saw in mathematics the model of a structuralism that 
permeated the whole of culture, but which would be distinct from that 
practised by Lévi-Strauss. Serres’ approach is to treat science as intrin-
sically historical, and to reveal its historicity as multiple, made up of 
distinct patterns of relations (both continuous and discontinuous) and 
directions of travel, which in turn reveal a multiplicity of temporali-
ties. Taken together, these make up a ‘pan-historicity’ that is the true 
condition for a more orthodox account of the idealities of science and 
mathematics in which history features only as a progression towards 
greater clarity and formalisation.38 The ‘anhistoricity’ of systematic 
science is revealed ‘not as the absence of time, but as the fusion of all 
possible times’ (HI 94). Recognising this opens up new possibilities for 
the historical analyses of knowledge and science.
Serres describes mathematics as a theory that is externally closed 
and internally open. By external closure, he means that mathematics is 
not dependent on other sciences, that it has incorporated epistemologi-
cal problems and their solution into the body of its own practice, and 
that it has eliminated intuition, by which it had previously been tied 
back into the subject. As such, mathematics appears very much like 
the autonomous formal discipline described by Cavaillès (and to some 
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extent by many philosophers of mathematics in the twentieth century). 
That mathematics is internally open is said by Serres to mean that it is 
characterised by a recurrential history, going back to its beginnings as 
much as moving towards a point of fulfi lment, that it separates itself off 
from other practices gradually, and is not constituted in advance, and 
fi nally that it discovers and clarifi es its rules and its principles as it goes 
along. To make the distinction at all of course depends on there being 
a simple contrast to make between mathematics and other discourses 
or disciplines. At the level to which Serres is referring, this seems to 
be self-evident, even granted the additional complexity he wishes 
to introduce into the history of mathematics. However, when we turn 
to Foucault, the picture is a little different. What Foucault is addressing 
is not the history of a formal discipline such as mathematics, but rather 
the history of the formal conditions that underlie the various forms of 
knowledge and nascent science that he studies. At this level, to say that 
there is a clear demarcation between one set of formal conditions and 
another would be to assume that each science was constituted indepen-
dently in advance, which is the very opposite of Foucault’s intention. 
It therefore no longer makes sense to distinguish between the external 
and internal historical characteristics of a discourse: at the level of the 
historical and formal conditions of discourse, the historical a priori, 
there is no external/internal distinction. One can then say that Serres’ 
description of the purity of mathematics denotes the fact that discourse 
is all there is to describe; that is, it becomes the archaeological analogue 
of the way that for phenomenology all phenomena are immanent to 
consciousness, except that now language as it is actually produced (in 
statements) is distributed in concrete relations with other statements, 
groups of statements and non-discursive events. This re-location of the 
conditions for the production of meaning allows the temporal form by 
which the elements are assembled to open up, revealing multiple tem-
poralities; and these, no longer planted deep in the subject, can in turn 
be analysed by the historical techniques Foucault describes, and which 
he groups together under the heading archaeology.
In the closing pages of section (e) of this chapter, Foucault discusses 
the idea of the episteme that he had used in The Order of Things. Given 
how central a role it played in that study, published only three years 
earlier, it may be surprising that it makes an appearance only at this 
late stage. The Order of Things was structured around a threefold divi-
sion of history into renaissance, classical and modern periods, defi ned 
not chronologically, but by the epistemes that were the structural 
conditions of being scientifi c. Foucault’s presentation had attracted a 
great deal of criticism for being a crude, not to say artifi cial, division 
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of history, and in these few pages he clearly wishes to set right what he 
regards as a misunderstanding.
Continuing a theme already well-established in this book, his 
primary concern is to counter the impression that epistemes are fi xed 
structures with clearly defi ned boundaries. As described here, the epis-
teme comprises: the system of relations uniting a discursive practice 
that gives rise to an epistemological fi gure, science or formal system; 
how the transitions across the thresholds described above occur, the 
distribution of these thresholds and their relation to one another; and 
the ‘lateral relations’ between epistemological fi gures and sciences that 
belong to neighbouring discursive practices (AK 211, 250). The fact 
that the episteme comprises the distribution of thresholds implies that 
these thresholds are not fi xed, and that it is one of the tasks of archaeol-
ogy to determine their relation to one another. For this reason, among 
many others, archaeology cannot be reduced to an orthodox episte-
mological refl ection that aims to establish the ‘correct’ criteria that a 
discourse must satisfy in order to qualify as knowledge or science. For 
the description of the episteme ‘opens up an inexhaustible fi eld’, from 
which there emerges a ‘constantly moving set of articulations, shifts, 
and coincidences that are established, only to give rise to others’ (AK 
211, 250). In so far as archaeology does not sift through this confusion 
to fi nd the conditions of the legitimacy of a given science or epistemo-
logical fi gure, it does not return to the ‘critical question’ (AK 212, 251). 
Instead, it accepts the existence of a science as a fact, and then asks 
what it is for this particular science to be a science. Archaeology there-
fore has an ontological dimension: it asks how a given science exists as 
a science, which is not the same as asking how it satisfi es the criteria 
to qualify as a science. On the one hand, archaeology must address the 
rules by which discourses operate, and in particular how they achieve 
their status as sciences, and to this extent it appears to be pitched at a 
meta-level with respect to particular sciences. But on the other hand, 
the rules in question emerge from existing discursive practices, and 
are modifi ed by their continuation. For this reason, the description of 
the rules governing discourse are not independent of the description 
of the discourses themselves (at the archaeological level of statements, 
their elements, and the relations between them). So while archaeology 
focuses on individual sciences, rather than the general question of what 
it means be a science, its attention moves from the sciences themselves 
to the conditions by virtue of which they exist as sciences at all. As it 
does so, archaeology discovers not the simplicity or unity of an origin, 
but the complexity of the historical relations that constitute discursive 
formations. The general question of what it means to exist as a science 
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is eclipsed by the specifi c question of what it means for a specifi c science 
to exist under specifi c conditions. Rather, it is dissolved entirely, such 
that there is no longer a general question of what it means for a science 
to exist, any more than there is a general category of change underlying 
the multiplicity of transformations that discourses undergo.
This point is carried forward into the fi nal section of the chapter, and 
therefore of the book as a whole, apart from the Conclusion. Under the 
heading of ‘Other Archaeologies’, Foucault asks whether archaeology 
is necessarily directed towards sciences, or whether other bodies of 
knowledge could be analysed, and picks out the archaeological descrip-
tion of sexuality as a possibility. Such an analysis would reveal how 
ways of speaking are invested in systems of prohibitions and values, 
and would therefore be carried out in the direction of the ethical (AK 
213, 252–3). The suggestion is of course familiar to us from the work 
that Foucault did indeed go on to do, and which clearly puts to use 
a great deal of what he sets out here in this book. Other possibilities 
involve work on painting and politics. An assimilation of mathematics 
into philosophy, the opening of discontinuous (plural) dimensions of 
history, and the displacement of the fi gure of man have therefore made 
new forms of inquiry possible.
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Part V: Conclusion
The Conclusion to the book takes the form of a series of responses by 
Foucault to objections that he could anticipate, and no doubt some 
which had already been made. In the main he takes the (staged) oppor-
tunity to step back and provide a more strategic view of what he aimed 
to achieve, to reiterate a few key points, and to try one last time to head 
off misinterpretations.
Foucault makes the point that suspending the category of the subject 
in no way suppresses individuality beneath a universal form of dis-
course, not least because the forms of discourse that he introduces into 
the analysis are not universal. To be universal, they would have to be 
imposed on discourse from the outside and immune to any alteration, 
but this is not the case. Not only are the particular confi gurations into 
which all the elements of discursive formations fall local and provi-
sional, but these elements themselves are descriptions of discourse as 
Foucault fi nds it. Although the scale of a historical transformation 
leading to the disappearance of one or more of what seem in this analy-
sis to be fundamental categories would have to be much greater than 
those considered here, there is nothing to prevent it, and this point is 
underlined later in the Conclusion. In fact, the suspension of the cate-
gory of the subject is a strategic decision made to align the analysis with 
the disappearance of man, and thereby with the current of thought that 
promises an escape from the impasse described at the end of The Order 
of Things. It is not, therefore, made out of a bias towards objectivity. 
If there are thus powerful strategic reasons for Foucault to move in 
this direction, it is work in the history and epistemology of mathemat-
ics and the mathematical sciences, and that of Bachelard and Serres in 
particular, that clears the way. At the heart of this question is the issue 
of history and in particular of Foucault’s rejection of ‘a uniform model 
of temporalization’ (AK 221, 261). Time is the key to the fi nitude man 
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that is at stake in the transformations in the structure of knowledge that 
Foucault has been describing. If man is to disappear, releasing knowl-
edge from the hold exerted by the distinction between eschatology and 
positivism, and everything that comes with it, then the unity of time has 
to give way. Since the unity of time is secured by the subject, the subject 
must be suspended. Far from committing individuals to an anonymous 
formalism, or anything of the kind, this in fact makes possible the 
reconfi guration of experience, and even the modifi cation of its onto-
logical conditions. Foucault reminds the reader here of the importance 
of suspending ‘the general, empty category of change in order to reveal 
transformations at different levels’ (AK 221, 261). These are transfor-
mations in the structure of discourses (and of knowledge), and as such 
they also modify the position and function of the subject in relation to 
those discourses, leading to a more radical sense of freedom. This is 
not yet a fully fl edged account of the freedom of the subject to engage 
in practices that reconfi gure the conditions of its existence, but it is an 
important step in that direction and the ground is prepared here for the 
accounts of freedom that Foucault would go on to give in later works.
The next objection in the series appears to be two rolled into one. 
First, the imagined interlocutor refuses to accept that scientifi c dis-
courses can be analysed adequately without securing their rationality 
in a teleological principle and the promise of eventual truth and clarity. 
Second, it is objected that even if one suspends any discussion of the 
speaking subject itself, the simple fact of speaking a given language 
means that one inevitably has a blind spot, since one cannot turn the 
analysis back on the forms of discourse that made it possible. In fact, 
the two objections are linked, in so far as the blind spot to which 
the second refers is, the objector hopes, to be brought back into view by 
the kind of history to which the fi rst refers. But the argument is circular, 
since the existence of the blind spot in the fi rst place assumes the sense 
of reason and history intended to restore unity and transparency. As 
Foucault explains in his response, his intention was to analyse history 
in a way that could resist all attempts by teleological reason to restore 
such unity and transparency. For this reason, the history of thought 
cannot stand above the forms of discourse it describes, as though it had 
a vantage point from which to survey the course of their development 
and to identify its law. Here, Foucault makes a simple and powerful 
point. If one is prepared to concede that a piece of empirical research 
can challenge ‘the transcendental dimension’ then one has accepted 
almost everything he proposes. For all the sophistication with which 
Foucault elaborates his account, his basic position is one that refuses 
a messy compromise: either the transcendental dimension always has 
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priority over the order it conditions, or it is implicated in the order it 
conditions; what he resists at all costs is the idea that the transcendental 
dimension may be historical in a sense that can still be contained by 
reason and thereby recover some form of patched-up unity. Once the 
decision is made that the transcendental dimension is implicated in the 
order it conditions, the diffi culty is to establish the nature of their rela-
tion and of its historicity, and it is this problem that The Archaeology 
of Knowledge addresses. Its originality lies in its attempt to present this 
historicity as irreducible to either the transcendental or the empirical. 
The series of displacements and misunderstandings that Foucault lists 
on pages 224 and 225 all fail to take this into account, and thereby all 
reproduce in various ways the framework of knowledge in modernity 
that Foucault analysed in The Order of Things, and to which archae-
ology is intended to provide an alternative. It needs to be underlined 
here that in making this point Foucault shows that he does not exempt 
the entire apparatus that he has introduced in this book from the kind 
of historical transformations it describes. The concepts of associated 
fi elds, surfaces of emergence, grids of specifi cation, fi elds of coexistence, 
and even those of statement, enunciative function, concept and object, 
may all eventually be caught up in the history for which, here, they have 
emerged as the most fi tting description.
But the question is not settled yet. The next objection addresses head 
on this issue of the level at which archaeology is pitched. It insists that 
either archaeology is an empirical analysis, in which case it will fall 
prey to the naivety of all positivisms, or that it is more than an empiri-
cal analysis, in which case the objector claims that ‘it will enter our 
game, and, in turn, extend the very dimension that it is trying to free 
itself from’ (AK 226, 267). The challenge is summed up in the ques-
tion of whether the discourses to which Foucault refers are history or 
philosophy. Foucault acknowledges that this question causes him some 
embarrassment. He writes that he would have preferred to leave the 
question in suspense because the discourse he has sought to develop, 
contrary to usual academic (and especially philosophical) practice, has 
not tried to determine the ground on which it is based. In fact, Foucault 
declares that his discourse has tried to avoid such a ground. Reading 
this, one might wonder whether it amounts to avoiding the question 
of whether his discourse could determine the ground on which it is 
based, should it choose to do so. However, Foucault’s comments here 
are a reminder of how radical a change he is proposing to the usual 
conceptions of the analysis of discourse. Its task, he writes, ‘is to make 
differences’ (AK 226, 268). This a striking suggestion in itself, but is 
it consistent with what he has actually described in the course of the 
WEBB 9780748624218 PRINT.indd   154 29/10/2012   08:47
 Commentary 155
book? Has he not claimed to be describing the differences passed over 
or concealed by other forms of analysis, interpretation and history? Has 
the descriptive act become an intervention? Not exactly, for Foucault 
goes on to say here that its purpose is to diagnose, and in this respect 
its differentiations are still descriptive. However, the point has been 
made repeatedly that successive discursive events can modify the series 
in which they appear, which means that they can modify the regularity 
that determined their existence. In addition, as outlined on pp. 24–5 
above, Serres describes how the epistemology of mathematics, having 
been assimilated by mathematics itself, performs both descriptive and 
normative functions (HI 46–7). The benign confusion between descrip-
tion and transformation implied by Foucault’s comments places him 
beyond the reach of the objection to which he is responding here, which 
assumes a more orthodox arrangement between the branches and func-
tions of inquiry.
It all depends on the kind of history being conducted. For a history 
of empirical events is essentially descriptive, and at most can require a 
revision in the way events are understood, but the description of the 
rules by which discourses are formed is already an engagement in their 
own history. As Cavaillès insists, to analyse a history one has to follow 
it from within, and not survey it from above; Bachelard, Cavaillès and 
Serres have all described the way mathematics develops by revising 
its own past; and Foucault accepts that there is a feedback loop from 
discursive events to their conditions. There are therefore at least two 
reasons why Foucault can state quite freely that his discourse avoids 
determining its own ground. First, as he made clear much earlier, 
archaeology cannot fully determine its own archive. Second, to seek 
to determine its own ground in the way the objection urges would 
be to abandon its principles; and before criticising archaeology for 
an irresponsible lack of seriousness in its refusal to determine its own 
grounds, the objector should bear in mind that Foucault is following 
the precedent set by the mathematical sciences. Here, as Cavaillès dem-
onstrates more fully than anyone, the ground simply is the historical 
movement itself, which generates its own necessity without recourse 
to external principles. The importance of this point for Foucault can 
hardly be overstated. However, at the same time, Foucault’s vision of 
discourse as open and complex, as a place where any pretence to neces-
sity can always be unmasked, is far removed from anything that could 
by supported by Cavaillès and is much closer to Serres’ conception of 
different constellations of knowledge, each with their own local rules 
and form of organisation. At the end of his response to this objection, 
Foucault remarks that what he is doing cannot in any way be regarded 
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as either philosophy or history (AK 227, 268). This is true, as long as 
one accepts an orthodox picture of each. However, in a manner con-
sistent with the principles he has described, Foucault’s account of the 
archaeological structure of discourse has already contributed to the 
transformation of both philosophy and history.
The mutability of discourse is also the theme of the next objection, 
which casts a rather weary eye over the theoretical innovation of its day 
and wonders how many of the youthful pretenders will stay the course. 
Unsurprisingly, given Foucault’s well-known fondness for change and 
uncertainty, and again demonstrating consistency with the principles of 
discourse he has set out, the prospect that archaeology might prove to 
be a short-lived stage on the way to something else does not concern 
him.
The fi nal question Foucault poses to himself is more interesting: if 
every discursive event is rule governed, and if the adoption of archaeol-
ogy has led to a proliferation of such rules, then does archaeology not 
take away the freedom of individuals to act and speak in the way they 
choose? The objection assumes that freedom is essentially spontaneous 
and unregulated, and that the subject is fundamentally free before being 
caught up in situations that impose constraints. From this perspective, 
the more rules are present in any given situation, the less freedom one 
has to act and to think for oneself: ironically, given Foucault’s comment 
at the end of the Introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge, his 
analysis is painted here as a kind of bureaucratic nightmare in which 
individuals are frustrated by a tangle of incomprehensible regulations. 
The objection is, however, misconceived, or at least Foucault does not 
share its basic premise about the subject and freedom. He explains 
that the positivities, the complex networks of discursive relations, he 
has described are not imposed from outside as constraints on a subject 
endowed with an innate freedom. Rather, they are to be thought of as 
constituting the fi eld in which the freedom of the subject is articulated, 
as rules it puts into operation, and relations which provide it with 
support (AK 230, 272). In each case, the initiative of the subject plays 
a part without being the origin or the focus of the relations and rules 
in which it participates. Reading this now, one can see it through the 
lens of Foucault’s later writing on freedom, the subject and power. But 
this idea of action within a ‘fi eld’ of relations that serve as rules is also 
prefi gured in mathematics. For Cavaillès, concepts are operations that 
act on objects which have themselves been constructed and there is no 
such thing as a mental act for which the subject then fi nds a suitable 
form of expression, and therefore no inner freedom to experience the 
rules of discourse as a constraint. In some respects, this is the familiar 
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scenario that there can be no thinking without language. More specifi -
cally, in 1967 Derrida published La Voix et la phénomène, in which he 
deconstructs the distinction between an inner intention and its outward 
expression, thereby demonstrating that a pure intention is impos-
sible. There is, then, nothing unique in this claim. However, linking 
Foucault’s position here to mathematics, and to Cavaillès in particular, 
does add something distinctive. First, it is not the case that the act of 
thinking necessarily depends on an external medium, and therefore 
has to conform to the rules belonging to it. This would leave open the 
possibility that the subject thinks using ‘ready-made’ materials, which 
nonetheless organise an intention that is already there. Instead, the act 
of thought constructs an object according to rules, but in doing so it 
responds to a problem that arises in a specifi c setting. To think is to 
take part in a pattern of conceptual development, and to carry out the 
steps by which a demonstration unfolds or new concepts and objects 
are produced. As such, the act is itself conditioned by the history of 
the operation it performs, without being determined by it. Because the 
rules of discursive formations are temporal, to engage with discourses 
beyond those that are closest and most familiar will be to expose one’s 
own temporal confi gurations – what Bachelard would call the rhythms 
of one’s own duration – to disruption and interference from outside. 
Enlivened, hopefully they will be recomposed in a pleasing way.39 
Going back to Foucault’s Introduction, this is at least a part of what it 
means ‘to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought’ (AK 
13, 21).
In the fi nal three or four paragraphs of the book, Foucault turns the 
tables and challenges his imagined interlocutor to clarify the motiva-
tion behind the various objections that he raises, and the issues are 
very much those just outlined. Is there not asks Foucault, a kind of 
fear that speaks in many of the criticisms levelled at what he is doing? 
Do the objections not express a desire for the calm of an order that, if 
not eternal, is at least continuous, whole and predictable? One thinks 
of Lucretius here, urging his readers not to fear the vision of contin-
gency and multiplicity that he presents, and instead to understand that 
ataraxy can be achieved through an understanding of its principles.40 
Epicurus declared that we should not fear death because it lies beyond 
the limits of our experience, and Foucault seems almost to play on this 
idea here in accepting that in discourse he does not banish his death, 
but may on the contrary establish it, allowing interiority to be dissolved 
in an exteriority that is indifferent to his life. His description of this 
exteriority as neutral invokes Blanchot again, and the confl uence of lit-
erature and death.41 The message is: I should not expect my engagement 
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in discourse to bring comfort and a tenuous immortality, but neither 
should I fear the dissolution it threatens. Discourse is not life, Foucault 
writes, but actually it only really brings about the death of man as the 
central fi gure in the constitution of knowledge in modernity. It is our 
part in this drama that is ending. Beyond their inscription in this role, 
however, the lives of individuals go on as freely and as passionately as 
before.
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The Archaeology of Knowledge begins with a review of methodologies 
adopted by contemporary historical writing, but it quickly becomes 
clear that this is part of a far bigger concern. As in much of Foucault’s 
writing, a meticulous attention to the detail of history is accompanied 
by an aspiration to change not just what is thought but the terms or 
conditions in which thought takes place. To appreciate the aims of this 
book, one therefore has to consider the currents of history in which 
it moves, and these are defi ned above all by the problem to which it 
responds. As I set out in the Introduction, in Foucault’s view think-
ing in modernity had become caught in an impasse from which it 
could not escape without undergoing a radical change, one to which 
The Archaeology of Knowledge is intended to add its own impetus. 
To make sense of this book one therefore must also place oneself in 
the future it works to open up. Saying this might imply that one has 
to take sides and either fail to understand his approach or endorse it 
fully, surrendering a critical perspective on what it achieves and on its 
methods. But this is not the case; in fact, nothing would be more alien 
to Foucault’s own way of thinking. It simply means that what Foucault 
tries to do in The Archaeology of Knowledge does not make sense from 
the standpoint of the historical situation to which it responds. In this 
respect, the book has the character of an intervention and one has to be 
prepared for the framework of historical and philosophical thought it 
engages to be modifi ed in some way.
The diffi culty of exceeding a limit that defi nes the current possi-
bilities of thinking has become a relatively familiar problem, and one 
addressed in various ways by thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Derrida and Deleuze. In what can only be a rough characterisation 
here, the diffi culty may be understood to lie in the way the limit is 
conceived as so deeply embedded in the subject that to contravene 
it is literally unthinkable. Thinking, then, tests the limits of what is 
possible, intimating what it cannot summon up from within itself 
without ceasing to make sense, without the subject disavowing itself as 
a subject. If this path leads ultimately to a risk of madness that comes 
with the separation of the subject from itself, for Foucault it is history 
that spares us from having to travel down it, in the sense that history 
absolves the subject of being uniquely responsible for initiating the 
changes required to carry thinking on to a new future. The changes that 
Foucault proposes have their own history, which lies mainly in work 
related to science and mathematics carried out by Bachelard, Cavaillès 
and others. Once this is taken into account, the displacements and inno-
vations introduced in The Archaeology of Knowledge can be seen to 
have their own precedents. Without detracting from the originality of 
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what Foucault achieves in this text, it can thus be read as a development 
of work already undertaken, and in this respect less as a singular assault 
on orthodoxy than as a continuation of what thinking had become, or 
was in the course of becoming.
Reading The Archaeology of Knowledge in this way has the advan-
tage of placing its innovations in the context of a pattern of responses 
to the end of a certain confi guration of philosophy. In particular, it 
 highlights the link between his elaboration of archaeology and his 
earlier engagement with anthropology in Kant, and thereby also with 
his recommendations for the renewal of critical philosophy. Time, 
in the form of temporal dispersion, takes on a pivotal role, and the 
strategic release of thinking from the grip of the distinction between 
transcendental and empirical philosophy is underlined as the leitmotiv 
running throughout the text.
If The Archaeology of Knowledge was intended to herald a new form 
of thought, does the fact that Foucault’s later books do not reproduce 
its analytical framework and terminology mean that it failed, or had 
only a qualifi ed success? That it did not solve the problem once and for 
all is no surprise, and should be no reason for criticising it. Moreover, 
its success should not be measured in terms of its longevity. While it 
is true that the precise terminology of The Archaeology of Knowledge 
is not reproduced in later analyses, if one looks beyond the letter, one 
fi nds the spirit – the aspiration – of the text very much alive. It is as 
though the intense focus on terms, distinctions, thresholds, limits, and 
patterns of discourse in The Archaeology of Knowledge opened up 
a dimension and form of analysis that subsequent studies could then 
occupy, and even transform, without having to begin each time from 
fi rst principles. In other words, modes of thought from mathematics 
and the natural sciences are shown in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
to have responded, deliberately or otherwise, to the fundamental crisis 
in knowledge in modernity that Foucault had identifi ed in The Order of 
Things. Moreover, Foucault demonstrates that such modes of thought 
not only had something important to say about the construction of 
knowledge in their own domains, but that the innovations they evolved 
could be extended to fi elds of inquiry that more traditional confi gura-
tions of knowledge have generally held apart from science. In fact, the 
reasons for demarcating the humanities from the natural sciences lie 
primarily in the framework that had, in Foucault’s view, become the 
source of the problem; namely, the distinction between transcendental 
and empirical forms of inquiry and their placement around the fi gure 
of man. In so far as Foucault, following precedents in the mathemati-
cal sciences, breaks down this framework, he opens up a stratifi ed 
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dimension for thinking in which traditional boundaries between disci-
plines break down into more complex patterns of both continuity and 
 discontinuity – a theme that has also been central to Serres’ work.
To say that The Archaeology of Knowledge opens up a dimension 
that later analyses occupy is not to affi rm a continuity running through 
Foucault’s work from early to late. The idea that the principles of such 
analyses, once set, should be left intact is both at odds with Foucault’s 
own restless revision of his own methods and inconsistent with the 
recognition, repeated many times in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
that conditions may be transformed by the conditioned to which they 
give rise. To claim that The Archaeology of Knowledge has a lasting 
importance for Foucault’s later work is simply to point out that, 
as Foucault himself argues, what appear to be sharp displacements 
between disciplines, periods, or methodologies are less straightforward 
than they may seem at fi rst and generally involve threads of continu-
ity, or incremental change as well as sharp breaks and divergences. To 
identify a motif that appears to remain consistent across such transfor-
mations is inevitably to invite its exposure as fractured and mobile, but 
one might point to the way Foucault traces the conditions of knowledge 
and existence in a conception of actuality that is always a work in 
progress. While there is no appeal to transcendental conditions beyond 
the level of events analysed, such events are not taken as simply given. 
The entities in question, what counts as an event, the kind of relations 
between events that are considered signifi cant, and more besides, are 
all subject to continual revision. However, because Foucault’s method 
is developed specifi cally to allow analysis to operate across different 
levels without losing its footing, it is also capable of adapting to the 
challenges presented by historical change, and by new fi elds of enquiry.
Beyond its methodological signifi cance, the recognition of change 
across different levels of analysis is also important for the formation of 
subjects – an issue that was always one of Foucault’s central concerns. 
While it is true that The Archaeology of Knowledge restricts its con-
sideration of the subject in the main to the construction of enunciative 
functions, Foucault’s analyses avoid the traditional dichotomy between 
a commitment to a sense of human freedom that transcends the mate-
rial world on the one hand and the inevitability of empirical deter-
minism on the other. As a result, they put in place resources for later 
analyses of the conditions of actual existence, action and speech that 
extend what is presented in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Without 
claiming that the later work is simply prefi gured in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, which is too simplistic to the case, one theme nonethe-
less stands out as especially signifi cant. Foucault’s engagement with 
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ethics in his later writing contrasts with an earlier emphatic diagnosis 
of the inability of thinking in modernity to address the question. In The 
Order of Things, Foucault describes how thought in modernity inevi-
tably transformed that which it sought to grasp, setting it in movement 
(OT 327). As a function of the idealism that remained an inescapable 
condition of knowledge, this refl ected both the fact that the object was 
revealed as familiar to the subject by virtue of its conditions of pos-
sibility, and yet that it was at the same time made more remote. This 
distancing arose, Foucault explained, because man’s own being was 
made to change as a result of its being deployed in the distance between 
thought and its object (OT 327). There is, he adds, something about 
this which is tied in directly with the repertoire of ethical thought in the 
West. Leaving religious moralities to one side (assuming that they can 
be easily separated out), he identifi es fundamentally two ethical forms. 
In pre-modern thought, ethics was premised on an understanding of 
the order of the world, the discovery of which served as a basis for a 
code of wisdom, and even for a conception of political organisation. 
Such a view is exemplifi ed in the stoics, Foucault writes, though one 
could easily trace the same motif in Aristotle and even Plato. But in 
modernity, ‘any imperative is lodged within thought and its movement 
towards the apprehension of the unthought’ (OT 328). It is committed 
to giving speech to what is silent, to illuminating what has remained in 
darkness. Its aim is to articulate the fi nite being of man that grounds 
the relation between the subject of knowledge and what it knows. In 
practical terms, Foucault proposes that the imperatives of ethics attest 
to the search for a ground that cannot be attained because of the very 
framework of thought from which such imperatives arise. Structurally 
unable to grasp its own being, the subject in modernity cannot provide 
the ground for knowledge that it desires, and in so far as ethics is con-
strued as a form of knowledge it is not exempt. Foucault’s conclusion is 
that ‘For modern thought, no morality is possible’ (OT 328).
Archaeology does not promise a direct response to this problem, but 
it does describe a change to the framework in which the problem arises. 
History takes on an important role by providing what might be called 
a late modern analogue of the order of the world that served as a basis 
for ethics prior to modernity. The codes of knowledge that underpin 
a modern, or perhaps late modern, counterpart to wisdom and ethics 
are historical. In the context of Foucault’s archaeology, this means 
that they are local and not universal, since historical change does not 
conform to a single law or principle. The knowledge that may provide 
a basis for ethics is therefore a knowledge not of the natural world, but 
of the historical world. Most important of all, it is not a knowledge of 
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events but of the regularities that shape events, of the limits of the dis-
courses that defi ne them, and thereby what can be known and spoken 
about at a given time, and the position that the subject can take up 
within and with respect to such discourses.
In so far as this is not a traditional form of history one is brought 
back to the opening of The Archaeology of Knowledge, where Foucault 
reviews modifi cations to historical method that have begun to emerge. 
But now one can see that the form of history he proposes has a larger 
part to play in contemporary thought than it might at fi rst seem. The 
unachievable pursuit of the unthought in modernity is replaced by the 
analysis of the historical conditions of the construction of knowledge 
and experience. Yet these, too, are impossible to grasp defi nitively. 
Has thinking therefore exchanged one abyss for another? No, since 
archaeology can always press its analyses further, taking in more detail, 
revising as it goes. By breaking the historical a priori conditions down 
into different strata and patterns of regularity, the subject of archaeol-
ogy reveals the contingent provenance of what may seem initially to be 
binding rules and conditions. Gaps and disjunctions appear. Where the 
subject in modernity was faced with the impossible task of taking hold 
of itself as a knowing subject, Foucault describes a situation in which 
the subject can re-shape the regularities that defi ne what it can know, 
say and do. It is, then, by hastening the disappearance of man, by dis-
placing the subject from its central role in the enterprise of knowledge, 
and by adapting conceptions of historical form and analysis that had 
emerged in the mathematical sciences that Foucault reveals scope for a 
renewal of ethical practice.
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Notes
B A C K G R O U N D
 1. I will follow Foucault in his use of ‘man’ throughout the book in order to 
be consistent with published texts.
 2. The French ‘le veçu’ is translated in the published edition of The Order of 
Things as ‘actual experience’, which has been modifi ed here to ‘lived expe-
rience.’ ‘Le veçu’ is the French translation of the German term ‘Erlebnis’ 
that occurs in Husserl, and which is usually translated into English as 
‘lived experience’. Adopting this translation brings out the connection 
between Foucault’s analysis in these passages and phenomenology.
 3. Foucault actually refers to the irreducibility of its ‘space’. However, the 
spatiality of Dasein is understood in temporal terms. The key point is that 
the dimension of Dasein’s existence is the sole arena for the disclosure of 
Being.
 4. Cf. ‘Science and Knowledge’ (AK Part IV, Chapter 6) where Foucault 
contrasts archaeology with a phase of analysis that is associated with 
Bachelard (AK 209–10).
 5. Bachelard welcomed the development of set theory at least in part because 
it liberated intuition from sensible objects. Cf. Bachelard, ‘L’oeuvre de 
Jean Cavaillès’, in Ferrières, Jean Cavaillès Un philosophe dans la guerre 
1903–1944, pp. 235–48.
 6. The fi fth postulate was stated by Euclid without a proof. It sets out the 
properties of two lines as they intersect a third, but it leads to the conse-
quence that where there is a line and a point not on the line, there is only 
one line parallel to the fi rst that runs through the point.
 7. Bachelard gives the example of the Millikan experiment. ‘The Millikan 
experiment is one where the unity of the electric charge is isolated and 
translated by a direct action. By using a microscope to observe the move-
ment of a drop of oil condensed upon an electron, and through the counter 
action of an electric fi eld and gravity, the two characteristics of the elec-
tron, that is, its mass and its charge, can be determined. This delicate 
experience seems at fi rst to be the triumph of scientifi c “chosism,” yet 
upon further examination of the philosophical problem we realise that the 
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free electron is truly an electron without atomic properties. What interests 
us are the properties of the allied electron, of the electron in relation to 
the proton. The Millikan experiment is thus an experience of our world 
because it is detached from the mathematical perspective of the atomic 
world. In leaving the atomic world, the free electron leaves the mathemat-
ics of the atom’ (NM 76).
 8. In La philosophie du non, Bachelard writes that microphysics is essentially 
noumenal: ‘its constitution requires that thinking (les pensées) be put 
before experiences, that experiences be remade on the basis of thinking...’ 
(PN 103–4).
 9. Cf. ‘The Mathematical A Priori’ below, pp. 31–4. Foucault suggests that 
Kant’s critical philosophy be repeated on the basis of the mathematical 
a priori. The laws as Bachelard describes them in the essay ‘Noumena 
and Microphysics’ are neither abstractions from experience, nor pure 
transcendental or formal conditions. Although Bachelard doesn’t say this 
explicitly, they are the conditions for the existence of quite specifi c objects, 
and not universal conditions for the possibility of experience (cf. PN 106). 
This can also be seen as prefi guring Foucault’s description of the rules of 
discursive formations in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
10. Bachelard warns that ‘there is nothing more dangerous than postulating 
the simplicity, the independence, and the unity of beings’ (NM 76). His 
concern here is above all that apparent simplicity at the noumenal level 
invokes a world of naturalised objects, and that this in turn may slow 
down scientifi c creativity.
11. Raymond Barsotti’s ‘The “Non-Kantianism” of Bachelard: Towards the 
Transcendental Sense of the Epistemological Break’ is particularly helpful 
on this point.
12. The Birth of Biopolitics is the text of the lecture course that Foucault gave 
at the Collège de France in 1979. Having explained that his method con-
sists in starting off with the assumption that universals do not exist, and 
then asking what kind of history it is possible to write, he adds: ‘[Politics 
and the economy] are things that do not exist and yet which are inscribed 
in reality and fall under the regime of truth dividing the true and the false’ 
(p. 20). This is just one of a great many examples that could have been 
given here.
13. The lines quoted continue: ‘always it was the embroidery that we saw, 
never the fabric, always the shadows and refl ections mirrored on a restless 
river, never its deep, pellucid waters’. The reference to embroidery and 
fabric ties Bachelard’s remarks back to a text from Roupnel from which he 
quoted earlier in the essay: ‘Our acts of attention are episodes of sensation 
extracted from the continuity we call duration. Yet the continuous fabric 
of which our minds embroider discontinuous patterns of acts is but the 
mind’s laborious and artifi cial construct’ (TI 69).
14. Gaston Roupnel was a historian of the Burgundy region who made geo-
graphical themes the objects of historical study. His work was in part 
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associated with the Annales group, though he remained a marginal fi gure. 
Cf. Whalen, ‘Gaston Roupnel (23 September 1871–14 May 1946)’, in 
Daileader and Whalen (eds), French Historians 1900–2000, pp. 527–44.
15. Physics IV.10 217b29–218b20.
16. Cf. Weyl, The Continuum, p. 93.
17. Foucault, ‘Life: Experience and Science’, in Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, p. 466.
18. Cavaillès, ‘On Logic and the Theory of Science’, p. 409. Cavaillès was exe-
cuted in 1944 as an active member of the Resistance during the German 
occupation of France. During a period of imprisonment, remarkably, he 
wrote this long and closely argued essay setting out his views on math-
ematics and logic. The essay, still incomplete, was edited by his friends 
and colleagues Canguilhem and Ehresmann and published posthumously 
under the title of La logique et la théorie de la science.
19. Cf. Thompson, ‘Historicity and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, 
and the Phenomenology of the Concept’ and ‘Response to Colin 
Koopman’s “Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: 
Two Kantian Lineages”’. Cf. also Webb, ‘Cavaillès and the Historical a 
priori in Foucault’.
20. Intuitionism proposes that mathematics be understood as a constructive 
practice rooted in the activity of the mind. Intuitionism is opposed to the 
formalism of David Hilbert.
21. Cf. also Pierre Cassou-Noguès, De l’expérience mathématique: Essai sur la 
philosophie des sciences de J. Cavaillès, pp. 272–3.
22. Cf. Sinaceur, Jean Cavaillès: Philosophie Mathématique, p. 90.
23. Serres with Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture and Time, p. 37.
24. Dosse, History of Structuralism Vol. 1, p. 89.
25. Nicolas Bourbaki was the pseudonym for group of mathematicians includ-
ing Henri Cartan, Claude Chevalle, Jean Dieudonné, André Weil and 
Charles Ehresman (who later co-edited for publication Jean Cavaillès’ 
posthumous work ‘On Logic and the Theory of Science’). The group pub-
lished a series of works aiming to provide a rigorous system of mathemat-
ics based on set theory.
26. Serres: ‘The self-description carried out by an internal epistemology has 
. . . an impact of primary importance on the object described; far from 
stabilising and naturalising it, the description reconstitutes it, reanimates 
it, restructures it’ (HI 64).
27. The idea of naturalised epistemology fi rst makes an appearance in Quine’s 
essay ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ in Ontological Relativity and Other 
Essays. Quine advocated that epistemology simply be replaced by empiri-
cal psychology and linguistics. Few have followed him all the way on this, 
and weaker versions have been developed. However, the idea of replace-
ment has re-emerged in the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s pro-
gramme of eliminative materialism.
28. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions. At least to some extent, 
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Kuhn’s analysis continues to rely on a distinction between the ‘internal’ 
rationality of a science and the ‘non-scientifi c’ factors that can and do 
shape it, and which can intervene decisively at times of crisis. This is a 
distinction that Foucault does not accept as fundamental. The point is 
discussed on p. 123.
29. Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, cf. especially Book II, and 
Serres, The Birth of Physics.
30. The second in the series of Hermes volumes that Serres published is sub-
titled L’interférence.
31. Serres, Le Système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques, pp. 10–11. 
Descartes and the majority of the rationalist tradition have left us with the 
idea of linearity as the only acceptable form of rational relation, but Serres 
draws from Leibniz that rationality can also be embodied in the network, 
the fabric, or embroidery. This does not mean that there is a single pattern 
either unfolding or repeated across all areas, but rather that in each region 
one fi nds each point linked to most or all of the others. In this respect, 
observes Serres, Leibniz is not of his time, having instead more in common 
with the stoics and with our own epoch. The stoics proposed the inter-
connection of all things, and the concept of networks and complexity is 
characteristic of contemporary thinking.
32. Serres, Le Système de Leibniz, p. 65.
33. Serres, Le Système de Leibniz, p. 65.
34. Serres, The Birth of Physics.
35. Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe II, pp. 218–19. The fact that it 
escapes determination has led the philosophical tradition to look on the 
clinamen with some suspicion, not to say disdain, and to regard it as little 
more than an ad hoc hypothesis to bridge the gap between the infi nite 
uniform rain of atoms and the emergence of order. But the clinamen is 
neither an ad hoc principle nor the sign of a gap in our knowledge. While 
it is true that the clinamen falls below the threshold of measurement, this 
does not necessarily mean that there is a true physics waiting for improve-
ments in instrumental precision.
36. History is not the attempt to bring external events into the realm of 
memory, but rather the attempt to analyse memory as it occurs, external-
ised, in the conjunction of atoms (BP 148). By contrast, ‘the universal does 
not require any memory’, precisely because its law is absolute.
37. Cavaillès published Mèthode axiomatique et formalisme in 1938, but the 
theme of formalism remained a focal point of his thought in essays such as 
‘Mathématique et formalisme’, published posthumously in Revue interna-
tionale de philosophie in 1949, in an edition prepared by Canguilhem.
38. Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, p. 89.
39. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 172–3 and 215–21; 
Being and Time, p. 45.
40. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p. 3.
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C O M M E N T A R Y  O N  T H E  A R C H A E O L O G Y  O F 
K N O W L E D G E
 1. Cavaillès sets out his critique of Husserl in the third section of his essay 
‘On Logic and the Theory of Science’ (OC 473–560). For accounts of 
this reading, see Cassou-Noguès, De l’experience mathématique: essai 
sur la philosophie des sciences de J Cavaillès, pp. 282–308; Sinaceur, 
Jean Cavaillès Philosophie mathématique, pp. 84–124; Webb, ‘Cavaillès, 
Husserl and the Historicity of Science’.
 2. Mayr, What Evolution Is, p. 81.
 3. Cf. AK 212, 251. Note also that Foucault often contrasts his own approach 
to that of the Frankfurt School, where questions of legitimacy are central.
 4. The idea will be familiar to many from the account of paradigms as 
central to scientifi c inquiry introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure 
of Scientifi c Revolutions. See p. 125 for a discussion of issues relating to 
incommensurability.
 5. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic.
 6. Foucault returns to this question in the Conclusion (AK 226–7, 268). See 
also p. 154.
 7. The translation may be misleading here. It runs ‘one replaces the pure aims 
of non-contradiction in a complex network of conceptual compatibility 
and incompatibility’ (AK 69, 83), where ‘one replaces’ is a literal transla-
tion of the French ‘on replace’, which in this instance appears to denote an 
action of ‘placing back’ or ‘returning something to’. Thus ‘the pure aim of 
non-contradiction’ is placed back into a complex network of conceptual 
compatibility and incompatibility that includes many forms of relation 
besides that of simple contradiction. This may be more helpfully translated 
here as ‘one places back’.
 8. Serres, The Troubadour of Knowledge, p. xv.
 9. In a similar fashion, modalities of enunciation are described on the basis 
of the position occupied by the subject in relation to a domain of objects. 
Giving an example that does not precisely match the description, Foucault 
observes that, given the system of formation of objects in natural history 
in the eighteenth century, certain enunciative modalities are excluded and 
others implied. Similarly, given different enunciative modalities, certain 
coexistences of statements are excluded or required.
10. Bachelard, Les Intuitions atomistiques; cf. especially Chapter II, 
‘L’Atomisme réaliste’.
11. To the objection that statements can be seen and heard, and that they 
are therefore not ‘sub-phenomenal’ in the sense that an atom is, one can 
respond that it depends on what one takes as real, and where the threshold 
of visibility is placed; if one deals with objects, subjects, science, traditions 
and books, then the statement is invisible. In fact, statements and atoms 
have this in common: it is through regularities in their relations to one 
another that objects, concepts and subject positions are formed.
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12. Bachelard, Les Intuitions atomistiques, p. 125.
13. The published translation erroneously includes a negation here: ‘. . . are 
not constituted. . .’.
14. There is a mistranslation in the English text here. It runs: ‘A sentence 
cannot be non-signifi cant; it refers to something, by virtue of the fact that 
it is a statement.’ This would be better translated as: ‘Even though a sen-
tence may be meaningless (Une phrase a beau être non signifi ante), it refers 
(or is related to) something by virtue of the fact that it is a statement’ (AK 
102, 119).
15. Mathematics depends on demonstration, and not on an experience of 
certainty. Indeed, such an experience, for Cavaillès, represents the end of 
thinking. In this sense, we can see that for Cavaillès the future of math-
ematics is open and cannot be foreclosed by any form of subjective expe-
rience, however rigorously determined. Foucault would be of the same 
mind.
16. Foucault also uses the expressions ‘associated fi eld’ and ‘enunciative fi eld’ 
apparently interchangeably.
17. For an associated fi eld to have enough regularity to do the job of speci-
fi cation required, it must already be differentiated from the total fi eld of 
all statements. This could be taken to imply that there is another, still 
unacknowledged, layer of the account that explains how associated fi elds 
emerge, which would lead to an uncomfortable regression. However, the 
point has already been covered by the idea that the prediscursive is itself 
discursive (see p. 84).
18. Heidegger, Being and Time, §34.
19. HI 11, and Serres, The Troubadour of Knowledge, pp. 21–2.
20. The account of construction that Cavaillès gives, above all in ‘Transfi ni et 
continu’, is instructive in this respect. Even within the unity of the history 
of mathematics that is a non-negotiable condition for Cavaillès, there is a 
pull towards temporal pluralism. Moreover, the concept itself has tempo-
ral characteristics, rather than being an ideal structure that participates in 
a temporal process (synthesis). See Sinaceur, Jean Cavaillès: Philosophie 
Mathématique, p. 117. However, the most signifi cant precedent for the 
way that time works in The Archaeology of Knowledge is the work of 
Serres, which contains many re-workings of the idea of temporal pluralism 
in an unbounded material process. See for example, Serres, Genesis, pp. 
115–17.
21. Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p. 148.
22. Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p. 149.
23. Foucault also puts the converse question: is the account of discursive for-
mations presented earlier actually dealing with statements? This is impor-
tant because if it is not, then his earlier work will appear to have been 
developed on the basis of a sense of the statement that he now, on careful 
refl ection, has found to be inadequate.
24. To express this here, I’ve used the notion of regularity from Serres’ reading 
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of atomism in The Birth of Physics, but a similar point could be made in 
relation to Cavaillès’ understanding of the historical dimension of math-
ematics, where the rules for the formation of mathematical objects are 
themselves the outcome of a recursive historical process.
25. See p. 46 and p. 157.
26. Foucault refers to Serres’ use of the idea of recurrence in his Introduction 
to The Archaeology of Knowledge (AK 5, 11), and does so again in the 
fi nal chapter, ‘Science and Knowledge’ (AK 209, 248). Serres writes about 
recurrence and the history of mathematics in the chaper ‘Les Anamnèses 
Mathématiques’ in HI, especially pp. 94–104. Bachelard had written 
about recurrence in history before him, in L’activité rationaliste de la phy-
sique contemporaine, pp. 26–8.
27. One could see this idea of ‘recurrence’ as simply refl ecting the fact that 
historical events can be reinterpreted in many ways, and thereby tied in 
to different versions of the past, but such a reading would be compatible 
with the existence of a ‘real’ chain of events concealed beneath a variety of 
appearances.
28. Serres, Conversations on Science Culture and Time, pp. 60–1.
29. This is not to suggest that Foucault saw himself as acting alone to open 
up new possibilities for the future of thinking. There were precedents, and 
some of these are outlined in Part A above.
30. In Hermes I, Serres, who was in turn following Bachelard, called for 
a new form of epistemology combining the formal rigour of the math-
ematical sciences with an analysis of historical life that addresses what 
has been treated as the symbolic world of cultural meaning. This pro-
posal is set out in the Introduction, which has the sub-title ‘The Network 
of Communication: Penelope’, referring to the myth in which Penelope 
weaves and unweaves the burial shroud she pretends to be making for 
the long-departed Odysseus, thereby holding off her suitors. The process 
of weaving and unweaving of networks of communication becomes for 
Serres the condition of time. Many years later, he describes time as a 
‘patchwork’ through which redundancy passes, fl uctuating between dis-
order and rigid formalisation (Genesis, pp. 116–17). On Serres’ call for 
the marriage of mathematical thought and historical analysis, see Webb, 
‘Michel Serres: From the History of Mathematics to Critical History’ in 
Herzogenrath, Bernd Time and History in Deleuze and Serres, pp. 68–86.
31. Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, p. 89.
32. Foucault writes: ‘In trying to play the game of a rigorous description of 
the statements themselves, it became apparent to me that the domain 
of statements did obey formal laws, that, for example, one could fi nd a 
single theoretical model for different epistemological domains; and in 
this sense one could conclude that there was an autonomy of discourses. 
But there is nothing to be gained from describing this autonomous layer 
of discourses unless one can relate it to other layers, practices, institu-
tions, social relations, political relations, and so on.’ ‘On the Ways of 
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Writing History’, in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology 1954–1984, p. 
284.
33. Given Foucault’s closeness to Bachelard, it is no surprise that this position 
refl ects that of Bachelard more than that of Bergson.
34. Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p. 284.
35. Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p. 283.
36. Serres, Genesis, pp. 116–17.
37. Cf. Phillipe Sabot, ‘Archéologie du savoir et histoire des sciences. Y a-t-il 
un “style Foucault” en épistemologie?’ in Cassou-Noguès, Le concept le 
sujet et la science, pp. 109–24.
38. Cf. HI 94, but also the whole section leading up to it.
39. Bachelard: ‘Life is strictly contemporaneous with material transformations 
and impossible without their unceasing help, without the interplay of 
assimilation and dissimilation . . . When life is successful, it is made of well-
ordered times.’ The Dialectic of Duration, Chapter 8, ‘Rhythmanalysis’, 
p. 44.
40. Lucretius: ‘For once your reason, born of mind divine / Starts to proclaim 
the nature of the world / The terrors of the mind fl ee all away, / The walls 
of heaven open, and through the void / Immeasurable, the truth of things 
I see’. On the Nature of the Universe, Book 3, 14–17.
41. Blanchot, ‘Literature and the Right to Death’, in The Station Hill Blanchot 
Reader, pp. 359–99.
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